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Preface 
The title of this study is somewhat paradoxical. "Wayward Liberal" 
conjures up images of the agnostic, whereas Donald Richberg's 
story is that of a persistent faithfulness to outdated concepts of 
liberalism rather than a turning away to something new. True, the 
usual stereotype of Richberg is that of the old Progressive turned 
conservative, of the "traitor" to organized labor who defected to big 
business. Yet the real paradox is to be found in the ever-changing 
meaning of liberalism itself. The problem was that after the New 
Deal of Franklin Roosevelt liberalism came to mean something 
different than it had in the days of the Progressives of 1912, but 
Richberg refused to trade the old liberalism for the new. Even in 
his later reputedly conservative years, he privately felt that his views 
were essentially consistent with his youthful identification with the 
Progressives, and in many respects he was correct. Though after 
the 1930s Richberg superficially gave the appearance of having 
changed, the reality was that he had not. The words liberal and 
progressive no longer described what Richberg stood for because 
they had taken on a new meaning. 
Attempting to locate Donald Richberg in the American reform 
tradition raises a difficult problem of definition. For much of this 
study, I shall speak of Richberg's ideological and political position 
in terms of specific ideas and programs. But it will at times be 
necessary to use such overworked categories as "liberal," "progres-
ix 
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sive," and "conservative." Such generalizations, of course, are im-
precise, yet language would be unduly cumbersome without them. 
The problem can be partly resolved by agreeing at the outset on 
how these terms will be used, even though these definitions may 
be arbitrary to some degree. 
The term progressive will be used interchangeably with liberal. 
Both will denote sympathy for reform movements regardless of 
political party, and generally will indicate a receptivity to increased 
government activity and regulation of economic life within the con-
fines of the capitalist system. Both terms require the addition of a 
time dimension, for the emphasis on government intervention 
which they denote increased markedly after the New Deal, culmi-
nating in an idealization of the welfare state. The term Progressive, 
capitalized, will refer to the formal political party created in 1912 
by Theodore Roosevelt, or to the 1924 movement which nominated 
Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette, Sr., for president. Con-
servative will denote an identification with the business community 
and especially with the interests of its larger units, the corporations. 
It will carry with it such connotations as opposition to government 
regulation and to increased government activity, reluctance to ac-
knowledge organized labor as a factor in economic policymaking, 
and a general preference for the status quo. 
The problem of definition can never be completely solved, for 
the ideas and movements which terms represent are not static, so 
that they can only be understood relative to the context in which 
they are used. A constant awareness of the setting in which ideas 
emerge and evolve is thus necessary for an accurate interpretation 
of their meaning. 
Many people contributed to the successful conclusion of this 
project. In particular, I wish to thank David C. Mearns and the 
staff of the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress; Miss 
Elizabeth Drewry, director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 
and her assistants, librarian Joseph Marshall and archivists Jerome 
Deyo and Robert Parks; Archie Motley, manuscripts librarian of 
the Chicago Historical Society; Miss Ruth Davis of the State His-
torical Society of Wisconsin; and the many archivists and librarians 
at the National Archives in Washington, D. C.; the Federal Records 
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Center in Suitland, Md.; the Oral History Research Office of Co-
lumbia University; the Social Welfare History Archives of the 
University of Minnesota; and the University of Chicago Library. 
David A. Shannon of the University of Virginia, Robert Berkhofer, 
Jr., of the University of Wisconsin, Ralph F. de Bedts of Old Do-
minion University, and my former colleagues at the University of 
Minnesota, George Green and Clarke Chambers, provided me with 
the benefit of their critical comments. I owe a special debt of grati-
tude to E. David Cronon of the University of Wisconsin, under 
whose direction this study was initiated. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Making 
of a Progressive 
In his prime, Donald Richberg was once described as resembling 
"an amiable woodchuck"-tall and a bit chubby, yet surprisingly 
loose and agile, with an ever-ready smile and a glad hand.1 But be-
neath the easygoing exterior there was a studiously intense individ-
ual, one given to theorizing and moralizing about social and eco-
nomic problems, about matters of law and the Constitution, and 
about the ultimate questions of life itself. A man of soaring ambi-
tion, Richberg immersed himself in the world of big business, or-
ganized labor, and national politics. His work was his life, and his 
need for personal recognition and success prodded him on to higher 
and higher levels of achievement. 
In historical perspective, what draws attention to the political 
career of Donald Richberg is his reputation as an old progressive 
turned conservative. Gerald Johnson, reviewing Richberg's auto-
biography in 1954, classified him as a "played-out liberal" of a type 
known to Americans ever since Tom Paine and John Randolph. 
Others have reiterated this conclusion time and again.2 
Although historians have instinctively hit upon this puzzle as 
the most relevant question to ask about Richberg, their pet image 
of the "tired liberal" is not really a very illuminating answer. And 
so far, historians have said little about why Richberg became a 
liberal or progressive in the first place. Yet it is essential to deter-
mine the nature and content of his early progressivism before de-
3 
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ciding whether or how he moved away from it. The thesis pre-
sented here is that Richberg remained relatively immobile in 
ideology, at the level of abstract political theory, though not in his 
active life in the world of law and politics, where his fortunes were 
affected by his career-situation, his friendships and personal con-
nections, and his deep-seated need for personal recognition. 
On the surface, Richberg's public political loyalties appear very 
unstable. By stages he was a Theodore Roosevelt Progressive, a la-
bor lawyer representing the cautious ambitions of the railway un-
ions in the I92os, a New Dealer promoting the corporate-state 
ideals of the National Recovery Administration, and finally a prop-
agandist against organized labor and civil rights in the I 940s and 
I 95os. The apparent change in Rich berg was made all the more 
dramatic by the way in which he lost his old friends in the pro-
gressive camp and took up with new friends in the business world. 
Yet compared to his wavering loyalties in the world of active 
politics, Richberg's intellectual life was characterized by remark-
able consistency-even inflexibility. This reveals a great deal about 
the kinship between the progressives of I 9 I 2 and the conservatives 
of the I95os, and partly explains Richberg's new associations in his 
later career. Richberg continued to invoke the values of his youth 
even as the world around him moved on to a new concept of lib-
eralism, a concept most simply equated with the welfare state and 
an extension of government activities far beyond anything fore-
seen in I9I2. His apparent migration from left to right politically 
-using the scale of the I 95os-was due not only to factors pe-
culiar to himself, but more importantly to a metamorphosis in the 
meaning of liberalism over a fifty-year period. Liberalism at mid-
century did not mean the same thing as at the beginning of the cen-
tury. For example, the welfare state goals of Harry Truman's Fair 
Deal, though largely unrealized, were practically beyond the imagi-
1 Jonathan Mitchell, "Grand Vizier: Donald R. Richberg," New Republic 
82 (April24, 1935): 301. 
1 Reviews of My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Un-
heroic Life, by Donald Richberg: Gerald Johnson, New York Herald 
Tribune, Nov. 28, 1954; George Mowry, Saturday Review 37 (Nov. 6, 
1954): 21, 43; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., New York Times, Oct. 31, 1954· 
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nation of even the New Nationalists of Theodore Roosevelt with 
their belief in vigorous government and nationally defined purpose. 
The New Nationalist program appeared to assign a large role to 
government action only by the standards of the early 19oos, not by 
those of the post-New Deal world. The values of the progressives 
were closer to the nineteenth century than they were to the welfare 
state. Richberg's pilgrimage from the progressivism of his youth to 
the conservatism of his later years must be set against the whole 
background of developments in the meaning of liberalism generally; 
then, in a strictly intellectual sense, his movement may be inter-
preted as having been more apparent than real. After the 1 92os, 
liberalism evolved at a much quicker pace and in different direc-
tions than Donald Richberg. 
The fact remains, however, that Richberg's public activities-if 
not his ideology-did change dramatically in character over the 
years. Besides the evolution in the meaning of liberalism and Rich-
berg's own intellectual immobility, the personality factor must be 
accorded an important place in explaining his alignment with the 
conservatives of the 194os and I9)0S. It strongly influenced his 
life in active politics as distinguished from his theoretical political 
beliefs, though one reinforced the other. Outstanding among Rich-
berg's characteristics was an intense yearning for attention and sup-
port. Easily hurt by criticism and susceptible to flattery, he pos-
sessed great personal ambition and was frequently bothered by anx-
iety. He could be sly. Yet his friends and associates considered him 
a man of considerable charm; often he was the life of the party, 
and he genuinely enjoyed the part. 
All these traits made Richberg vulnerable to the influence of the 
people around him and made it difficult for him to hold out against 
their disapproval. This compelling need for acceptance gave other 
people a very real power over Donald Richberg, so that it made a 
difference who his friends were. As progressives and labor leaders 
became alienated by his failure to keep pace with the evolution of 
liberalism, their place was taken by leaders in the business commu-
nity, who reinforced Richberg's ideological immobility. This proc-
ess culminated in the New Deal. It was the New Deal and the 
growth of big government that eventually made apparent the dif-
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ferences between the old liberalism and the new liberalism. Rich-
berg served President Franklin Roosevelt as general counsel and 
later head of the National Recovery Administration, an agency 
dominated and staffed largely by the business community. Sur-
rounded by associates hostile to his liberal reputation, he felt com-
pelled to justify his prior connections with organized labor by lean-
ing over backwards to be fair to the business community. In the 
process, he created new friends in the business world while erod-
ing the loyalty of the liberal camp, which by then was rapidly re-
defining its programs and methods far beyond those of I 9 I 2 or of 
the I92os. Throughout, the personal factor reinforced the ideolog-
ical, for as Richberg's notion of liberalism failed to advance, the 
character of his supporters changed. The trend became so pro-
nounced that when Richberg returned to the private practice of 
law in I935, he no longer could rely on a labor clientele but in-
stead eventually joined one of Washington's leading firms dealing 
principally in corporation law. 
The New Deal, then, brought out the limitations inherent in 
Donald Richberg's understanding of liberalism and helped crystal-
lize his position. Until the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, 
the evolution of liberalism generally had not proceeded at such a 
pace as to move ahead of Richberg. In fact, his limitations were 
those of the old progressives of the early I 9oos as a whole. The 
commitment of many of them to reform, however fervent it might 
have been, hardly was so radical as to envision the welfare state 
and the immense federal bureaucracy that would be required to ad-
minister it. Ideological factions appear in every political movement, 
of course, but for most progressives, the assumptions of the com-
petitive system were accepted as given, so that the use of political 
power, even among those reformers who emphasized government 
planning and intervention, had as its objective simply the more ef-
ficient and humane functioning of a system regarded as fundamen-
tally desirable. Reform was a way of making capitalist values more 
viable by increasing-not displacing-opportunity, individualism, 
and competition. For many progressives, social welfare was to be a 
by-product of these virtues, and not the direct objective of the lib-
eral program. The middle-class background of so many of the na-
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tion's political leaders, regardless of party, undoubtedly permitted 
them to take such values for granted, and this class characteristic 
affected progressive leaders as much as those of a more conservative 
identification. 
Richberg himself emerged from just such a middle-class back-
ground, one that would have prepared him to have been a regular 
Republican or Democrat as easily as a Progressive. Though early in 
his career he decided to identify with the reform camp, this iden-
tification had about it all the moral fervor and earnestness of 
Victorian America and contained no serious challenge to the com-
petitive values that had placed his family in the comfortable cir-
cumstances which it enjoyed. Such a background had important 
consequences for how Richberg marked out the boundaries of lib-
eralism. Given those influences, it is not surprising that his early 
idea of reform was as much moral as it was political, and directed 
more against evil men than against a defective economic system. 
Grandfather Louis Richberg had immigrated to America from 
Germany in I85r. Of middle-class Lutheran stock, he established 
himself as a merchant in New York City and remained there until 
I854, when he moved his family to Chicago and set up a meat-
packing business. Richberg's father, John C. Richberg, attended 
Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois, and the United States Naval 
Academy during the Civil War. He read law in St. Louis and 
eventually entered into legal practice in Chicago. When he came 
into his inheritance in the early I88os, he moved the family to East 
Clinton, Tennessee, and spent two years trying to make a success 
of a zinc mining and smelting venture. The failure of this enter-
prise forced him to return to Chicago, where he eventually built a 
successful law practice representing individuals, corporations, and 
the Chicago City Treasurer and Board of Assessors. During the 
I87os, John Richberg served as a member and as president of the 
Chicago Board of Education and oversaw a reform program that 
included equal pay for men and women teachers and discontinu-
ance of Bible reading in the classroom. Later in his career he was 
interested in legal reform, especially divorce legislation (he him-
self had been divorced before marrying Richberg's mother), and in 
a movement to do away with local and state diversity in laws deal-
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ing with common problems. Governor John Peter Altgeld of Illinois 
appointed him to a commission to promote uniformity of legisla-
tion among the several states. 
The Richberg maternal heritage included a number of strong-
willed women who were not afraid to challenge accepted social and 
religious mores. Richberg's grandmother and mother were Ver-
monters and had family roots that went back to the Revolutionary 
War. Both women studied and practiced medicine, and each culti-
vated an interest in spiritualism. A militant suffragist, grandmother 
Marenda Briggs Randall was divorced by her husband on grounds 
of desertion in 1857. Richberg's mother, Eloise Randall Richberg, 
met his father while principal of the Clark School in Chicago. 
After her children were grown, she undertook the study of home-
opathy. When her husband objected to her practicing medicine 
upon the completion of her program of studies, they separated and 
were reunited only when John C. Richberg suffered a stroke in 
1909.• 
Neither of Donald Richberg's parents subscribed to an organ-
ized religion, and his own religious education was eclectic; they 
sent him to a number of different Sunday schools as a child. The 
result was that Richberg likewise never identified with a particular 
church, though his characteristic behavior was very much that of a 
moralizer. Depending on circumstances, Richberg could be exceed-
ingly self-righteous. In place of a formal religion, he developed an 
1 Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Un-
heroic Life (New York, I954), 8-I4, 29-3I; Richberg, Tents of the Mighty 
(New York, I93o), I4-I5, I8, 26; Richberg, "Memories for My Grand-
children," 2-4, and other memorabilia in the possession of Mrs. John H. 
Small m (formerly Mrs. Donald Richberg), Charlottesville, Va.; interview 
by the author with Mrs. John H. Small III, Charlottesville, Va., Jan. I I-12, 
I967; "Commission for the Promotion of Uniformity of Legislation in the 
United States," Chicago Legal News 26 (May 26, I894): 3I2; Mary 
Grace Canfield, "Dr. Marenda Briggs Randall," The Vermont Standard 
(Woodstock, Vt.), Aug. I5, I935; Eloise 0. Richberg, horoscope for Rich-
berg, June 1902, Donald Richberg Papers, Library of Congress, Box 5 I; 
obituary, Dr. Eloise Richberg, Hyde Park, Ill., Herald, Oct. 10, 1924; 
Richberg to John S. Lord, Nov. 23, 1943, in the possession of John S. 
Lord, Chicago. 
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ethical philosophy and a highly abstract concept of the spiritual 
world and, as he described it, viewed the "Guiding Power of the 
Universe" as "inchoate" and as having "no sense of personality 
about it." His mother's ideas about spiritualism fascinated him, so 
that he maintained a lifetime interest in the subject. Although 
Richberg shunned any loyalty to organized religion, he shared 
many of its ideals, but saw a more rational approach as the way to 
realize them. For Richberg, the social sciences would provide the 
key to improving man's lot, not formal religion. Yet the rational 
content of his ethical system did not eliminate the moralizing style 
of thought and action of a man who, after all, was born and raised 
in the Victorian Age. Despite his analytical approach to ethics, 
Richberg's values were shaped by his background perhaps more 
than he realized.4 
There was little, however, in Richberg's early growth to indicate 
the depth of his future commitment to reform rather than some 
other brand of politics. Writing his memoirs years later, Richberg 
recalled that he was young for his age in school and therefore often 
felt himself an outsider. In time, he compensated for this feeling of 
inferiority by a concerted involvement in extracurricular activities, 
an involvement which by the time of college was so total that it al-
most cost him his bachelor's degree from the University of Chi-
cago. Richberg allocated his limited academic energies mainly to 
courses in English, history and anthropology. He frankly ad-
mitted that his objective was to study only what interested him and 
to take courses that would not require much work or interfere with 
his outside activities. He never did any formal course work in po-
litical science, economics, or other subjects that later would be the 
substance of his mature intellectual interests. As Richberg recalled 
his undergraduate days at Chicago, "We are not exactly molly-
4 Interview with Mrs. John H. Small m, Jan. 11-12, 1967; Richberg, 
"I have a faith ... ," ca. 1915, and "If there is in your heart an abound-
ing faith. • . ," n.d., Richberg Papers, L.c., Boxes 5 and 8; Richberg, 
Tents, 222-32. In addition, see Richberg, A Man of Purpose (New York, 
1922), 9-10, 239, for an autobiographical sketch of his religious upbringing 
as represented by the main character of the novel, Rodney Merrill, and for 
an exact copy of Richberg's early statement of religious beliefs as cited here. 
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coddles and no professor ever called us 'grinds.'" He barely grad-
uated with his class in 1901, doing so only by the grace of the fac-
ulty, which waived a special requirement imposed on students such 
as Richberg who had cut chapel services and lectures too many 
times.G 
In accordance with his father's wishes, Richberg entered Har-
vard Law School in the fall of 1901, but his years at Harvard 
proved to be a repeat performance of his undergraduate days. Rich-
berg did not look forward to the practice of law, especially in 
partnership with a domineering father, as was the family's expecta-
tion. He never developed any enthusiasm for his studies nor ap-
plied himself scholastically beyond what he later described as 
"something less than average.'06 
What Richberg was really dreaming about throughout his under-
graduate and law school days was a literary career. He spent a large 
part of his time working on plays, short stories, poetry, and essays, 
but his efforts failed to attract any attention from outside college 
circles at the time. These interests brought Richberg together with 
his first wife, Elizabeth Herrick; she was the sister of Robert Her-
rick, author and professor at the University of Chicago. They were 
married in December 1903, during Richberg's final year of law 
school. Both had literary ambitions, and Richberg was tempted to 
abandon his law studies and take a full-time position as a reporter 
for a New York newspaper. But marriage made such dreams un-
realistic, for as the head of a household Richberg required a more 
substantial income than journalism or the theater offered. Conse-
quently, he was forced to rescue his flagging law studies by a mas-
sive cramming session in May 1904 and once again barely sue-
8 Richberg, My Hero, x6-19; Richberg, Tents, 12; Richberg, "Memories 
for My Grandchildren," 5-9; H. P. Judson to William Rainey Harper 
[May-June 1901]; Harper to James H. Tufts, May 21, 1901; Tufts to 
Harper, June 7, 1901, The Presidents' Papers, ca. 1889-1925, University 
of Chicago Library, Donald Richberg folder. 
8 Richberg, My Hero, 19-20; Richberg, "Memories for My Grandchil-
dren," 8-9. See also Harvard Law School, Annual Examinations, June 
1903, Record of D. R. Richberg," Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 51; Richberg's 
average grade for his second year of law was a C. 
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ceeded in saving his degree. In July 1904 a reluctant Donald Rich-
berg entered into partnership with his father in Chicago.7 
The first years of law practice proved to be all that Richberg had 
dreaded. Faced with the routine tasks assigned to fledgling law-
yers, he found little that appealed to him in what he later recalled 
as long days of studying, wrangling, and worrying over "a thou-
sand petty questions of no real importance." For Richberg, these 
were "meaningless years of groping," lost in the "fog of an un-
certain purpose." Four months after joining his father's firm, he 
confessed to William Rainey Harper, president of the University 
of Chicago, "Law is ... my livelihood and not my ambition."8 
A number of factors were of special importance in drawing 
Richberg out of this miasma and sparking his interest in reform 
politics. Among the more important were his perception of what 
the practice of law was really like and what it implied for his self-
respect, and the contrast between his business life and his social 
life. Of course, given Richberg's outgoing personality and the in-
volvement of his father's firm in corporation law and city politics, 
it was likely that he would have been caught up in Chicago politi-
cal life anyway, but there were other factors that helped deter-
mine the nature of his involvement. They help explain why he 
identified with the reformers rather than with the regular party 
politicians. 
Richberg's initial response to the practice of law was unfavora-
ble. The seamy side of business and politics was starkly apparent 
after life in Cambridge. The Richberg firm's representation of the 
Chicago City Treasurer and Board of Assessors gave him an inside 
view of municipal politics, but he was not attracted by what he 
saw. Equally repugnant was the idea of serving some of the firm's 
business clients. 
Richberg's social life added to his frustrations. He and his wife 
Elizabeth lived in the vicinity of the University of Chicago. Rich-
1 Richberg, My Hero, 20, 207-10; Richberg, "Memories for My Grand-
children," 1 1-1 2; Rich berg, Miscellaneous plays, articles, songs, and poetry, 
Richberg Papers, L.a., Boxes 5, 28-3o, 32. 
8 Richberg, Tents, 20-21; [Richberg] to Harper, Oct. 20, I 904, Richberg 
Papers, L.a., Box I. 
12 THE WAYWARD LIBERAL 
berg was a member of the Quadrangle Club and the University 
Club and moved easily in university social circles. Often he played 
tennis with Nobel Prize winners Robert Millikan and Albert Mich-
elson, or went partying with such literary luminaries as Robert 
Herrick, his wife's brother, or Robert Morss Lovett and William 
Vaughn Moody. 
What might have been a stimulating intellectual atmosphere 
proved at the social level quite irritating to Richberg. Later he re-
membered his university friends as intelligent, highly motivated 
people, but described their social life as "a superficial sort of exist-
ence." It was merely relaxation. Both Richberg, with his longstand-
ing passion for writing and his insider's view of city politics, and 
his wife, with her love of literature and the theater, fitted in well 
enough. But Richberg felt that his friends were moving ahead in 
their professions while he was not. For them, socializing was a 
brief respite from a steady advance in more important pursuits. 
Years later Richberg would recall how "after the relaxation of a 
hilarious evening, I went back to a dusty office full of dusty prob-
lems in which I had little interest beyond a natural desire to do a 
good job and earn a decent fee." 
Richberg's wife was of little help in his search for direction and 
purpose. Having decided that she had no talent for acting and 
having given up a possible career as a newspaperwoman, she 
sought refuge in the very entertainments that exacerbated Rich-
berg's sense of frustration. Her continual demands for partying and 
theater-going made him all the more aware of the aimlessness of 
these early years of law practice. The resulting antagonism would 
lead to divorce in 1915. For now, Richberg only wanted to use his 
spare time for more serious pursuits than what he would later re-
member as nights of "smoking and drinking and dancing and eat-
ing and singing and wasting time in all sorts of pleasant ways." 
What Richberg wanted from his wife was moral support for his 
own ambitions, not demands for attention on her part. 
It was the very starkness of the contrast between his business 
life and his social life which finally mobilized Richberg and led 
him into reform politics. What he saw happening in the down-
town offices of lawyers and businessmen seemed unimportant com-
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pared with what was going on in Professor Michelson's physics 
laboratory or in Charles E. Merriam's political science classes. His 
work seemed sordid beside that of his university friends. Not sur-
prisingly, Richberg's first avenue of escape was in writing. But what 
began as escape ended in reform politics.9 
Writing provided Richberg with an outlet for his indignation 
against the alleged evils he confronted in the day-to-day practice 
of law. It helped him clarify his ideas about law as a profession and 
his place in it. Throughout his life, Richberg turned to his own ex-
periences as sources of literary inspiration. His serious efforts, 
whether they were treatises destined only for the eyes of other mem-
bers of the legal guild or whether they were articles for popular 
consumption, always reflected his current interests in law or poli-
tics. Even in his lighter writing, he usually made his novels and 
stories serve a more serious purpose than simple entertainment. 
Richberg's writing usually taught a lesson or contained a moral, 
even at the cost of interfering with the plot. Sometimes he would 
slip into the essay form in the middle of a story; characters fre-
quently gave orations on love, law, economics, or conventional 
moralities. Writing for Richberg was a way of blowing off steam 
generated either in his work or in his personal life. 
As a consequence, Richberg's discontent with his profession 
manifested itself in explicit terms. In the October 1909 issue of 
The Atlantic Monthly, for example, he published a critique of the 
legal guild which clearly articulated his sense of personal frustra-
tion with being-as he saw it-the paid hireling of clients looking 
for someone to invent "legal sophistries ... to justify any sort of 
conduct." Instead, he argued that the lawyer could not leave ethical 
considerations to his clients, relying on them to pursue good over 
evil and merely effecting their objectives like a blameless, amoral 
robot. The lawyer was not simply a lowly employee but a member 
of a profession and an officer of the court. As such, he had the 
duty to exercise independent judgment in the interest of the gen-
eral welfare. The lawyer was not "a mere business man." Richberg 
11 Richberg, My Hero, 29-31, 210-11; Richberg, Tents, 13-25, 214-19; 
interview with Mrs. John H. Small m, Jan. 11-12, 1967. The quotations 
are from Tents, 20-21, and My Hero, 211. 
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would accept no lesser status for the profession and, by implica-
tion, for himself .10 
Richberg's views were hardly notable for their originality, and 
this lack of newness characterized most of his writing for the rest 
of his life. His literary talent lay in his ability to articulate and 
synthesize much of what people around him were thinking. He 
was a skilled popularizer and propagandist. His critique of the trust 
problem, for example, was typical muckraking. Dozens of essays, 
short stories, and even novels such as The Shadow Men published 
in I9I I and In the Dark published in I9I2 became the vehicles 
of his moral indignation and of his proposals for institutional reform. 
Yet like many muckrakers, his assessment of the corporation and its 
alleged evils represented no challenge to the essential characteris-
tics of the economic system which he criticized. In fact, he de-
scribed the corporate form of business organization as "part and 
parcel of a splendid and tremendous commercial development." 
Far from proposing any radical changes in American business in-
stitutions, Richberg's purpose in publicizing corporate evils and 
proposing reform was to protect, not destroy, the corporations by 
insuring that "their activities will not arouse the popular condem-
nation under which they are at present laboring."11 
Not all Richberg's literary efforts were polemics. He was capa-
ble of engaging in writing simply for its own sake. On balance, 
though, a strong moralizing tone dominated most of his fiction and 
drama as well as his essays. He wrote because he enjoyed it, but 
the tensions of his business and personal life demanded an outlet, 
and proselytizing almost invariably crept into his work. 
Consequently, writing itself became an important catalyst in ac-
tivating Richberg's interest in reform politics. In later years, he saw 
10 Richberg, "The Lawyer's Function," The Atlantic Monthly 104 (Oct. 
1909): 489-92; Richberg, Tents, 22-23. 
11 Richberg, The Shadow Men (Chicago, 191 1); Richberg, In the Dark 
(Chicago, 19 I 2); Rich berg, Miscellaneous articles, mss. of novels, and short 
stories, Richberg Papers, L.c., Boxes 5, 9, 32; Richberg, "Why Should Not 
Corporations Be Imprisoned?" and "The Imprisonment of Criminal Corpo-
rations," both in The Imprisonment of Criminal Corporations, Aug. 1907, 
3-9, 20-32, pamphlet in Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 5· The quotations are 
from "The Imprisonment of Criminal Corporations," 32. 
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The Shadow Men, one of his novels indicting contemporary busi-
ness practices, as having had a specific role in developing his bud-
ding progressivism: "To begin with, I had to give up my games 
and parties and lots of good times in order to write. This helps one 
develop a martyr complex, which every reformer should have in 
some degree." More important was his observation that "writing 
down an incoherent revolt tends to strengthen it and make it real-
if it is soundly based."12 
A number of factors, then, all came together in Donald Rich-
berg to create a blend of moral concern, personal anger, and self-
righteousness which provided some of the motive power behind his 
progressivism: his middle-class background and Victorian moral-
ity; the shock of returning from Harvard to the practice of law in 
Chicago and the apparent end of his dreams of a literary career; 
the state of the legal profession; the contrast between his business 
life and his social life; the apparent professional success of his uni-
versity friends; his wife's demands for attention and her failure 
to provide moral support; and his tendency to nurse all these griev-
ances in the privacy of his own literary world. This is not to sug-
gest that Richberg's reformism was a delusion or that there were 
no evils in twentieth-century America that needed changing, but 
simply to say that his assessment of his personal and professional 
situation provided him with a heightened receptivity to progres-
sivism. The tensions that Richberg encountered, it is true, could 
have been dealt with in several different ways besides becoming 
a progressive. The results might have been very different-per-
haps a Babbitt or an introvert instead of a crusading reformer. Fur-
thermore, such tensions are present in all men to some degree. And 
despite Richberg's preoccupation with the status of his profession, 
it is a truism that a sense of individual worth is essential to the 
normal personality. 
Richberg's response to the seeming pointlessness of his social life 
and the apparent evils he found in the world of law and business 
was appropriate from both a psychological and an objective his-
torical standpoint. Psychologically, reform was to prove a way for 
Richberg to give greater meaning to his existence and to end the 
12 Richberg, Tents, 24-25. 
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aimlessness of his early career. Objectively, the evils that he saw 
were real enough and it would take a mature personality to be 
moved to do something about them rather than simply to shrink 
from becoming involved. The easier resolution of Richberg's prob-
lem would have been to go along with the status quo, but he did 
not choose to do so. Since personality has both an emotional and 
a rational dimension, a satisfactory explanation of Richberg's iden-
tification with reform can only be achieved by somehow encom-
passing both. Reform did serve a personal need for Richberg, but 
it was likewise a logical response to objective conditions as he per-
ceived them in his professional life. It was this coincidence between 
the rational and the emotional which created a commitment to pub-
lic service in Richberg which was to endure throughout his career. 
CHAPTER II 
The Anxious Reformer 
Richberg's first taste of political activity came within a year after 
he joined his father's law firm-in the 1905 Chicago mayoralty 
campaign. In this and succeeding contests, he consistently lined up 
with the city's independents on such issues as traction franchises, 
utility rate regulation, municipal ownership of public utilities, cor-
ruption in city administration, and the other perennial problems 
of American municipal government at the tum of the century. 
Richberg was one of the younger members of a group of future 
Progressive party leaders which included Harold Ickes, Jane Ad-
dams, Raymond Robins, Charles E. Merriam, and Medill McCor-
mick.1 
It was not until the end of the first decade of the twentieth 
century, however, that it became clear that the progressive spirit 
was crystallizing into a national political movement. Men such as 
former President Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Robert Marion 
La Follette of Wisconsin encouraged the trend. In their attempts 
to take over leadership of the movement, they helped bring a cer-
tain degree of coherence to the diversity of independent political 
organizations, like Chicago's, which had been evolving at the city 
and state levels since the late nineteenth century. Concrete evi-
dence that the movement had attained national proportions came 
in the 1910 congressional elections. Progressive and independent 
candidates made sufficient inroads into the two major political 
parties to throw control of the House of Representatives to the 
Democrats for the first time in sixteen years; in the Senate, pro-
gressive Republicans held the balance of power, and the Old Guard 
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leadership had to rely on them to maintain a Republican majority. 
Chicago was swept along by these currents, so that 1911 found 
its independent political elements fielding a mayoral candidate 
based on the progressive sentiment that had been growing in the 
city since the turn of the century. The independents coalesced 
behind Charles E. Merriam, professor of political science at the 
University of Chicago. In a short time on the city council, Mer-
riam had built a reputation as a vigorous opponent of machine poli-
tics and corruption in government. His campaign was managed 
by Harold L. Ickes, one of Chicago's leading independents and 
a future secretary of the interior under President Franklin Roose-
velt. The reformers planned to challenge the incumbent mayor, 
Fred A. Busse, a machine politician, in the Republican primaries. 
Chicago independents were still operating within the framework 
of the two-party system, though by the end of the campaign some 
such as Richberg were to have reservations about this strategy. For 
Chicago, the 191 I mayoralty contest was to be the catalyst of the 
city's organized Progressive party. 
Much to the surprise of the regular party organization, Merriam 
won the Republican nomination over two other candidates after 
Busse withdrew from the race. As leader of the Merriam anti-
machine campaign in the primaries, however, Ickes found it diffi-
cult to work with the regular party organization after his candidate 
had won the nomination, so that winning the election proved to 
be another matter. Merriam narrowly missed a victory over Carter 
H. Harrison, Jr., a popular Democrat who had been mayor four 
times prior to 1905. The independents were convinced that the 
regular Republicans had worked against Merriam as a way of de-
stroying the progressive wing of the party, even though he was 
their official mayoral candidate. As Rich berg told Merriam, "Your 
defeat was to be laid to your supposed political allies and not to 
your supposed opponents." He urged that "one of two things must 
be done by the men in this town who believe it is worth while to 
1 Donald Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an E1lentful 
but Unheroic Life (New York, 1954), 26-29; Harold L. Ickes, The Auto-
biography of a Curmudgeon (New York, 1943), 89-1 14; Chicago Ex-
aminer, April I, 1907. 
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fight for better government; either clean up one of the political 
parties or form a new party." After the apparent betrayal of the 
mayoralty contest, Richberg was among those prepared to take 
the latter course. For the time being, though, Chicago's independ-
ents under the guidance of Harold Ickes set up a small executive 
committee, incorporated as the Progressive-Republican League of 
Illinois, to keep their ranks intact until the next round.2 
In 1912, before the presidential campaign, the backers of the 
Progressive-Republican League made yet another attempt to pene-
trate the regular Republican party machinery by running candi-
dates in the April state and county primaries. Richberg agreed to 
seek the nomination for state's attorney, the office of prosecutor for 
Cook County; he had not previously considered running for office, 
but yielded to a draft in order to support the progressive effort. 
But once again, the reformers found the regular party organiza-
tion unresponsive; the progressive slate went down to defeat and 
Richberg ran sixth in a field of nine.3 
Yet later in the spring as the preconvention presidential cam-
paign drew nearer, many Chicago progressives forgot the setbacks 
suffered in the local and state primaries and turned to a new drive 
to win the Republican nomination for Theodore Roosevelt. They 
were soon caught up in a successful campaign to pass a presiden-
tial primary law in their state, a move that eventually led to Roose-
velt's winning the Illinois delegation to the Republican national 
convention! William Howard Taft's grip on the Republican party, 
however, was too strong for even Roosevelt to break, so that when 
the president won renomination, Roosevelt bolted the Republican 
2 Richberg, My Hero, 36-37; Richberg, Tents of the Mighty (New York, 
1930), 25-26; Ickes, Curmudgeon, r 17-44, 148; Charles E. Merriam, 
Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics (New York, 1929), 281-
87; Richberg to Merriam, April 5, 191 r, Charles E. Merriam Papers, Uni-
versity of Chicago Library, Box 21; Ickes to William Draper Lewis, Jan. 
27, 1919, Harold L. Ickes Papers, Library of Congress, Box 8. 
3 Ickes, Curmudgeon, 148-51; Richberg, My Hero, 38-39; Richberg, 
Tents, 25-27; Chicago Tribune, Feb. 8, I6, I7, I9, 2I, March 4, I3, I7, 26, 
29, April 7> IO, I I, I9I2. 
4 Ickes, Curmudgeon, I58-6o; Ickes to Lewis, Jan. 27, I919, Ickes 
Papers, Box 8. 
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convention and created the new Progressive party to back his can-
didacy. At last, the diverse groups of reformers and independents 
in Chicago and around the country had a national political organi-
zation. 
Like many Illinois Progressives, Richberg was swept along by 
the enthusiasm for Roosevelt. The commitment of his friends un-
doubtedly strengthened his own involvement in the campaign, es-
pecially since Richberg initially had no liking for Roosevelt per-
sonally, though he supported his program. But in a short time, the 
excitement of the campaign made Richberg into a dedicated fol-
lower with a total commitment-to the man as well as his plat-
form.5 
Richberg's part in the Progressive campaign, once the party had 
decided to run not only a national but a state and county ticket 
in the fall general elections in Illinois, typified what was to become 
his characteristic role in various future reform movements. With 
one other lawyer, Edward B. Burling, Richberg was placed in 
charge of all Progressive party litigation involved in securing a 
place for the party's candidates on the Illinois ballot.6 
This was the beginning of Richberg's role as one of the leading 
technicians in the service of reform for the next several decades. 
Owing to personal embarrassments-his two divorces in 1915 and 
1924-Richberg considered himself ineligible on practical grounds 
to aspire to an elective office; he had sought the Republican nomi-
nation for state's attorney in 1912 and would seek election to the 
Cook County Circuit Court in 19 r 5, but thereafter felt that his 
private difficulties rendered any future effort futile. 7 Yet identify-
ing with reform causes fulfilled keenly felt psychic and intellec-
tual needs for Richberg; he could not simply ignore their demand 
for an outlet. Reform provided him with a chance to employ his tal-
ents as a lawyer in a way that would safeguard his self-respect. It 
offered an opportunity to restore the legal profession to what he 
5 Richberg, My Hero, 44-46; Richberg, Tents, 31-34. 
6 Richberg, My Hero, 46-47; Richberg, Tents, 36-37; Richberg to Theo-
dore Roosevelt, Nov. 19, 1912, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Con-
gress, Series 1, Box 2 3 1. 
7 Richberg, My Hero, 38-39, 70, 137-38, 207-14, 218-19. 
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regarded as its rightful place as arbiter of the public good and 
brought an excitement to the practice of law that he never felt in 
the service of private clients. Though he considered himself un-
acceptable as a candidate for elective office, Richberg found the 
role of the behind-the-scenes technician equally satisfying; he could 
provide essential services to the Progressive party and to future 
liberal causes, while at the same time finding personal fulfillment 
in service of a quasi-public nature. As a lawyer, he had the ex-
pertise needed for writing political platforms and for translating 
the ideas of the party leadership into workable proposals. The very 
profession that he had once despised was to provide Richberg with 
a way to participate in the kind of undertaking which he found 
personally and intellectually satisfying.8 
Despite their work on the Progressive party's legal problems, 
Richberg and Burling were not sanguine about the party's chances 
at the polls, especially in view of the nomination of Woodrow 
Wilson by the Democrats.9 The Republicans were divided and the 
Democrats were running a candidate chosen from their own pro-
gressive wing. Yet Wilson's victory was not enough to put an end 
to the new movement or to Richberg's hopes for its eventual success 
-at least for the moment. Many like Richberg regarded the Pro-
gressive party as the true guardian of liberalism. They believed 
that the Democratic party, presumably dominated by urban bosses 
and Southern conservatives, could not possibly sustain a reform 
image, however earnest Wilson's intentions; its victory was to be 
attributed simply to the Republican-Progressive split. The inevita-
ble Democratic failure would clear the way for the triumph of the 
Progressive party. 
In Richberg's case, such hopes were the function of personal 
8 See Richberg, "Memories for My Grandchildren," 17, unpublished 
manuscript in the possession of Mrs. John H. Small III (formerly Mrs. 
Donald R. Richberg), Charlottesville, Va.; Richberg, "Legislative Ref-
erence Bureaus for Political Parties," Proceedings of the American Political 
Science Association at Its Tenth Annual Meeting, Supplement to the Ameri-
can Political Science Review 8 (Feb. 1914): 222-33; Richberg, "The 
Lawyer's Function," The Atlantic Monthly 104 (Oct. 1909): 489-92. 
11 Richberg, My Hero, 47-49. 
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need as well as of an assessment of the political realities. What re-
form activity had done for him personally was to transform the 
practice of law from a petty service for private interests into a 
service enhanced by the public interest. The law had thus taken 
on greater meaning, a meaning which overcame his early disillu-
sion with political morality and which had definite implications 
for his future career. For his own psychic security and in light of 
his evaluation of the state of the legal profession, Richberg found 
it congenial to believe in the future of the Progressive party and 
his place in it. 
In fact, I9I3 saw Richberg turn full time to the work of the 
Progressive party. He joined the newly created Progressive Na-
tional Service in New York City as director of its Legislative Refer-
ence Bureau, a post which he held until the virtual demise of the 
Service in the spring of I9I4· The Service had been authorized in 
December I 9 I 2 by a conference of Progressive leaders meeting in 
Chicago for a postmortem on the presidential election. The idea 
behind the project was to create an organization separate from the 
office-seeking political machinery to serve as the party's educational 
arm and legislative reference bureau. As such, the Service repre-
sented an attempt to put Progressive ideals into action and was well 
suited to rationalizing Richberg's commitment to the legal pro-
fession. Its principal work would be to prepare model legislation 
for Progressive congressmen and state legislators and propaganda 
for popular consumption. Hopefully, it would bring impartial sci-
entific knowledge rather than self-interest to bear on policymaking 
and took as its model Charles McCarthy's Legislative Reference 
Library in the State of Wisconsin.10 
George Perkins, chairman of the Progressive party's National 
10 Richberg, "Legislative Reference Bureaus for Political Parties," 222-
33i Frances A. Kellor, The Progressive Service of the National Progressive 
Party ([New York], Jan. 25, 1913), pamphlet in Donald Richberg Papers, 
Library of Congress, Box 41; S. J. Duncan-Clark, The Progressive Movement 
(Boston, 1913), 302-16; Richberg, My Hero, 50-55; Richberg, Tents, 40-
48; Edward A. Fitzpatrick, McCarthy of Wisconsin (New York, 1944), 67-
69; Progressive Party, National Committee, Minutes, Dec. I I, I 9 I 2, 
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series I 3d. 
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Executive Committee, and William Draper Lewis, dean of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School and chairman of the Leg-
islative Reference Committee charged with setting up the Bureau, 
initially hoped to engage McCarthy himself. McCarthy, however, 
felt that he had built too large a stake in Wisconsin to risk leaving 
it unprotected. A deteriorating money situation further impeded 
the Legislative Reference Committee's search, and the Bureau 
existed solely on a makeshift basis until March 1913, when Rich-
berg was hired. The decision to turn to Richberg came after a long 
and unsuccessful search to find someone of greater experience in 
legislative reference work, but with McCarthy out of the running, 
that proved impossible. Although Richberg had given yeoman serv-
ice in the I 9 I 2 campaign, he had had no experience in the tasks 
assigned to the Legislative Reference Bureau. Yet by March he 
was the most acceptable lawyer the Progressives could obtain.11 
Richberg's personal situation made him eager to participate in 
the experiment, but his New York experiences proved to be less 
than a vindication of the lawyer's role in policymaking. Though 
occasionally receiving advice and suggestions from Lewis's Legis-
lative Reference Committee, Rich berg was limited in what he could 
do, for he and one assistant were all that constituted the entire Leg-
islative Reference Bureau. Like many Progressive party ventures, 
the Bureau was more impressive on paper than in action. Rich-
berg's principal achievement was to prepare ten bills for the Pro-
gressive delegation in Congress; none were original proposals but 
embodied longstanding ideals common to reformers of many dif-
ferent political affiliations, and most of them were drafted with the 
help of members of the Legislative Reference Committee. In the 
face of the Wilson administration's program, none of the Progres-
sive party proposals had a chance. Otherwise, most of Richberg's 
11 Charles McCarthy to George Perkins, Dec. 9, I9I2, cited in Fitz-
patrick, McCarthy, 68-69; William Draper Lewis to McCarthy, Jan. I I, 
I9I3; BernardS. Van Rensselear to McCarthy, Feb. 8, I9I3; McCarthy to 
Richberg, April2I, I9I3, Charles McCarthy Papers, State Historical Society 
of Wisconsin, Box Io; Richberg to McCarthy, May 3, I9I3; McCarthy 
Papers, Box II; Lewis to Richberg, March 18, I9I3; Richberg to Lewis, 
April I, I9I3, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 1. 
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time was spent in preparing propaganda for the party and adver-
tising its hopes for more concrete achievements in the future. Noth-
ing came to fruition in the way of preparing model legislation for 
the use of Progressive leaders in the states.12 
The National Progressive Service as a whole realized equally 
negative results. It never really solved the problem of its own in-
ternal organization nor clearly defined its objectives and procedures 
of operation. Such questions occupied the attention of Frances 
Kellor, chief of the Service, to the very end of its existence. In addi-
tion, budgetary and personnel problems plagued the Service, and 
Kellor herself became the center of constant disputes of a personal 
nature among Service employees. With his own high-strung per-
sonality, it was not surprising that Richberg found himself repeat-
edly at odds with Kellor. Problems concerning the Legislative Ref-
erence Bureau's budget and the relationship between the National 
Service and the local party organizations in the states created icy 
relations between the two. Exacerbating their disagreements over 
specific policy questions were the different ways in which each 
perceived the other's proper role and authority in the Service. Rich-
berg considered himself primarily responsible to Lewis's Legisla-
tive Reference Committee, which had hired him in the first place, 
whereas Kellor as chief of the Service considered him subject to 
her administrative directives. Kellor's dismissal of Paxton Hibben 
as director of the Educational Bureau precipitated open hostilities 
between the two; Hibben had been a classmate of Richberg's at 
Harvard, and he came to the defense of his old friend. Lacking 
firsthand knowledge of conditions in the Service, party leaders re-
solved the dispute in favor of Kellor, though providing for addi-
tional supervision over her work. But the decision left Richberg 
and other members of the Service thoroughly demoralized.13 
12 "Special Report of the Progressive National Service, to the Progressive 
National Executive Committee. For the Period of the Second Quarter 
April 1st-May 15th, 1913," n.d., Raymond Robins Papers, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, Box 5; Richberg to Lewis, Dec. r, 1913, Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 1; Progressive Party, National Legislative Reference Com-
mittee, Progressive Congressional Program (New York, 1914). 
13 [Richberg], "The Service has suffered ... ," memorandum, n.d.; 
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Yet the days of the National Progressive Service were num-
bered anyway. Largely because of a shortage of available funds, 
the party's National Executive Committee decided that in 1914 
the Service would have to be cut back drastically so as to give pri-
ority to the vote-getting political machinery. Nineteen fourteen was 
an election year for Progressive congressmen and state officials, and 
the need to give attention to the practical matter of winning public 
office was becoming more and more apparent. The time for idealistic 
experiments was over, and the supporters of the Progressive Service 
had failed to make the most of it. When funds ran out for the di-
rectorship of the Legislative Reference Bureau in March, Richberg 
returned to Chicago to resume law practice in his father's office 
once again.14 
The same factors that initially had drawn Richberg to the Pro-
gressive National Service kept him loyal to the party, despite his 
less-than-happy experiences in New York. His desire to justify his 
work in terms of the public welfare did not disappear with the 
breakup of the Service. Even as it crumbled around him, he per-
sisted in his favorable evaluation of its potentialities, if not its ac-
complishments. In a paper prepared for the American Political Sci-
ence Association during the last days of the Service, he gave an 
account of his continuing faith in its possibilities. Richberg saw 
the Progressive National Service not only as a mechanism for de-
veloping a liberal legislative program but also as a vehicle for trans-
forming the legal profession from a gang of parasites living off the 
troubles of mankind into an agency for the betterment of the gen-
eral welfare: "There is in the work that combination of law and 
politics and social science which is rapidly creating a new profes-
Paxton Hibben to Executive Committee of the National Committee of the 
Progressive Party, Nov. 18, 1913; Hibben, Dec. 7, 1913, with attached 
letter, Kellor to Hibben, n.d., Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 41; [Richberg] 
to Herbert Knox Smith, Dec. 6, 1913; George Perkins to Donald Richberg, 
Dec. 18, 1913; Smith to Richberg, Dec. 9, 1913, Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box 1; [Robins] to H. Edward Dreier, Dec. 29, 1913, Robins Papers, Box 6. 
14 Progressive Party, Executive Committee, Minutes, Jan. 24, 1914, 
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 13d; Lewis to Richberg, Jan. 29, 1914, 
Rich berg Papers, L.c., Box I. 
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sion, which might be termed that of social counselor. It may be 
regarded as one of the large divisions into which the profession of 
law is separating." 
The Progressive Service, and especially Rich berg's Legislative 
Reference Bureau, were to be an integral part of this transforma-
tion-in fact, its primary catalyst: "During the transition period 
between the almost purely parasite lawyer of today and the social 
counselor of tomorrow legislative reference bureaus may serve as 
postgraduate schools in which young lawyers may be brought in 
touch with the needs of their generation in the way of jurispru-
dence." By setting up national and state bureaus, political parties 
could serve as the channels conveying the people's need for up-to-
date concepts of social justice to members of the bar, so that in 
every community there might develop "groups of earnest young 
men devoted to the idea of helping the law to keep pace with the 
great strides of social and industrial needs." An apprenticeship in 
such a bureau would give the young lawyer some sense of the gen-
eral welfare which might counteract the forces of private privilege.15 
The persistence of Richberg's vision in the face of the reality 
can be understood in terms of his personal situation and his inter-
pretation of the state of political morality. Implementing the Serv-
ice idea had proved far more difficult than its sponsors had antici-
pated, and the bulk of its troubles had come from within, not from 
without. But for someone such as Richberg, who had long justi-
fied his career in terms of the status of his profession, the tendency 
to perceive the Service in terms of ideals and hopes rather than 
realities comes as no surprise. Richberg's New York adventure 
thus paradoxically became part of a larger complex of experiences 
that reinforced rather than eroded his identification with reform. 
Consequently, Richberg's return to Chicago meant no slacken-
ing in his dedication to the Progressive party, though as the 1914 
elections approached, its future was more and more clouded. Harold 
Ickes had joined the Richberg law firm in 1913, and his presence 
reinforced Richberg's commitment to reform politics. Within a few 
months, Richberg was at work promoting the candidacy of Ray-
mond Robins for election to the United States Senate on the Pro-
15 Rich berg, "Legislative Reference Bureaus for Political Parties," 229-30. 
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gressive ticket. Once again, he operated behind the scenes prepar-
ing propaganda against the Republicans and Democrats and over-
seeing the litigation necessary to nominate candidates under Illinois 
law. But once again, the Progressives' efforts were unavailing, and 
Robins carne in a poor third, defeated by the Republican machine 
candidate, Lawrence Sherman. Even Richberg began to feel dis-
couraged about the future of the party.16 
Although Richberg fought to preserve the Progressive party as 
an independent political force until I9I6, he realized that the re-
sults of the I9I4 campaign gave inescapable proof that its strength 
had rapidly dissipated. In Illinois, only Medill McCormick and 
H. S. Hickes of Rockford won state offices and were returned to 
the House of Representatives in Springfield. No Progressive candi-
date for Congress or the state senate won. What happened in Illi-
nois was repeated all across the country. Nineteen fifteen was no 
better for Chicago Progressives, and their attempt to take over the 
Republican primaries in the mayoralty contest failed. Furthermore, 
of four Progressives included on a compromise judicial slate made 
up by a coalition of Progressives and regular Republicans, all but 
one were defeated, and Richberg was among those who failed to win 
office. As an organization, the Illinois Progressive party was in a 
shambles by the spring of I 9 I 5.11 
Yet Richberg needed the Progressive party as much as it needed 
him. Regardless of the ill-fortunes of its organizational life, he re-
peatedly encouraged Theodore Roosevelt to run again as the party's 
presidential candidate in I9I6, arguing that whatever political 
power the Progressives had was the product of the personal popu-
larity of the Bull Moose himself, and that unless Roosevelt ran, the 
18 Richberg, My Hero, 58-59, 61; Richberg, Tents, 52-53; Richberg, 
"Opinion with Reference to the Right of the Senatorial Committees of the 
Progressive Party (for Social Justice) to Determine the Number of Candi-
dates to be Nominated by Their Party for Representative at the Primary of 
Sept. 9, 1914," Robins Papers, Box 7; Robins to Richberg, Nov. 7, 1914, 
in the possession of Mrs. John H. Small III (recently deposited in Richberg 
Papers, L.c.). 
11 Richberg, My Hero, 7o; Richberg, Tents, 53-54; Ickes, Curmudgeon, 
170-76; Chicago Daily News, Jan. 25, 1915; Ickes to Robins, Dec. 17, 
1914; Ickes to Robins, Jan. 6, 1915, Robins Papers, Box 8. 
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party would be finished. This was starkly apparent after the re-
sults of I 9 I 4- I 91 5.18 But throughout, Roosevelt's position remained 
ambiguous, while he toyed with doubts about whether the Progres-
sive party itself was an adequate vehicle of reform, whether a new 
bid for the presidential nomination would be best sought through 
it or through the Republican party, and whether his stand on mili-
tary preparedness would affect these other calculations. 
In addition to the role that reform work played in Richberg's 
view of the political situation, the war in Europe and American 
preparedness likewise became factors in his thinking about Roose-
velt's chances for election in 1916. The war issue reinforced what 
was already a deep commitment to the Roosevelt candidacy on 
Richberg's part. Though of a German background himself, and 
hence suspect in the eyes of many anglophiles in the United States, 
Richberg was as vehemently in favor of military preparedness as 
Roosevelt himself. His extremely sensitive nature was likely to 
make him respond to any reflection upon his Americanism. Hence, 
he viewed Roosevelt's strong preparedness position in highly posi-
tive terms-terms that undoubtedly reflected his own personal 
needs but may not have accurately reflected the objective division 
of public opinion as he tried to report it to Roosevelt. Over and 
over again, Richberg professed to see an "evidently increasing Roo-
sevelt sentiment here in Illinois at least, after a period of what was 
plainly a decline." Again, Richberg's outlook was as much the 
product of his own hopes as of the political realities.19 
By the time of the I916 Progressive nominating convention, 
Richberg joined a small band of party leaders in nominating Roose-
18 Richberg to Roosevelt, Sept. 22, I9I3, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
Series I, Box 259; Richberg to Roosevelt, Nov. 5, I9I5, Theodore Roosevelt 
Papers, Series I, Box 29o; Richberg, Who Wins in November? The "Inside 
Politics" That Will Decide the Presidency in 1916 (Chicago, I9I6), 
6o. 
19 Rich berg to Roosevelt, Sept. I, I 9 I 5, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
Series I, Box 288; Richberg to Roosevelt, Nov. 5, I9I5, Theodore Roose-
velt Papers, Series I, Box 290; Richberg to Roosevelt, Aug. 25, I9I6, and 
Richberg to Roosevelt, Sept. 8, I9I6, both in Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
Series I, Box 31 I; interview with Mrs. John H. Small m, Charlottesville, 
Va., Jan. II-12, I967. 
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velt over his protest and that of his strategy planners, headed by 
George W. Perkins, who wished to amalgamate with the Republi-
can party. If the Republicans nominated an acceptable candidate, 
Roosevelt and Perkins were prepared to support him. To Roosevelt, 
the most important objective in I9I6 was the defeat of Woodrow 
Wilson; he therefore wished to avoid splitting the Progressives and 
the Republicans as in I 9 I 2. 
In the eyes of people such as Donald Richberg and Harold 
Ickes, Perkins was seriously underestimating Roosevelt's strength 
in the country and the possibility of maintaining an independent 
political party if the Republicans failed to respond to Progressive 
overtures with favorable terms. Richberg believed-or perhaps 
hoped-that Roosevelt's popularity had increased spectacularly in 
the period from January to June I9I6, after hitting a low point 
sometime in I 9I 5. He therefore considered the Perkins strategy 
out of step with a constantly changing situation; the Progressives 
need not wield their power negatively. Richberg and Ickes were 
afraid that Perkins was bent more on returning to the Republican 
party at any price than on promoting either the development of a 
controlling Progressive element within the Republican party or, 
alternatively, the preservation of a separate Progressive party.20 
Consequently, at the Progressive nominating convention, Ickes 
headed up a group of Roosevelt backers which went to elaborate 
lengths to insure his nomination. Privy to the Ickes strategy were 
Richberg and a group of important party leaders including Ray-
mond Robins, Gifford Pinchot, Chester H. Rowell, Matthew Hale, 
William Allen White, Henry Allen, Victor Murdock, Bainbridge 
Colby, Hiram Johnson, and John M. Parker. But given the over-
whelming pro-Roosevelt sentiment of the delegates themselves, 
elaborate planning was not as necessary as Ickes and Richberg 
seemed to have imagined, so that the Bull Moose was asked to head 
up the ticket again despite his own feelings about the question. 
20 Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?" American Historical Review 
46 (Jan. 1941): 308-22; George F. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the 
Progressive Movement ("American Century Series"; New York, 196o), 
32.3-44; Richberg to Roosevelt, Nov. 5, 1915, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
Series r, Box 290; Richberg, Who Wins in November? 59-64. 
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When the Republicans nominated Supreme Court Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes and he immediately accepted, Roosevelt's 
decision whether to accept the Progressive nomination was a fore-
gone conclusion. He had repeatedly asserted his belief that Presi-
dent Wilson had to be defeated at all costs because of his vacillating 
foreign policy; a Progressive-Republican coalition presumably could 
do this. Most important, it was known that Hughes was an accept-
able candidate to Roosevelt. He therefore declined the Bull Moose 
nomination; the choice for the Progressives then was either to fol-
low Roosevelt back into the Republican fold, or make an independ-
ent campaign in the face of desertion by the one leader who had 
a chance of winning. The new Progressive National Committee 
voted thirty-two to six, with nine abstentions, to follow Roosevelt.21 
The Ickes Progressives in Chicago generally went over to the 
Hughes camp, though the management of the campaign was in 
the hands of Republicans who had no sympathy for those whom 
they regarded as renegades. But with Roosevelt's defection, there 
was little choice. Richberg perhaps found it easier than many other 
Progressives to transfer his loyalties to the Republican party. His 
adulation of Roosevelt went far to rationalize any inconsistencies 
in his course of action. What Roosevelt had decided was best. The 
Progressives had known Roosevelt's feeling about the nomination 
when they had called him to be their standard bearer. They had 
placed the fate of the party in his hands, knowing the risk. Rich-
berg felt that they must now abide by his decision. Although 
Hughes appointed a number of Progressives, including Harold 
Ickes, to his campaign committee in a conciliatory gesture, most 
Old Guard Republican leaders remained resentful toward them, 
so that people such as Ickes and Richberg had little to say about 
running the 1916 campaign.22 
21 Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?" 322-33; Richberg, Who 
Wins in November? 64-68; Richberg, My Hero, 64, 86-88. 
22 Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?" 334-37; Richberg, Who 
Wins in November? 67-82; Richberg, My Hero, 88-9I; Richberg, Tents, 
74-78; Richberg to Roosevelt, Sept. 8, I916, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
Series I, Box 3I I; Richberg to Roosevelt, Nov. 2I, I916, Theodore Roose-
velt Papers, Series I, Box 3 I 4· 
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With the Republican's defeat by President Wilson, Richberg 
found himself with the problem of finding a new outlet for his re-
form energies. Roosevelt's support of Hughes was the coup de 
grace that finished the Progressive party as an independent politi-
cal force. But Richberg's career problem for the present was com-
plicated not only by the demise of the Progressive party but also by 
his family situation; his political activities and the recently grow-
ing needs of his dependents placed him in desperate need of money. 
For a time, he would have to be concerned with the more practical 
side of life. 
Richberg's personal life reached a turning point in 1915. Until 
then he had been free from any extraordinary family obligations. 
But in March of that year, his father suffered a stroke for the second 
time. The first occasion had been in I909, but within a few months 
he had recovered and resumed his law practice. Now he was ren-
dered completely helpless and lingered in that state until his death 
in February I918. Richberg thus found himself at the head of 
a household with numerous financial obligations. Besides his 
mother and father, he acquired several other dependents. Over the 
next several years, his brother Windsor and his sister Leda, as well 
as his two half-sisters Elsinore and Fanelia, required either partial 
or complete support. 
Richberg was burdened with these obligations for the greater 
part of his life. But the impact was especially severe in I 9 I 5, for his 
absence in New York in I913-1914, his recent devotion of much 
time and energy to nonremunerative political work, and his father's 
I 909 illness had left the Rich berg law firm in a poor financial con-
dition. Although Harold Ickes was also a partner in the firm, he 
too had dedicated a large part of his energy to politics rather than 
law. Furthermore, Richberg's campaign in 19I 5 for circuit court 
judge necessitated an outlay of $2,500 from personal funds for 
campaign expenses. And when John C. Richberg finally died, he 
left not an inheritance but what his son considered a heavy burden 
of debt, which took several years to pay off. Richberg's brothers 
and sisters were of no assistance in lightening this burden. 
Added to Rich berg's anxieties in I 9 r 5 was his separation from 
his first wife. Their relationship had long been deteriorating, and 
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Richberg took the onus of leaving her. He provided separate main-
tenance until 1917, when she sued for divorce on wounds of deser-
tion. Alimony payments then followed for several years, until she 
voluntarily relieved him of this obligation. Nevertheless, Richberg 
was burdened with alimony until 1952, for in 1918 he had remar-
ried, only to be disappointed again. As in his first marriage, Rich-
berg found that his new wife failed to give him the kind of moral 
support that he required. She pursued her own interests instead of 
sharing his, and retained old associations which made him jealous. 
In I 924, they were divorced, but in December of that same year, 
Richberg married for a third time. His new venture was to prove 
highly successful; at last he had found a woman who could sub-
ordinate her ambitions to his. 
Events in 1915 thus conspired to make Richberg acutely aware 
of his financial status. The experience was one that he later viewed 
as marking for him "the end of youth," and it left a lifetime im-
pression which made Richberg solicitous about the financial ar-
rangements of his future career commitments. He had been care-
less about such matters for too long. Yet there lingered in Richberg 
a desire to feel that his work had a public service dimension as well. 
His immediate personal problem was to find a way of combining 
practicality and politics, so that he might earn an adequate living 
while still serving reform.23 
As a partial solution to the dilemma, Richberg and Ickes decided 
to take two more partners into the firm, John S. Lord and Morgan 
Davies, both of whom brought additional clients and were more in-
terested in practicing iaw than dabbling in politics. But fortunately 
for him, Richberg did not have to dedicate his energies entirely to 
private clients. He soon found a new outlet for his reform proclivi-
ties to take the place of the defunct Progressive party, one that at 
the same time provided him with additional income. Richberg be-
came Special Counsel for the City of Chicago in Gas Matters.24 
Richberg's appointment came about as the result of lobbying on 
the part of his old friend, Alderman Charles E. Merriam. The new 
23 Richberg, "Memories for My Grandchildren," chapt. D; Richberg, 
My Hero, 71-72, 210-14; Richberg, Tents, 54-56. 
24 Richberg, My Hero, 61. 
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mayor of Chicago, William Hale Thompson, had created a Select 
Committee on Gas Litigation in the Chicago City Council to re-
deem his campaign promise to investigate rising gas rates. Neither 
Merriam nor Richberg had supported the Thompson brand of re-
form in the 1915 elections, but Merriam-by then one of the city's 
most outspoken reformers-was appointed to the special committee 
anyway, perhaps to mollify critics of alleged political connections 
between the mayor and the Peoples Gas Light and Coke Com-
pany, which was the public utility under fire. The committee's 
first task was to engage counsel to carry on an investigation and to 
prosecute long-pending litigation against the company. Merriam 
proposed Richberg for the job, while the chairman of the Select 
Committee, Alderman James H. Lawley, backed another candi-
date, Glenn E. Plumb. After the First World War, Plumb was to 
become well known as the promoter of the Plumb Plan for the 
public management of the nation's railway network. As a result 
of a political deal after a long deadlock on the Select Committee, 
Richberg was engaged as counsel with Plumb as his assistant.25 
From 1915 until the mid-192os, Richberg was involved in three 
principal strategems against the gas company. He pressed litiga-
tion already initiated by the City Corporation Counsel for recover-
ing alleged overcharges, negotiated a new agreement between the 
city and the company controlling future rates, and managed the 
city's interest in valuation proceedings against Peoples Gas as the 
basis for regulating future profits and rates. In each instance, Rich-
berg enjoyed temporary successes during the course of litigation or 
negotiation, thereby encouraging the city council's hopes for a clean 
sweep. He ultimately failed, however, in his efforts to recover ex-
cess charges and to reach a permanent modus vivendi with the com-
pany over rates. The valuation proceedings did result in a lower 
rate base than the company had hoped for at various times, but it 
was not as low as Richberg had wanted. 
Although engaged by a committee appointed by Mayor Thomp-
son, Richberg was constantly at odds with him over the handling of 
the proceedings. This only confirmed Richberg's suspicions that the 
mayor was using the rate controversy as a smokescreen for a do-
35 Ibid., 72-73. 
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nothing policy. Furthermore, Samuel lnsull was chairman of the 
gas company's board of directors, and thus provided Richberg with 
the very kind of symbol that epitomized the evils he saw in the 
world of business. To Richberg's mind, lnsull was the sort of figure 
who would make a likely character in one of his muckracking 
novels. Actually, lnsull's desire to raise gas rates was the product 
of a more complex situation than a simple grasping for profits. In-
creasing labor and supply costs had placed the Peoples Gas Com-
pany in a precarious financial situation. Furthermore, expenses to 
be undertaken for plant and equipment modernization designed 
to ease the problem in the long run would exacerbate it in the short 
run. Though Richberg's negotiations with the company over future 
rates revealed some awareness of its problems and the consequences 
of a financial breakdown, his conduct of the gas proceedings at 
times exhibited the overriding moral fervor of the deeply commit-
ted reformer. Someone like lnsull, concerned primarily with the 
survival of a company with very shaky financial resources, was 
mystified by Richberg's tendency to turn the problem into an ethi-
cal rather than a practical question. In that respect, the Chicago gas 
fight was tailormade for satisfying Richberg's desire to remain in 
reform work. The gas proceedings were completed by 1925, after 
the entire fight, including engineering as well as legal expenses, 
had cost Chicago approximately $4oo,ooo. Richberg resigned as 
special counsel in 1927, when Mayor Thompson returned to office 
after having been out of power for one term. Thompson considered 
the expense of the Richberg campaign out of proportion to the 
results.26 
The Chicago gas fight thus bridged the gap between the demise 
of the Progressive party and Richberg's work in labor law during 
26 Ibid., 74, 102-1 1; Richberg, Tents, 109-21; Forrest McDonald, 
Insull (Chicago, 1962), 158-61, 177-82, 205-13; Journal of the Proceed-
ings of the City Council of the City of Chicago (Chicago, 1916-1928), 
1915-1916,4-5, 2o6o, 2483-85; 1916-1917,387-89,1297-1304,4325-
33; 1917-1918, 353-54. 731-38, 1073, 1242-43. 1902-1908, 2025-26, 
2380; 1918-1919, 92-93, 112, 222, 230-31, 267-72, 290-91, 302, 743-
p, 1168-69, 1221-24, 1371-74; 1920-1921, 628-32, 1569-70; 1924-
1925, 3647-49, 4405-4406; 1926-1927, 3913-14; 1927-1928, 161-62, 
1288. 
THE ANXIOUS REFORMER 35 
the 1 92os. His experiences as special counsel had reconfirmed his 
identification with the role of the behind-the-scenes technician, the 
man with the know-how to protect the public interest. Equally 
important, they strengthened his interest in public utility regula-
tion and industrial organization, so that Richberg's thinking about 
such questions continued to mature throughout these years. 
The First World War likewise stimulated Richberg's theoriz-
ing about industrial relations. His family situation and his involve-
ment in the city's dispute with Peoples Gas discouraged him from 
seeking a commission in the armed forces, but he volunteered as a 
patriotic speaker for the Illinois Council of Defense.27 Richberg 
quickly became disillusioned, however, by the contrast between 
the democratic idealism which he preached from the platform and 
the reality of coercive practices on the homefront, especially in la-
bor relations. Furthermore, Richberg came to believe that the war 
effort itself was endangering the very object of battle-democracy. 
The "forced competition of war" was changing the character of the 
Allied governments; the necessity for a rapid .and efficient reor-
ganization of industry to meet the challenge of foreign aggression 
made once democratic regimes turn to authoritarian methods to 
marshal the needed effort and resources for self-defense. Richberg 
feared that "governments so reorganized" would not easily return 
to democracy once the exigencies of battle had passed. 
In Richberg's mind, this wartime trend arose from a longer-
range difficulty, namely, the oligarchic organization of industry 
itself. The majority of those interested in a given enterprise, the 
workers, had no part in decisions which intimately affected their 
lives; instead, capital interests imposed decisions on workers through 
a hierarchical system of authority. Nowhere was it recognized that 
labor and capital had a common interest in the success of an enter-
prise and that one way to insure the enthusiastic support of both 
was by granting each a voice in determining policy. But the war 
effort threatened to strengthen the inherent authoritarian features 
of industrial organization.28 
27 Richberg, My Hero, 91-93; Richberg, Tents, 8o. 
28 Richberg, "Democratization of Industry," The New Republic 11 (May 
12, 1917): 49-51. 
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Richberg's thinking moved in the direction of a modified cor-
porate state ideal, with each major interest group organized to carry 
out a specific role in a larger undertaking defined on a company-
wide or even an industrywide basis. His argument for giving greater 
recognition to organized labor and encouraging unionization re-
volved around the idea that the "principal job" of the nation's in-
dustrial leadership was "to attract and organize men into a co-
operating machinery of production wherein their self-interest will 
lie in the efficiency and profitableness of the business." Only sec-
ondarily was it necessary "to obtain the capital . . . to provide the 
physical machinery to be operated by the organized labor power." 
To Richberg, the conclusion seemed inescapable that "capital can-
not live without men; but men can manage to exist without capital. 
Therefore, although capital and labor are somewhat interdepen-
dent, capital is more dependent upon labor than labor is upon 
capital." The reason for labor strife was that contemporary indus-
trial leadership persisted in organizing the interests of capital only. 
Unionization was the inevitable response of the workers. Richberg 
believed that "labor organizers have merely done the work which 
the industrial leadership should have done; that is, they have or-
ganized productive labor power." 
Richberg's solution developed over time, becoming by degrees 
more and more explicit. The general answer could be easily formu-
lated: "A steady How of capital into industrial enterprises has been 
obtained by providing for a board of directors elected by capital 
contributors and charged with the responsibility of protecting their 
interests. A steady How of labor could also be obtained by so organ-
izing corporations that representatives chosen by the labor contrib-
utors would participate jointly with representatives of capital con-
tributors in the direction of the enterprise." Richberg maintained 
that his plan was not a form of socialism, because "it leaves the 
control of a business in the hands of those who actually carry on 
that business." His proposal did not make industry subject to "a po-
litical control whereby it is regulated by those who do not partic-
ipate in furnishing either labor or capital," nor did it "contemplate 
the elimination of capital or of the rights of owners of capital." 
Instead, "it merely aims at eliminating the autocratic domination 
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of capital contributors in an institution whose success or failure 
depends upon obtaining the voluntary and wholehearted support 
of labor contributors."29 
The more detailed solution proposed by Richberg grew out of the 
hypothesis that the relations of employer and employee were "rela-
tions arising out of the corporate form of organization." The cor-
poration was nothing more than the modern method of organizing 
capital and labor in a common project. Therefore, the most effec-
tive way to attack abuses in industrial relations was "by changing 
the form of corporate organization." Such a change could be easily 
accomplished because incorporation was a privilege granted by the 
state through the issuance of a charter; by redefining the terms of 
incorporation to provide for the representation of labor as well as 
capital interests, a democratic state could bring about a reformation 
in industrial institutions, making them more consistent with the 
character of the state itself. The democratizing of industry would 
eradicate a remnant of feudalism in the United States and would 
prevent the war effort from becoming a sham and a fraud. 
Beyond the recognition of labor's right to organize into unions, 
Richberg proposed a new concept of stockholding: the creation of 
two kinds of stocks, labor shares and capital shares. The number of 
capital shares would depend upon the amount of capital investment 
required in an enterprise; the number of labor shares would be 
calculated according to the investment required to yield dividends 
equivalent to the salaries paid to employees. These dividends would 
in effect become the workers' salaries. Dividends on capital invest-
ment would be paid after salaries had been met. Equally impor-
tant, the system of shareholding would provide an equitable method 
of measuring the relative voice of labor and capital interests in 
determining company policy. Although Richberg felt that a trial 
period would be necessary in which capital would have the domi-
nant control, he believed that once the plan was fully implemented, 
both capital and labor would become aware of their common inter-
est in the success of the enterprise, so that neither would seek to 
dominate the other. 
2e Richberg, "Industrial Failure and a Remedy," 1920, mss. in Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 5· 
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Richberg envisioned the end result as "the reestablishment of 
competition between industrial units and the establishment of 
cooperation inside industrial units," which would "eliminate the 
present antisocial class organization of industries whereby the 
representatives of capital in different units combine, and the rep-
resentatives of labor in different units combine, and each group 
wages war on the other with the resultant loss of industrial effi-
ciency." Class war would end. "The present demand for collective 
bargaining ... would disappear in its present form," and labor 
would find a formal place within the corporate structure itself.80 
Of course, Richberg's ideas were lost in the labor strife that 
followed the First World War and which seemed to bear out his 
fear that the war itself would exacerbate the contradiction between 
America's industrial organization and its governmental organiza-
tion-between autocracy and democracy. For now, his ideas could 
only be expressed in magazine articles and in correspondence with 
such people as Herbert Hoover, vice-chairman of an industrial con-
ference held in I 920 under the auspices of the Wilson administra-
tion.31 But the time was soon coming when his ideas on labor rela-
tions would count for more than mere echoes of the Progressives' 
faith in the rationality and harmony of human relationships. 
Since his early days as an independent in Chicago politics, Rich-
berg's career situation thus had evolved in a direction which as-
sured him of the psychic security and ideals necessary to resolve 
his doubts about law as a profession. Though the old Progressive 
organization of 1912 had fallen apart by 1916, Richberg found 
new outlets for his need to feel that he was serving the public good. 
Furthermore, the Chicago gas fight and the war crusade helped 
mature his interest in industrial organization. They helped him de-
30 Rich berg to Herbert Hoover, Jan. 28, I 920; Rich berg to Ed D. 
Kneass, April 6, I92o, Donald Richberg Papers, Chicago Historical 
Society, Box I; Rich berg, "Outline of Suggested Industrial Program," 
[I92o] Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 5· 
31 Richberg to Hoover, Jan. 2I, I92o; Hoover to Richberg, Jan. 23, I920, 
Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box I; Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 
Vol. 2: The Cabinet and the Presidency, I92o-1933 (New York, I952), 
30-3 I; Rich berg, "Democratization of Industry," 49-51. 
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velop clear notions about the place of labor and capital in industry. 
Consequently, when an opportunity came at the right moment, 
Richberg was prepared psychologically and intellectually to give 
himself to another task which was consistent with his past work as 
a reformer-that of labor lawyer. 
CHAPTER III 
Labor Lawyer 
Donald Richberg's eminence as a labor advocate in the 1920s testi-
fied to his competence as a lawyer and to his deep commitment to 
causes which he identified with the public interest. His initial 
involvement with organized labor, however, was somewhat the 
product of chance. Prior to 1920, Rich berg had had no labor clients 
in his private practice, nor had he been involved in any court bat-
tles with unions. His only contact with Chicago labor leaders had 
been in the form of casual acquaintances made during the course 
of political campaigning for the city's various reform groups or for 
the Progressives. Given Richberg's preoccupation with political or-
ganization during the heyday of the Progressive party and with pub-
lic utility law during the Chicago gas fight, his failure to become 
actively involved in trade union circles comes as no surprise. This 
was simply one of many issues which were beyond his capacity as 
far as active participation was concerned; another was race rela-
tions. In this respect, Richberg was like many other Progressives, in 
that certain kinds of issues-such as the trust problem, child labor, 
corruption in government, and institutional reform--engaged their 
attention while others went practically unnoticed. Richberg's bat-
tles with Samuel Insull and the social consequences of the First 
World War had broadened his horizons, but thus far had resulted 
only in a heightened concern for industrial and labor problems; his 
active energies were wholly absorbed by politics and by city work. 
It was the Chicago gas fight that brought Richberg into the la-
bor camp in an active way. His assistant in the city work, Glenn 
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Plumb, had long been deeply involved in labor advocacy and cur-
rently was representing the railway labor unions in proceedings be-
fore the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICc) to support Senator 
Robert La Follette's program for the valuation of railroad properties 
as a basis for ratemaking. Over the years, Plumb had become one of 
the more important lawyers working for railway labor. At the end 
of the First World War he formulated the Plumb Plan for public 
management of the nation's railway system. As interest in the plan 
became widespread, Plumb found himself more and more involved 
in speechmaking and other promotional activities, and consequently 
recommended to his clients that Richberg take over the contest he-
fore the ICC. The railway unions proved agreeable, and Richberg 
thus entered upon one of the most important phases of his career. 
By the time of Plumb's death in the summer of 1922, Richberg 
had been sufficiently groomed in the work of the railway unions so 
that he appeared to be a logical successor to his former associate. 
Though Richberg had no standing as a labor lawyer prior to 1920, 
events at the beginning of the decade quickly brought him to a 
strategic position within the labor movement.1 
Richberg's active involvement in labor representation, however 
much the product of chance, was congenial both from the personal 
and from the intellectual standpoint. His self-conscious articulation 
of the role of the lawyer as a semi-public official bound to guard 
the public good was a key factor in his psychic security. This was 
an abiding concern, one that continually provided a coherent ra-
tionale for his legal advocacy. This was true even in his later years 
when Richberg dedicated his legal talents to the service of what 
were then known as conservative causes. Yet the justification was 
the same. Always Richberg had to conceive his role as being in the 
public service. Someday he would view the growing power of labor 
unions, a power that he helped to create, as a threat to freedom of 
choice and individual initiative; he was thus able to rationalize his 
later affiliations with the business world in terms of defending the 
businessman's freedom of action against the collective, coercive 
1 Donald Richberg, Tents of the Mighty (New York, 1930), 123-24; 
Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic 
Life (New York, 1954), 112-14. 
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power of organized labor armed with one-sided federal legislation. 
In the 192os, however, Richberg saw the balance of power between 
labor and capital in a different light; it was the employing classes 
that wielded coercive power over the laboring classes. This was the 
rationale for his work as a labor lawyer for more than ten years.2 
Richberg's new identification thus reinforced the trends that had 
been developing in his thinking about industrial relations. As the 
decade of the I 92os opened, his speeches and writings continued 
to emphasize coercion as the main internal contradiction within the 
American democratic system-especially economic coercion. He 
condemned the use of force by either labor or capital, though as 
the representative of the railway workers most of his energies were 
concentrated against management abuses. Political or economic de-
mocracy could work only where compulsion was absent, and where 
each party had the right and-equally important-the ability to 
carry out its role in the system. Richberg's battles for railway labor 
were not directed so much at forcing capital to do something for la-
bor, as simply at procuring and safeguarding the right of labor to do 
things for itself-mainly to organize unions independent of em-
ployer influence and to bargain over wages and working conditions 
with management. Paternalism, or the "welfare capitalism" which 
some employers felt would pacify the labor front in the 192os, was 
no part of Richberg's ideal, as it was merely another form of capital 
coercion. Yet socialism was not his answer either, for the same rea-
son that it meant the use of coercive power by one class, the pro-
letariat, against the rest of society. 
If the businessmen of the 192os had understood Richberg's 
theory of labor relations, they might not have branded him a radi-
cal. Though the idea of dealing with employees on a basis of equal-
ity annoyed many large employers, at heart Richberg's theory em-
phasized the traditional American values of individualism and free 
enterprise. His solution was not really labor dominance of the in-
dustrial world but simply its recognition as having a place in the 
economic system equally important as that of capital. The funda-
mental principles of free enterprise-private ownership and mini-
2 Richberg to David B. Robertson and Bert M. Jewell, Feb. 25, 1949, 
Donald Richberg Papers, Library of Congress, Box 2. 
LABOR LAWYER 43 
mal state regulation-were left undisturbed. Nevertheless, anyone 
who served labor in that era ran the risk of being stereotyped as a 
socialist or worse. In Richberg's case, such a charge was absurdly 
wide of the mark. 
In the evolution of democracy in economics, Richberg believed 
that the lawyer had a crucial role. He viewed history as advancing 
in terms of the wider and wider diffusion of liberty, and seemed to 
harbor the hope that there was something inevitable in this progres-
sion, so that history was on his side. But the greatest obstacle to this 
inevitable advance, as he saw it, was the failure of the law to keep 
abreast of social change or the "ever changing ethics of the human 
will." The most remarkable breakdown had occurred in the law of 
industrial relations, which was suited to an earlier primitive or fron-
tier society of self-sufficient individuals and which was increasingly 
irrelevant to a contemporary society whose defining characteristic 
was the interdependence of producers. What modem jurispru-
dence had failed to comprehend was that this opened up a new 
area for legal action; modem men were "dependent for the abso-
lute necessities of life upon the continuous service of large groups 
of other workers, usually remote from them and not subject to their 
influence in any fixed way except through the processes of govern-
ment." Instead of acknowledging this interdependence, "the natu-
ral resistance of law" and "the natural density of the legal mind" 
had combined with the result that lawyers too often served the 
purposes of only one segment of modern society. The outcome was 
the development of "a class-conscious, paternalistic state, through 
which the ruling class coerces its subjects to live, to work, to pur-
sue happiness, even if possible to think, as the ruling class in its 
superior wisdom deems desirable." Perhaps as a labor lawyer, Rich-
berg might compensate for the "resistance to change inherent in 
the institutions for creating and enforcing the law ."3 
In many ways, the r 92os were an auspicious time for a man such 
3 Richberg, "The Fight against Ignorance," Life and Labor 8 (Feb. 
1918): 32-34; Richberg, "The Key of Knowledge," A Paper Read before 
the Law Club of Chicago, Feb. 25, 1921, copy in Richberg Papers, L.a., 
Box 5; Richberg, "Developing Ethics and Resistant Law," Yale Law 
Journal 32 (Dec. 1922): 109-22. 
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as Donald Richberg, who dreamed of a business-labor common-
wealth of cooperation. Unionism in the 1920s hit a low point, mak-
ing labor leaders as a group more amenable to cooperating with 
businessmen rather than fighting them. Overall membership in the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) declined, and several indus-
tries that might have been likely targets for unionization remained 
untouched by AFL organizers. As the decade progressed, the dete-
riorating position of labor was evident in the less frequent use of 
the strike as a bargaining weapon. There were several reasons for 
this: division within the ranks of a heterogeneous labor force; the 
prevalence of a social climate that viewed business approvingly; the 
expansion of new and as yet unorganized industries with antiunion 
managements; the growing obsolescence of craft unionism in the 
face of technological progress; company unions; welfare capitalism; 
and relative if uneven prosperity. 
Yet the lack of militancy among many labor leaders was not sim-
ply the result of negative forces, but also grew out of a positive 
identification with the values of the business community itself. As 
the Republican party's slogan of the "New Era" permeated Ameri-
can society, so too it reached into the ranks of labor. For many his-
torians, William Green, Samuel Gornpers's successor as president of 
the AFL, was to become the symbol of the new respectability of the 
labor movement. As one student of the New Era described it, 
"With business supreme, the A. F. of L. sought to sell itself as a 
necessary auxiliary of business."4 The time was ripe for Richberg's 
theories. 
Richberg's opportunity was not long in corning. The railway 
shoprnen' s strike of 1 922, which labor historian Irving Bernstein 
has called "the greatest strike of the decade," helped make Rich-
• Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 
192o-z933 (Boston, 196o), 83-108. For a sampling of Richberg's under-
standing of the desire of union leaders to cooperate with the business com-
munity, see Richberg to Henry J. Allen, June 15, 1922, Donald Richberg 
Papers, Chicago Historical Society, Box I. Here Rich berg expressed the 
opinion that "trade· unionism, with its present limitations, is a passing 
phase," one to be superseded by an era of "co-operative and more democratic 
organization of industry." 
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berg one of the leading advocates of the labor movement in the 
United States.5 
The shopmen's strike grew out of the railway labor unions' dis-
satisfaction with the rulings of the Railroad Labor Board, an 
agency of the federal government set up under the Transportation 
Act of I92o. The Transportation Act had returned the railroads to 
private management after the First World War, when as part of 
the war effort they had been taken over and operated by the United 
States Railroad Administration, headed by Secretary of the Trea-
sury William Gibbs McAdoo. Because the government had been 
concerned with maintaining continuity of service to keep the How 
of war material moving, the railway unions were able to win con-
cessions over representation and bargaining rights on most of the 
nation's railroads. But the establishment of the Railroad Labor 
Board after the war inaugurated a series of rulings on wages and 
working conditions which the unions felt would reverse this favor-
able trend. 
The Board's first decision, in July of I92o, resulted in wage in-
creases for the shop employees (machinists, blacksmiths, boiler-
makers, sheet metal workers, electrical workers, and carmen), but 
soon the period of rapid inflation that followed the war turned into 
a short depression. The railroads began to dismiss shop and main-
tenance workers. Further, they applied to the Railroad Labor Board 
for a reduction in the wage scale. This was allowed in June of I 92 I, 
and in August the Board permitted the roads to change work rules 
governing overtime and special jobs, resulting in further wage cuts. 
In addition, the shop crafts had another grievance-the railroads' 
practice of farming out repair work on their equipment to outside 
shops not governed by the Railroad Labor Board. In this way, the 
roads circumvented the standards established by the Board and fur-
ther jeopardized the position of the railway unions. In December 
I 92 I the shop crafts complained to the Railroad Labor Board; it 
ruled in their favor in May I 922, but the roads simply ignored the 
Board's decision. To the railway employees, the Board appeared to 
be a highly unsatisfactory instrument for maintaining peaceful in-
5 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 2 I I. 
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dustrial relations, one subservient to the demands of the roads but 
lackadaisical in effectuating the demands of labor.8 
The last straw came in the spring of I922. The roads applied for 
and were granted another wage reduction. The lowest paid and 
most poorly organized workers, the maintenance-of-way men and 
the shop crafts, suffered cuts, while the better-established transpor-
tation brotherhoods (such as engineers, firemen, conductors, train-
men, and switchmen) were spared any loss in earnings. The Rail-
way Employees' Department, an organization of the shop crafts af-
filiated with the AFL (unlike the transportation brotherhoods, 
which were unaffiliated), appealed to the Railroad Labor Board for 
an immediate hearing. Instead, the Board scheduled a hearing for 
only four days before the effective date of the wage cuts. Thereupon, 
the Railway Employees' Department took a strike vote, and 4oo,ooo 
members of the shop crafts walked out on July I. The mainte-
nance-of-way men, through the efforts of their president, secured a 
special hearing and a separate settlement, and so did not strike. The 
transportation brotherhoods also remained at work.7 
Glenn Plumb's death in the summer of I922 assured that Rich-
berg would be a dominant figure in developments; his work repre-
senting the railway unions in valuation proceedings before the 
Interstate Commerce Commission was extended to a general rep-
resentation of the shop crafts and the brotherhoods. Richberg 
worked closely with Bert Jewell, head of the Railway Employees' 
Department of the AFL, and other members of counsel for the shop 
crafts, FrankL. Mulholland and James S. Easby-Smith.8 
Throughout July Benjamin Hooper, chairman of the Railroad 
Labor Board, and President Warren Harding attempted to get the 
strikers to return to work as the first step in negotiating a settle-
ment, but the employees were adamant. To the strikers, the Rail-
road Labor Board still appeared to be management's agent, as when 
8 John R. Commons, ed., History of Labor in the United States, r896-
1932, Vol. 4: Labor Movements, by Selig Perlman and Philip Taft (New 
York, 1935), 515-18; Philip Taft, The A. F. of L. in the Time of Campers 
(New York, 1957), 471-72. 
1 Commons, History of Labor, 4: 518-19; Richberg, My Hero, 115-16; 
Richberg, Tents, 125. 
8 Richberg, Tents, 130. 
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it demanded that they resume work by July 10 or suffer the loss of 
seniority rights. At the end of July, after threats had failed, Hard-
ing suggested a return to work while all issues were submitted to 
the Railroad Labor Board without prejudice to either side. The 
strikers were willing, but the railroad presidents demanded the can-
cellation of employees' seniority rights as the price of negotiations. 
Thenceforth, the strike issue ceased to be wages and instead be-
came seniority; the original question had been superceded by one 
generated by the strike itsel£.9 
In August, Harding renewed his efforts to convince the roads 
that they should relent, but they remained adamant on the senior-
ity question. They felt that they had mastered the strike and need 
not compromise. The dispute entered a new phase, however, when 
United States Attorney General Harry Daugherty applied for a 
temporary restraining order on September 1 in the Chicago Dis-
trict Court of Judge James Wilkerson, a Harding appointee. His 
complaint charged that the shop craft strike was a criminal con-
spiracy in restraint of interstate commerce because the employees 
had no "legal right" to refuse to abide by the decisions of the Rail-
road Labor Board and because the strike evidenced "contempt for 
the United States and the government thereof.'~ The very right of 
railway labor to strike was at stake?0 
Though probably intended as the death sentence for what the 
managements regarded as a broken strike, the injunction evoked an 
immediate response from the shop unions. Richberg, prevented by 
the restraining order from communicating with his clients, moved 
to challenge the court, arguing that the strike was legal, that the 
attorney general obtained the order through fraud, and that a crimi-
nal trial was required in a criminal prosecution.11 
9 Commons, History of Labor, 4: 520-21; The Case of the Railway 
Shopmen: A Brief Statement of Facts concerning the Controversies Which 
Precipitated the Strike ([Washington, D. C.], 1922), 7-8. 
1° Commons, History of Labor, 4: 521-22; Jewell, J. F. McGrath, John 
Scott, W. H. Johnston, E. C. Davison, J. W. Kline, J. A. Franklin, J. J. 
Hynes, J.P. Noonan, M. F. Ryan to Richberg, FrankL. Mulholland, and 
James S. Easby-Smith, April 30, 1923, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 41. 
11 Commons, History of Labor, 4: 521-22; Richberg, My Hero, I 17; 
Richberg, Tents, 127; Taft, A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers, 404-406. 
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Richberg was appalled at the government move. He felt that ne-
gotiations which had recently started with Daniel Willard of the 
Baltimore and Ohio and thirteen railroads were beginning to make 
headway. The injunction coming when it did could only mean that 
it was not intended to end the strike but to destroy organized labor 
on the roads. It immobilized the use of union funds, prohibited 
picketing and persuasion by any legitimate means, and closed off 
ordinary channels of communication through "letters, printed or 
other circulars, telegrams, telephones, word of mouth, oral persua-
sion, or suggestion, or through interviews to be published in news-
papers or otherwise in any manner whatsoever."12 
While incidents of violence had occurred throughout the strike 
and had provided the attorney general with an excuse for action, 
Richberg was keenly aware of the futility of contesting court orders 
against alleged criminal acts. He had convinced the union execu-
tives to urge their followers to avoid violence, as the unions were 
not prepared to defend every case of lawbreaking in support of the 
strike. Otherwise, union resources would be taxed beyond endur-
ance. At one time, over three hundred suits were outstanding 
against the shop craft unions. Frank Mulholland and government 
attorneys had taken depositions on the various charges of violence 
against the unions throughout the country, and Richberg decided 
that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the government's case 
that unlawful action had been resorted to by many strikers. Argu-
ing against injunctions to prevent violence was pointless, so Rich-
berg convinced his clients not to contest the Daugherty injunction 
on such grounds. They would surely lose and the result would be 
a condemnatory opinion on the record, an opinion that might make 
trouble in the future.13 
Developments in another case, Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
v. United States Railroad Labor Board et al. in early 1923 also rein-
12 Richberg, Tents, 126-28; Richberg, My Hero, 1 17; Felix Frankfurter 
and Nathan Green, The Labor Injunction (New York, 1930), 62-63, 
253-63. 
13 Richberg, My Hero, 116-19; Jewell, McGrath, Scott, Johnston, Davi-
son, Kline, Franklin, Hynes, Noonan, Ryan to Richberg, Mulholland, and 
Easby-Smith, April 30, 1923, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 41. 
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forced Richberg's argument that the unions should not carry the 
fight against the Daugherty injunction to a conclusion. The case in-
volved a Board ruling that the Pennsylvania had violated the Trans-
portation Act by establishing a company union and refusing to deal 
with the independent railway unions. The Supreme Court deci-
sion destroyed whatever power the Railroad Labor Board may have 
had for enforcing its rulings: "The jurisdiction of the [Railroad 
Labor] Board to direct the parties to do what it deems they should 
do is not to be limited by their constitutional or legal right to refuse 
to do it. Under the Act there is no constraint upon them to do what 
the Board decides they should do except the moral constraint ... 
of publication of its decisions."H 
While the Pennsylvania case terminated the Board's enforcing 
power, it also relieved the labor unions from obeying its rulings. 
The 1922 strike was consequently legal, and the attorney general 
could not obtain an injunction on the grounds that the unions had 
no legal right to refuse to obey the Board. The right to strike was 
secure. Since Richberg refused to question the right of the govern-
ment to enjoin acts of violence, the virtual settling of the right to 
strike by the Pennsylvania suit left no further issues that the union 
leaders wanted tested in court. To the disappointment of the gov-
ernment attorneys, Richberg, Mulholland, and Easby-Smith all 
withdrew from the Daugherty injunction case in May 1923.15 
The settlement that eventually emerged from the strike under-
lined the need for effective legislation governing labor relations on 
the railroads. Though the shopmen had inaugurated the walkout 
by demanding wage increases and an end to farming out, seniority 
rights subsequently became the main issue. The final settlement 
was concluded on a road-by-road basis, so that all strikers did not 
fare alike. About 225,ooo returned to work with their seniority safe 
and their right to maintain independent unions intact. The other 
14 261 U. S. 72 (1923). See Eliot Jones and Homer B. Vanderblue, 
Railroads: Cases and Selections (New York, 1925), 720-30. 
11 Jewell, McGrath, Scott, Johnston, Davison, Kline, Franklin, Hynes, 
Noonan, Ryan, to Richberg, Mulholland, and Easby-Smith, April 30, 
1923, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 41; Richberg, My Hero, I 18; Taft, 
A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers, 474· 
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175,ooo were not so fortunate and for the most part found them-
selves herded into company unions.16 
Incidental to the 1922 strike was a criminal contempt case which, 
in Richberg's words, "resulted in a landmark decision by the Su-
preme Court." A man by the name of Michaelson had been held 
in contempt of court for having violated an injunction issued during 
the shopmen's strike. Michaelson demanded trial by jury, but was 
refused despite the provision of the Clayton Antitrust Act that a 
man accused of violating an injunction by a criminal act com-
mitted outside the court was entitled to a jury trial. Unlike a civil 
contempt, the judge alone could not try such a case. Although the 
railway union executives had decided not to contest every case that 
arose from the numerous injunctions issued during the shopmen's 
strike, Richberg and his clients decided that the Michaelson case, 
involving trial by jury and the constitutionality of a federal law 
guaranteeing that right, was too important to let go by default. 
Richberg took the case to the Supreme Court, which sustained his 
distinction between a civil contempt, primarily remedial in nature 
and intended to bring about compliance with a court order, and a 
criminal contempt, primarily a punishment for crime and hence a 
subject for trial by jury. Being a criminal act, the offense required 
criminal proceedings, separate from the original case that gave rise 
to the contempt.11 
There was a curious parallel between the shopmen' s strike and 
a novel which Richberg had completed a year or so before the 
walkout began-A Man of Purpose. Here Richberg painted a ro-
mantic picture of the role of the lawyer in defending what were 
portrayed as the downtrodden laboring masses, voiceless without 
a spokesman like Richberg. The story revolved around the search 
of a young lawyer for some kind of meaning in life, for an answer 
to the question of whether the great reward lay in service to one's 
self or to the people generally. The climax came when Rodney 
Merrill, the hero, stood up in court to denounce an injunction 
issued by the judge, a man seeped in prejudice against the working 
16 Commons, History of Labor, 4: 522-23; Taft, A. F. of L. in the Time 
of Campers, 474· 
17 266 U. S. 42 (1924); Richberg, My Hero, 124-25. 
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classes-in this instance, striking miners. Merrill was held in con-
tempt of court, but not before he had delivered a damning blow 
against judge-made law to become a martyr for justice.18 
That Richberg identified with Rodney Merrill is clear from a 
more than coincidental conformity between the events of his own 
life and that of his leading character. Reviewers commonly saw 
this concurrence. Though Richberg denied it publicly, it was there, 
and he would admit it privately.19 As he confided to Paxton Hibben, 
his old friend from Progressive Service days, "In some ways I am 
my principal character, and in some ways I am not." Richberg's 
design for A Man of Purpose was "to write the life of a man whose 
progress toward disillusionment had been sufficiently like mine 
so that I could be sure of the essential realism of the story and 
yet show his faith triumphant."20 
A Man of Purpose represented an attempt by Richberg to formu-
late a consciously felt need to believe that he was serving the pub-
lic welfare and that his work for the railway labor unions had an 
ethical value in its own right. A man with such a moralizing frame 
of mind as Richberg required this kind of justification. And the 
often melodramatic quality of the story reflected his romanticizing 
of this need. 
For Richberg and the railway unions, the 1922 strike termi-
nated the already questionable usefulness of the Railroad Labor 
Board. Some substitute arrangement for dealing with labor prob-
lems in the industry would have to be worked out. Richberg and 
his clients seized on this as an opportunity to shape the future 
conditions under which labor might work. For now, the right to 
strike was safe. The next step would be to safeguard the right of 
railway employees to form labor organizations of their own choos-
18 Richberg, A Man of Purpose (New York, 1922), 295-304, 3I8. 
19 Morris Fishbein, Review of A Man of Purpose, by Rich berg, Chicago 
News, Aug. 19, 1922; Review of A Man of Purpose, Richmond, Va., 
Evening Dispatch, April 22, I 922; Review of A Man of Purpose, 
Philadelphia Record, April 9, I922; Richberg, A Man of Purpose, 328-29; 
Richberg to Thomas Y. Crowell Co., Feb. 4, I922, and Richberg to Boetius 
H. Sullivan, April I I, I922, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box x. 
20 Richberg to Paxton Hibben, Jan. I7, I922, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 1. 
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ing, without interference from employers, and to secure the right 
to bargain collectively with management. This effort led to the 
Railway Labor Act of I 926, in which Rich berg was to play a 
major part. 
Work on what was to evolve into the Railway Labor Act began 
as soon as the outcome of the I 922 strike became clear in the fall. 
Richberg was convinced that the most practical way to fight the 
railroads was through legislation and not through the courts. In 
late I923 Bert Jewell, president of the Railway Employees' De-
partment of the AFL, sought Richberg's advice on instituting liti-
gation against roads which set up company unions, but Richberg 
believed that such efforts would simply be a waste of time and 
money, neither of which the railway workers could afford to sacri-
fice. He foresaw little success in court action: "As the courts are 
at present constituted and influenced by outside opinion, they 
are the branch of Government most partisan in opposition to the 
claims of organized labor." The courts gave precedence to property 
rights over human rights. The wisest course was "political action 
in getting new laws made by the legislatures and obtaining execu-
tive support of such laws."21 
After the I 922 strike broke up, a "Special Legislative Committee 
Representing the Recognized Railroad Labor Organizations" pre-
pared a tentative outline of what railway labor wanted, and by 
February 7, I923, its report was in the hands of Warren S. Stone, 
grand chief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and a 
leading figure in advocating cooperation among the several rail 
unions. A meeting of union executives called by Stone considered 
the recommendations in June and then turned them over to Rich-
berg and other railway union attorneys for revision. Samuel Gom-
pers, president of the AFL, suggested action along lines similar to 
what the railway unions had in mind and encouraged their efforts 
to formulate a new law.22 
21 Richberg to Jewell, Dec. 9, I923, cited in Jewell to Robertson, Dec. 
I I, I923, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 2. 
22 H. E. Wills, J. G. Luhrsen, J. J. Dermody, J. F. Anderson (Special 
Legislative Committee Representing the Recognized Railroad Labor Organi-
zations) to WarrenS. Stone, Feb. 7, I923; Jewell to Richberg, June I8, 
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Richberg and David E. Lilienthal carried out most of the draft-
ing of the railway unions' bill. Lilienthal was fresh out of Harvard 
Law School and had joined Richberg in August 1923. He came 
with the recommendation of Felix Frankfurter, law professor at 
Harvard and a future counselor of President Franklin Roosevelt. 
Richberg preferred to keep his office as small as possible; in fact, 
earlier in 1923 he had left his father's old firm to practice alone 
largely for this reason. But with Frankfurter's backing, Lilienthal 
was hired. At the beginning of his career, Lilienthal's principal in-
terest was labor law, and after a thorough search of the oppor-
tunities in the profession, he decided that working for Richberg 
would place him at the center of action. 
Immediately recognizing Lilienthal's talents, Richberg put him 
to work researching and drafting the railway bill. He prepared 
material on industrial arbitration, mediation, and conciliation; on 
individual and collective employment contracts; and on court prece-
dents and statute law dealing with labor organization.23 
By late November, the Richberg revision was ready for submis-
sion to the other attorneys of the railway unions, Oscar J. Horn, 
FrankL. Mulholland, Thomas M. Stevenson, and John M. Grimm. 
Though the draft represented the handiwork of Richberg and Lil-
ienthal, Richberg was essentially following the wishes of the rail-
way union executives themselves; as he reported, the draft was "in 
no sense the production of the attorneys, i.e., . . . they have not 
taken it upon themselves to revise the material submitted in any 
substantive way, but have merely sought to express the purposes 
1923; Samuel Campers to Richberg, Sept. 13, 1923, with draft of "Act 
Concerning the Granting of Injunctions" and "Act Concerning Labor 
Organizations"; Richberg to Campers, Oct. 4, 1923, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 2; Taft, The A. F. of L. from the Death of Campers to the Merger 
(New York, 1959), 67-68. 
23 Richberg, My Hero, 126-28; Richberg to Donald H. Riddle, Feb. 3, 
1949, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2; David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of 
David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 1: The TVA Years, 1939-1945, Including a 
Selection of Journal Entries from the 1917-1939 Period (New York, 
I964), I4-16; Richberg to Robertson, Oct. 27, I923; Lilienthal to John B. 
Andrews, Sept. I I, I923; Lilienthal, "Material on Legislative Program," 
Nov. I3, 1923, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 2. 
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of the executives in most apt form and manner and in such a way 
that the validity of the provisions proposed may be most effec-
tively supported."24 
The union executives and Richberg sought the active support 
of both management and the administration before bringing their 
proposal to the halls of Congress. Given the general labor situa-
tion in the 192os, the railway unions could expect to accomplish 
little without the support of those outside its own ranks. The I 922 
strike had proved that. Richberg consulted with Secretary of Com-
merce Herbert Hoover, both alone and in company with execu-
tives of the railway unions; he also was in contact with Samuel 
Gompers and AFL officials. The unions were most concerned about 
convincing Hoover that their proposal for national boards of ad-
justment was to be preferred to the roads' hope that regional boards 
would be established. Specifically, the unions hoped this would 
create uniform national rulings, thereby establishing national stand-
ards and spreading gains made by stronger unions to weaker ones. 
Additionally, national rather than regional boards would strengthen 
the standard railway unions as a whole in gaining general recogni-
tion as the representatives of the employees rather than localized 
company unions, due to the latter's restricted area of operation. The 
union executives would not yield to Hoover's proposals that the 
president be given special power to intervene in industrial disputes 
that threatened to create a national emergency in transportation. 
Consultations were also had with Secretary of Labor James J. Davis. 
Perhaps the most important outcome of these consultations re-
sulted when Secretary Hoover sought the cooperation of the rail-
way presidents in working out some plan with the unions. But 
the railway presidents were adamant and refused to confer at all. 
The initiative thus remained with the railway labor executives as-
sisted by Richberg, and there it stayed throughout the writing of 
the act. Despite Hoover's cooperativeness, the unions' bill did not 
gain administration support in Congress for another two years.25 
24 Richberg to Robertson, Nov. 28, 1923, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 2. 
25 "Memorandum of Legal Services of Donald R. Richberg," Dec. 1923; 
Robertson to Richberg, Dec. 29, 1923; Richberg to Robertson, Jan. 17, 
1924, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 2; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 219-2o; 
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Once the bill was ready, Richberg took it to Senator Robert La 
Follette of Wisconsin and others for counsel on legislative strategy. 
On the advice of La Follette, who had a longstanding interest in 
rail legislation, especially on matters of ratemaking and valuation, 
Richberg and the railway union executives, aided by Gompers and 
other AFL leaders, decided to ask Senator Robert Howell of Ne-
braska and Congressman Alben Barkley of Kentucky to introduce 
the bill into the first session of the Sixty-eighth Congress. Both 
Howell and Barkley promised the closest cooperation with the rail-
way unions in fighting for the new legislation and introduced the 
bill in their respective chambers on February 28, 1924.26 
Hearings in the Senate began promptly before the Committee 
on Interstate Commerce. Richberg and David B. Robertson, presi-
dent of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen 
and the successor to Warren Stone as the leader of cooperative ven-
tures by the rail unions, presented the workers' case. Robertson 
concentrated on the practical questions involving working condi-
tions on the roads; Richberg, as counsel for the brotherhoods and 
shopmen, outlined the legal aspects of proposed legislation.27 
In brief, the draft bill provided machinery for settling disputes 
arising out of both the negotiation of new agreements and the ap-
plication of old agreements. The disputants first would hold con-
ferences among themselves; these failing, they might tum to a 
Mediation Board; if the Board failed, it might recommend volun-
tary arbitration. In addition, the unions sought nationwide Boards 
"Progress of the Howell-Barkley Bill to Date: Report of Sub-Committee of 
Chief Executives of Railway Labor Organizations Supporting the Bowell-
Barkley Bill, Dated February 16, 1925, to be Submitted for Consideration 
of Meeting of Chief Executives in Chicago, Feb. 20, 1925," Richberg 
Papers, c.H.s., Box 4· 
26 Richberg, My Hero, 128; Robertson to Richberg, Feb. 26, 1924; 
Robertson to Richberg, Feb. 27, 1924; Robertson to Richberg, Feb. 28, 
1924, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 3; "Progress of the Howell-Barkley Bill 
to Date"; Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, 67-69. 
27 Richberg to Robertson, March 8, 1924, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 3; 
U. S., Congress, Senate, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Committee on Interstate 
Commerce, Arbitration between Carriers and Employees: Boards of Ad-
justment, Hearings on S. 2646 (1924), 1-29. 
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of Adjustment especially to assist negotiations over grievances con-
cerning the application of agreements; these Boards would include 
members nominated by the standard railway unions and would be 
invoked before such disputes went to the Mediation Board, which 
it was anticipated would devote most of its energies to new con-
tract negotiations rather than disputes over the enforcement of 
established contracts.28 
In defending the bill before the Senate committee, Richberg 
indicated that there was no ultimate weapon of enforcement "ex-
cept general condemnation and public opposition" against a recal-
citrant. While apparently unrealistic in its lack of an effective en-
forcing power, anything stronger would have stood no chance of 
winning the support of the roads.29 
In fact, the unions were forced to compromise on the use of the 
strike as a weapon in order to win management support before the 
bill eventually passed. The final draft of 1926 contained a pro-
vision for an Emergency Board appointed by the president upon 
the recommendation of the Board of Mediation in cases where 
negotiations had broken down and where a substantial interrup-
tion of interstate commerce was threatened. The Board's func-
tion was simply to investigate the dispute and report back within 
thirty days. Most important, both employers and employees would 
be obliged not to change the conditions of work or resort to a lock-
out or strike during the investigation, or for thirty days after the 
Emergency Board's report. Irving Bernstein has picked out this 
provision as "the main price the unions paid for employer support 
of the statute." But the Wilkerson injunction in the 1922 shop-
men's strike had shown that the unions could not stand alone in 
an industrial dispute without some way of marshaling support from 
either management or government; hopefully the draft bill would 
do this, so its passage was worth a high price.30 
28 David E. Lilienthal, "A Practical Plan for Railroad Peace" [March 
1924], Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 3; Robertson to Richberg, Dec. 8, 
1923, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 2. 
29 Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Arbitration between Car-
riers and Employees, 1924, 20. 
80 Bernstein, The Lean Years, :uB-19. 
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Richberg's congressional testimony emphasized that the pro-
posed legislation represented no great departure from former col-
lective bargaining procedures on the railways as developed up to the 
time of the Transportation Act of 1920. He pursued this argument 
even though the bill took the unusual step of empowering the 
standard railway unions to participate in nominating members of 
the Adjustment Boards, a provision which would have had impor-
tant implications for union recognition had it not been eliminated 
from the final bill in 1926. Nevertheless, Richberg estimated "that 
approximately 90 percent of the contents of the bill is a transcrip-
tion or adaptation of existing law and that the small portion which 
may be described as 'new' consists largely of improvements in de-
tail, the desirability of which has been shown by experience under 
existing laws." The unions had based their proposals on earlier at-
tempts to set up mediation or arbitration machinery as tried out in 
the Erdman Act of 1898 and the Newlands Act of 1913. Richberg 
often reiterated that the unions' bill represented no radical depar-
ture from past experience. 
The weak bargaining position of railway labor and the faith of 
people such as Richberg in cooperation as the only way to mutually 
satisfactory and enduring labor agreements was reflected in the 
bill's provisions imposing a duty on both labor and management to 
"exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements 
concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to set-
tle all disputes . . . arising out of the application of said agreements 
or otherwise." The burden of this obligation was to require parties 
subject to the bill to avail themselves of all the machinery provided 
for conference, mediation, and voluntary arbitration before resort-
ing to lockouts or strikes. More concretely, thirty days notice was 
required before either party could seek changes in agreements, 
thus avoiding arbitrary and summary changes in working condi-
tions, sudden discharge of workers, or a strike without warning. 
Negotiations hopefully would be under way before old agreements 
expired. This might obviate the one-sided power of employers to 
impose changes in wages and work conditions under threat of dis-
charge, a situation that had repeatedly come to the attention of 
the Railroad Labor Board through complaints by the unions prior 
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to the 1922 strike. Now at least employer and employee would 
talk things over first. 
Fundamental to the unions' position, of course, were the bill's 
guarantees that workers would be free to organize their own unions 
without interference from employers. Both sides were to select 
their own representatives for bargaining purposes "without inter-
ference, influence, or coercion exercised by either party over the 
self-organization or designation of representatives by the other." 
Nevertheless, there was no denying the perilous health of the trade 
union movement in the I 92os, so that the goal of the rail workers 
was in fact of a limited nature; they did not seriously expect to 
make the standard rail unions the exclusive bargaining agent for 
workers on the roads. Though employers might not interfere with 
worker organization, Richberg explained during the congressional 
hearings that the bill "imposes no obligation upon a railroad to 
maintain what is called a 'dosed shop'; it grants no special privileges 
to any particular labor organization; it leaves all railroad employees 
just as free as railroad managements to select their own representa-
tives and to enter into agreements with full liberty of contract." 
Thus did the New Era define the upper limits of union power. By 
recognizing these limits, the union executives and Richberg hoped 
to gain the support of management and of the Republican admin-
istration, without which little could be expected in the way of 
legislation. 
In sum, Richberg described the bill as "essentially a codification 
of industrial law for the railroads. It is not a radical or even a novel 
piece of legislation." But his assertion that "the act is drawn on 
the theory that nothing is accomplished in matters of this kind by 
attempting to swing a dub, except the compulsion to live up to 
the agreement and to make agreements," was really an inadvertent 
confession that the railway labor unions were helpless unless man-
agement could be won over.31 
For the time being management did not appear amicable. The 
railway presidents conducted a publicity campaign which misrep-
11 Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Arbitration between Car-
riers and Employees, 1924, I 7-2 I, 24-25. For the text of the act as passed 
in 1926, see U.S., Statutes at Large (I926), 44=577· 
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resented the proposed legislation and the motives of the unions in 
presenting it. They claimed that the bill had been prepared with-
out public discussion or consultation with the presidents of the 
roads, a blatant distortion of Secretary Hoover's attempts to get 
them to confer with the union leaders. The notion was spread that 
the public was unrepresented in the new machinery for settling 
disputes, whereas in reality more rather than less public represen-
tation was provided for as compared with the railroad-supported 
Transportation Act of 1920. The chief executives of the railway 
unions regarded the roads' publicity campaign as of a "purely de-
structive obstructive character"; they accused the railroad presi-
dents of offering "no constructive suggestions for improvement of 
the measure, although they presented no criticism of the funda-
mental principles actually underlying the bill."32 
Although the Senate committee reported the bill favorably, no 
action was possible in the House, so that Barkley and Richberg 
decided not to press the matter at that session of Congress. It was 
hoped that the groundwork laid in the first session of the Sixty-
eighth Congress would prepare the way for something more con-
structive in the second session.33 
While the railway unions were waging battle in Congress on 
behalf of their legislative program, the Railroad Labor Board, still 
functioning under the authority of the Transportation Act, once 
again discredited itself as far as the employee organizations were 
concerned. In I 924, the railway engineers and firemen on forty-
three western railroads sought separate conferences with the sev-
eral managements to negotiate pay increases commensurate with 
those in effect on the eastern roads. Management suggested con-
solidating the negotiations and holding a joint conference between 
representatives of all the roads and of all the unions. But when the 
conference was held, the employees found that the management 
32 "Progress of the Howell-Barkley Bill to Date"; Lilienthal to Edward 
Keating, April 22, 1924; Robertson to Chief Executives, May 4, 1924; 
Richberg to Walter Lippmann, May 8, 1924; Richberg to Editor, New York 
Sun, May 8, 1924, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 3; Richberg, "Railway 
Publicity Agents Poison Public Opinion," Labor, Dec. 13, 1924, 2, 4· 
38 "Progress of the Bowell-Barkley Bill to Date"; Richberg, My Hero, 
128-29. 
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representatives were not authorized to make binding agreements; 
they simply sought concessions and then planned to refer the work-
ers back to the individual roads for separate negotiations. Though 
the management representatives had not negotiated in good faith 
in accordance with the Transportation Act, the Railroad Labor 
Board attempted to intervene to force a settlement. The employee 
organizations, represented by Richberg in test cases requiring the 
appearance of union officials before the Board, challenged the 
Board's action because it had the effect of "aiding the railroads in 
refusing to hold conferences as required by the Transportation 
Act." Furthermore, the Board's decision would not have been bind-
ing in any case, nor enforceable in the courts. Richberg's conten-
tions were eventually upheld, though not before the Railroad Labor 
Board had once again made itself appear to be the partisan agent 
of the carriers and completely unacceptable to the workers' organi-
zations.34 
The second session of the Sixty-eighth Congress saw little prog-
ress for the employees' legislative program. Richberg prepared 
propaganda on behalf of the bill and worked to counteract un-
favorable management publicity in the press. Between sessions, 
the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive party conventions had 
all endorsed revision of the Transportation Act along lines sug-
gested by the railway unions. The president's message to Congress 
of December 3, I 924, backed efforts to obtain new legislation, al-
though it did not specifically endorse the Howell-Barkley bill. Con-
sequently, Richberg and the union officers took the opportunity 
for further consultation with the administration, and several con-
ferences took place with Secretary of Commerce Hoover and Sena-
tor Albert B. Cummins, president pro tern of the Senate, in which 
34 "Summary of Statement Made to U. S. Railroad Labor Board of 
Position of Employes in Regard to Docket No. 4055-Hearing July 24, 
I924"; "Outline of Argument for Respondents," Railroad Labor Board v. 
D. B. Robertson, and Railroad Labor Board v. J. McGuire, District Court 
of the United States, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, all in 
Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 3; "Material for the Report of the Executive 
Committee of the American Federation of Labor on the Howell-Barkley 
Bill and Developments Concerning the Railroad Labor Board, 1924-I925,'' 
2-6, Rich berg Papers, c.H.s., Box 4; Lilienthal, Journals, I: I 5· 
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the cooperation of the railroad presidents was sought-again with-
out success. Indeed, on November 19, 1924, the Association of 
Railroad Executives had declared "that there is no condition exist-
ing today which calls for any urgent legislative action by Congress 
with respect to the railroads, either as to rates, labor relationship, or 
valuation." 
There was no action on the bill in the Senate, though Senator 
Howell wanted to present it as an amendment to other legislation 
in February 1925. In the House, Congressman Barkley once again 
decided not to press the matter in view of additional attempts to 
obtain the cooperation of the railroad executives. Further, promoters 
of the bill thought it would be a tactical error to force consideration 
in view of the congested calendar and the shortness of the second 
session, which was to end March 4, 1925. Consequently, the union 
executives had to be content with the knowledge "that a general 
understanding of the uselessness and menacing qualities of the 
Railroad Labor Board now prevails at least in Congress, if not with 
the public at large."35 
Although the labor organizations were not hopeful of obtaining 
negotiations with the railroads for several months after the Sixty-
eighth Congress ended, events were moving toward just such a 
meeting. Throughout this period, Colonel Alfred P. Thorn, general 
counsel of the railroad presidents, kept in touch with Richberg, 
Howell, and Barkley. He was persuaded that the atmosphere in 
Congress was favorable to doing away with the Transportation Act 
and substituting new legislation, and that the roads ought to co-
operate in preparing a bill in their own self-interest. His point of 
view carried weight among the railroad presidents, and the Execu-
tive Committee of the Association of Railroad Executives finally 
appointed a committee on March 20, 1925, "for the purpose of 
taking up the whole labor situation." By the beginning of the sum-
mer, the executives through W. W. Atterbury, president of the 
35 "Progress of the Bowell-Barkley Bill to Date"; "Memorandum of 
Bowell-Barkley Bill Progress, Feb. 1-20, 1925"; "Memorandum of Sug-
gestions for Program for Bowell-Barkley Bill," Chicago, Nov. ;, 1924; 
Jewell and Richberg, press release, Washington, D. C., Dec. ;, 1924; Jewell 
to Richberg, Dec. 6, 1924, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 4· 
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Pennsylvania Railroad and a member of the special committee, 
suggested to union leaders that conferences on the proposed legisla-
tion would be agreeable to management. 
This was the opportunity that the chief executives of the em-
ployee organizations had been waiting for. Gathering in Washing-
ton on July 27-28, they authorized the conferences with manage-
ment. The initial meeting on August I 3 resulted in the formation 
of a subcommittee of employee and management representatives 
to draw up the outlines of a bill that both sides could support. 
The point of departure in these talks was the Howell-Barkley bill 
presented by the railway unions in the Sixty-eighth Congress. Nei-
ther Thorn nor Richberg participated in person, though both were 
"invisibly present," as Richberg described it. The matters discussed 
contained broad policy implications, something that the men them-
selves had to decide. They did not want lawyers to solve their prob-
lems for them, but merely to implement their decisions. Meetings 
continued throughout the fall and winter, so that on December 3, 
the chief executives of the employee organizations met in Wash-
ington and approved the principles of the agreed-upon draft, and 
the railroad presidents followed suit on December 2 I. The labor 
executives approved the bill unanimously, and the railroad execu-
tives assented I99 votes (cast by 52 carriers) to 48 votes (cast by 
20 carriers) .36 
Even before the railroad presidents gave their formal approval 
on December 2 I, the conferees decided to report to the White 
House the progress being made, so that President Calvin Coolidge 
could recommend the bill in his annual message to Congress. This 
he did, pointing out that the bill deserved support because it was 
the result of a joint effort and therefore offered a firm foundation 
for labor peace in the railroad industry. 
The final touches were put on the bill in a conference between 
Colonel Thorn, with representatives of the railroad presidents, and 
Richberg, with representatives of the employee organizations, held 
36 "Report of Sub-Committee on Passage of Railway Labor Act: Report to 
Chief Executives of Railway Labor Organizations for Consideration at Their 
Meeting in Washington, May 17, 1926," 1-3, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 
5; Jewell, "Memoranda," Chicago, Ill., Aug. 19, 1925, Richberg Papers, 
c.H.s., Box 4; Richberg, My Hero, 129. 
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January 5-6, 1926. James A. Emery, general counsel for the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, was allowed to appear before 
the meeting and made a last-ditch effort to talk the roads out of 
supporting a compromise bill. He offered amendments which the 
employee representatives regarded as crippling, but the manage-
ment representatives were not swayed by his efforts to prevent an 
agreement.37 
The joint bill differed from the ideal desired by the employees 
and first set forth in the Howell-Barkley bill in that it provided 
for an Emergency Board to intervene in the event of a failure to 
agree and if in the opinion of the Board of Mediation the dispute 
threatened a substantial interruption of interstate commerce. This 
was the Board appointed by the president to investigate and report 
on unresolved disputes; during the investigation and for thirty days 
thereafter, management was not to change the conditions of work 
and labor was not to strike. The workers thus paid the price of re-
stricting their right to strike in order to win the support of the car-
riers for new legislation. Further, Boards of Adjustment to handle 
grievances over the application of agreements were to "be created 
by agreement between any carrier or group of carriers, or the car-
riers as a whole, and its or their employees." While this left the way 
open for the formation of national Boards as the unions desired, it 
also provided a loophole whereby regional or system Boards might 
be established, as the railroads wanted. Simply by failing to agree, 
the railroads could prevent the formation of national Adjustment 
Boards; none were set up by the act itself. Further, the bill per-
mitted disputants to create any ad hoc negotiating arrangements 
they desired; they were not forced to utilize the machinery pro-
vided in the act, but only to make a reasonable effort to negotiate 
in some manner. Irving Bernstein has called this last provision "the 
capstone of the carriers' victory." Otherwise, in essentials the bill 
conformed to that outlined in the measure presented by Senator 
Howell and Congressman Barkley in the Sixty-eighth Congress.38 
In order to avoid any unnecessary antagonisms, Richberg and 
37 "Report of Sub-Committee on Passage of Railway Labor Act: Report 
to Chief Executives ... May 17, 1926," 3-4; Richberg, Tents, 184-85. 
38 U.S., Statutes at Large (1926), 44:577; Lilienthal, "A Practical Plan 
for Railroad Peace"; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 2 I 8-20. 
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the union executives agreed that the new bill should be turned 
over to Senator James Watson and Congressman James S. Parker 
to be introduced in their respective chambers of Congress. Watson 
and Parker were the chairmen of the committees that would have 
to hold hearings and recommend the bill to the House and Senate. 
Turning the bill over to them would smooth the way for approval, 
as the railroads had vigorously fought Howell and Barkley on the 
earlier version.39 
In the hope of clearing away the last remnants of opposition, 
Richberg and Colonel Thorn met with President Coolidge to re-
move his lingering doubts about giving unreserved support to the 
compromise measure. Coolidge was impressed with the objections 
voiced by some holdout railroads and by the National Association 
of Manufacturers (NAM). He urged Richberg and Thorn to accept 
the NAM's amendments. Thorn was willing, but Richberg held out 
on the grounds that the draft bill was the joint product of the rail-
roads and the workers. To change the bill now meant disturbing 
the understanding that had been achieved and giving the roads an 
excuse for not cooperating in its enforcement. Coolidge finally 
yielded to this argument, albeit reluctantly. With support from 
both management and labor, the bill passed through Congress ex-
peditiously, the House approving 381 to 13 and the Senate 69 to 
13, and Coolidge signed the Railway Labor Act into law on 
May 20.40 
For Richberg, the Railway Labor Act of 1926 marked one of the 
high points of his entire career. Forever after he would take a 
benevolent, fatherly interest in its application and amendment, 
whether or not he was directly involved. Yet his role in both its 
39 "Report of Sub-Committee on Passage of Railway Labor Act: Report 
to Chief Executives ... May 17, 1926," 4-5; Richberg, My Hero, 129-
30. 
40 Richberg, My Hero, 130-32; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 216; "Re-
port of Sub-Committee on Passage of Railway Labor Act: Report to Chief 
Executives ... May 17, 1926," I, 5-22; U. S., Congress, House, 69th 
Cong., xst sess., Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Railroad 
Labor Disputes, Hearings on H. R. 7180 (1926); U. S., Congress, Senate, 
69th Cong., xst sess., Committee on Interstate Commerce, Railway Labor 
Act (1926), 2 vols. 
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passage and in the I922 shopmen's strike, which had inspired the 
bill, was that of the behind-the-scenes technician, subordinate to 
the union executives. This was the role that Richberg had culti-
vated, for it offered him the opportunity to turn his technical com-
petence in the law to the service of a cause he believed in. Although 
not directly possessing power himself, Richberg found that his work 
as general counsel of the railway labor executives enabled him to 
exercise it by proxy. He was their agent, but his ideas carried 
weight with the union executives as well. 
The noncoercive character of the Railway Labor Act was in-
dicative of the concurrence between Richberg's views and those of 
the labor executives. Richberg's opportunity came about because 
the weak condition of labor in the I 92os precluded a more forceful 
measure and because union leaders, caught up in the business 
ethic of the New Era, were receptive to cooperative ventures be-
tween management and labor. They were ready to listen to what 
Richberg had to say. As far as the Railway Labor Act was con-
cerned, Rich berg got what he wanted. 
From the personal standpoint, and despite the discouragements 
of many long-drawn-out court and legislative battles, Donald Rich-
berg's days as a labor lawyer were among the most satisfying of his 
entire career. Again he seemed to have found a way of harmoniz-
ing his career situation with his personal psychic and intellectual 
needs. Though he had his complaints, Richberg's contentment 
with his work seemed greater than at any other time of his life. He 
threw himself into his job, with its defeats as well as victories, and 
enjoyed every minute of it. It seemed to provide the right mixture 
of martyrdom and security, of struggle and triumph, to sustain his 
need to do battle for the public welfare. The struggle provided a 
test of his dedication; the triumph vindicated his rightness. These 
were years of hard work, but they also had their moments of glory, 
and both elements-for Richberg-were vital. For the next decade, 
he immersed himself in the work of the railway labor organiza-
tions so that the story of Donald Rich berg in the I 92os is almost 
exclusively the story of his labor battles. 
CHAPTER IV 
Empire-Building 
Just as the shopmen's strike had led to agitation for new railroad 
legislation to replace the Transportation Act of 1920, so too the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926 inspired a further development in the 
organization of railroad labor. By joining together, the shop crafts 
and the transportation brotherhoods had been able to destroy the 
Railroad Labor Board and secure passage of the Railway Labor Act 
--objectives that each union working separately could never have 
realized. The lesson was not lost on Rich berg; the informal alliances 
that had carried out the shopmen' s strike and worked for new legis-
lation must be formalized in a more permanent organization con-
solidating the resources of all the rail unions. Making the Railway 
Labor Act work and defending it from the courts was an ongoing 
job that required continuous surveillance and resources beyond 
the capabilities of any one union. What once could be done through 
informal, single-issue alliances must now be done through perma-
nent institutions. 
Richberg's efforts, combined with the momentum created by 
the success of the rail unions' past joint ventures, culminated in 
the founding of the Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA) 
in August 1926. Though such a development was the logical out-
come of the unions' recent cooperative activities, it nevertheless 
required someone like Richberg to cement the relationship. Despite 
the proved benefits of association, each union remained jealous of 
its own autonomy, but largely through Richberg's efforts, they 
"finally worked out the scheme of a council of executives who 
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could work out uniform policies which they would then persuade 
their organizations to follow." As Richberg later told it, "The major 
factor that led to the creation of R.L.E.A. was my insistence on the 
necessity for uniform, or at least harmonious handling of disputes 
and litigation by the organizations under the Railway Labor Act."1 
Prior to the founding of the RLEA as a permanent, multi-issue 
alliance, there had been a few attempts to create formal organiza-
tions of all the railway unions, but except for the Railway Employ-
ees' Department of the AFL, made up of only the shop crafts, these 
ventures were primarily single-issue or political projects. The AFL 
did try to bring the transportation brotherhoods into the Railway 
Employees' Department, but never succeeded in winning their 
loyalty. The AFL came closest to success in I9I9, when the brother-
hoods applied for affiliation, but shortly thereafter they withdrew 
their application on the grounds that they did not wish to surrender 
autonomy in railroad matters. Though resentful of the brotherhoods' 
aloofness, Samuel Gompers and the AFL acquiesced in this separa-
tism and made no attempt to set up dual unions or otherwise chal-
lenge the brotherhoods' jurisdiction. Of the organizations created 
prior to the RLEA, the two most important that Richberg had some-
thing to do with were the National Conference on Valuation of 
American Railroads and the Conference for Progressive Political 
Action.2 
Sponsored by Senator Robert La Follette, Sr., of Wisconsin and 
the railway unions, the National Conference on Valuation of 
American Railroads was founded May 26, I923. Its purpose was to 
lobby for a valuation by the Interstate Commerce Commission of 
the capital investment in the nation's railroad system. The La Fol-
lette Valuation Act of I 9 I 3 and the Transportation Act of I 920, 
both amending the Interstate Commerce Act, had directed the ICC 
to determine the original investment and the cost of reproduction 
at current prices of all railroads and to use these findings as a base 
for regulating rates so as to allow a return on capital of approxi-
1 Donald Richberg, "Memorandum for Mr. Levy," May 19, 1952, Donald 
Richberg Papers, Library of Congress, Box 44· 
2 Philip Taft, The A. F. of L. in the Time of Campers (New York, 
1957), 462-67. 
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mately 6 percent. While the Commission had produced the infor-
mation on reproduction cost, it encountered difficulties in uncover-
ing the original cost, owing to incomplete records, stock-watering, 
and obstruction by the roads, which hoped to see reproduction cost 
made the exclusive base for setting rates. When Richberg became 
involved in the work of the Valuation Conference, he estimated 
that if the railroads' view prevailed, they would be valued at least 
$ro billion more than the probable estimates of building them in 
the first place. According to his figures, this would mean an in-
crease in passenger and freight rates totaling a minimum of $5 50 
million each year.3 
Actually, it was Glenn Plumb and not Richberg who had first 
interested the railway unions in working for lower rates and profits 
and supporting Senator La Follette's attempts to have the Icc carry 
out the valuation of the nation's railroads. After the First World 
War, when Plumb became involved in promoting his plan for pub-
lic ownership of the railway system, Richberg had taken over the 
work of representing the unions before the ICC. After Plumb's 
death in 1922, he had emerged as the railway organizations' fore-
most attorney-especially after the shopmen's strike. Thus, when 
the unions along with Senator La Follette and other sponsors de-
cided in I 92 3 to expand the base of support for their campaign 
by creating the Valuation Conference, Richberg was made general 
counsel of the new organization.4 
Richberg's job was to go before the ICC on behalf of the Confer-
ence and work for full compliance with the Valuation Act. The 
ICC allowed Richberg to appear in a number of valuation proceed-
ings and argue the position of the Valuation Conference. At the 
outset of his campaign, Richberg was optimistic that eventually a 
3 Donald Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but 
Unheroic Life (New York, 1954), 120-21; Richberg, Tents of the Mighty 
(New York, 1930), 146-47; Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, 
Robert M. La Follette, June 14, 1855-June 18, 1925 (New York, 1953), 
2:1070; U.S., Statutes at Large (1913), 37:701, and (1920), 41:456, 
48 8-9 z; Rich berg, "Railroad Valuation and the Public," The Locomotive 
Engineers Journal 57 (June 1923): 455-57, 460. 
4 Richberg, My Hero, 112-15, 119-21; Richberg, Tents, 14I-50, 153. 
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majority of the Icc would support the Conference position. Hence, 
his activities initially were restricted to participating in pending 
valuation proceedings before the ICC itself, rather than resorting 
immediately to court action. Eventually, however, Richberg's work 
did culminate in a landmark case in the United States Supreme 
Court-the St. Louis and O'Fallon Railroad case. But that was 
some years in the future. At the beginning, Richberg had good 
grounds for hoping that the ICC would be favorably disposed to 
his point of view, and so he proceeded cautiously. 
More helpful than court action to compel the ICC to evaluate 
original cost, in Richberg's opinion, would have been additional 
legislation from Congress directing the Commission to undertake 
the project despite the obstacles set up by the roads. Richberg 
worked with La Follette on this problem, and the senator intro-
duced a bill in I 924 to strengthen the valuation and ratemaking 
sections of the Interstate Commerce Act. In addition, Richberg 
undertook a publicity campaign designed to reach the general pub-
lic on behalf of the original cost theory, and to counteract railroad 
propaganda in favor of reproduction cost. He felt that any possible 
legislation would have to depend on an informed public for sup-
port, and regarded the legislative and publicity aspects of his valua-
tion work as intimately related. Nonetheless, in the end it was Rich-
berg's legal endeavors that consumed most of his energy and proved 
to be most significant.5 
The issue of reproduction cost versus original cost was squarely 
presented in the O'Fallon case. The ICC sued the St. Louis and 
5 Richberg, "Work of National Conference on Valuation of American 
Railroads from Its Organization May 26, I923, to January I, I924,'' Report 
to Robert M. La Follette, Chairman, Executive Committee, National Con-
ference on Valuation of American Railroads, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 44· 
Examples of Richberg's publicity efforts are Richberg, "Railroad Valuation 
and the Public," 455-57, 46o; Richberg, "The Great National Railroad 
Swindle: Gift, Graft, Guarantee," Address to the Conference for Progressive 
Political Action, St. Louis, Mo., Feb. I2, I924, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 
I 9; Rich berg, "Labor's Investment in Public Utilities," Public Affairs, 
March I925, I5-I6. Also see Richberg to the Editor, Chicago Evening 
Post, Jan. 18, I924, Donald Richberg Papers, Chicago Historical Society, 
Box 3· 
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O'Fallon Railroad, a nine-mile coal-bearing line, for excessive profits 
allegedly collected over the 6 percent allowed by law. According 
to the Transportation Act of I92o, such excess profits were to be 
collected by the ICC and used to assist roads operating at a loss. The 
O'Fallon, however, maintained that its profits had not been exces-
sive, on the grounds that the proper base for figuring valuation was 
primarily reproduction cost; using such a base, its profits did not 
even come up to the 6 percent allowed. The ICC, it claimed, had 
given undue weight to original cost in valuing its property and 
hence found its profits to be over 6 percent. Recognizing the case 
as a clear-cut presentation of the issues, one which would not be 
decided on technical rather than constitutional grounds, the Valua-
tion Conference backed Richberg in defending the ICC valuation, 
while many of the nation's railroads united behind the O'Fallon 
defense against the original cost theory. 
At the Icc hearing in July I926 Richberg was the only repre-
sentative to appear on behalf of the Commission's valuation, while 
approximately one hundred and fifty attorneys were present in de-
fense of the railroad. The Icc's chief counsel had asked to be ex-
cused from the case; his assistant did speak in favor of the original 
cost theory, but in an independent and not an official capacity. At 
stake was billions of dollars, depending on which theory of valua-
tion was upheld. To the dismay of the roads, the Icc upheld Rich-
berg's arguments in a six-to-four decision, handed down February 
I 5, I 92 7. The O'Fallon then took the case to the courts.6 
In the meantime, Richberg lobbied for a congressional investi-
gation into the whole matter of rate regulation and valuation. He 
suggested to Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, who had 
succeeded La Follette as head of the National Valuation Confer-
ence, that plans for a government-sponsored transportation system 
be prepared as an aid in estimating the value of the nation's rail-
roads; the concept was similar to the yardstick theory later utilized 
e Richberg, My Hero, 121-22; Hugh Russell Fraser, "One Man Beats 
150," The Outlook 145 (Oct. 5, 1927): 149-52. William F. Allen, "How 
One Man Single Handed Fought 'The Greatest Lawsuit in History,' " St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, June 12, 1927. 
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by the Tennessee Valley Authority in competing with private elec-
tric power companies. Richberg did not actually envision setting 
up a public transportation system, at least not in the foreseeable fu-
ture, but suggested the idea as a way to "tear to pieces the valua-
tion theories now being advanced by the railroads." The result 
would make public ownership unnecessary: "If the cry were once 
raised that a national transportation system should be constructed 
and estimates were obtained of the cost, we would see a voluntary 
reduction in the valuation of the railroads begin with a haste in-
dicating panic." Norris, as one of a small group of progressives in 
the Senate, was unable to undertake the project because he was al-
ready committed to a number of equally compelling causes. The 
brunt of the battle would have to be borne by Richberg and the 
Valuation Conference in the Supreme Court.7 
Norris was able, however, to render limited assistance. Because 
of a division within the ICC over the reproduction cost theory and 
the original cost theory, the Commission was unable to agree upon 
Richberg as its counsel in the O'Fallon case when it went to the 
courts. As the successful defender of the Icc valuation in the origi-
nal hearings, he would have been a logical choice, but was ex-
cluded because of the difference of opinion in the Commission. 
The ICC selected Walter Fisher, former secretary of the interior 
under President William Howard Taft, as its representative. Rich-
berg petitioned the district court to allow him to intervene on be-
half of the Valuation Conference, as it had been a party to the 
original proceedings before the ICC, but the court would only allow 
him to submit a brief; he did not participate in the oral arguments. 
As a result, Richberg anticipated grave obstacles in gaining the right 
to participate in the Supreme Court, especially since the O'Fallon 
attorneys were opposed to his intervening. The case was scheduled 
for the Court's October 1928 term.8 
7 Richberg to George W. Norris, Nov. 29, 1926; Norris to Richberg, Dec. 
r, 1926; Richberg to Norris, Dec. 3, 1926; Norris to Richberg, Dec. 19, 
1926, George W. Norris Papers, Library of Congress, Tray 8, Box 8. 
8 Richberg, My Hero, 122-23; Richberg to Norris, March 20, 1928, 
Norris Papers, Tray 8, Box 8. 
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Fearing the worst, Richberg turned to Norris with a suggestion 
that the senator circulate a letter to be signed by members of the 
Congress urging the Court to hear Richberg. Norris was receptive 
to the idea, and soon it snowballed from a letter by concerned con-
gressmen into an official Senate resolution. Richberg later related 
that it was Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana who first put forth 
the idea of a resolution. Though Richberg himself had raised the 
idea of bringing pressure on the Court, his original proposal did 
not contemplate official congressional action; he did not want to 
be put in the position of publicly forcing himself on the Supreme 
Court. Nevertheless, the Senate adopted the resolution on May 7, 
1928, by a vote of forty-six to thirty-one after a debate in which 
the opposition challenged the propriety of congressional advice to 
the Supreme Court. Privately, Richberg was flattered.9 
Though Richberg later asserted-at least for the public record 
-that he had been embarrassed by the idea of a Senate resolution 
on his behalf, he did feel that there was a precedent for such ac-
tion and provided Norris with arguments to use in defending his 
recommendation to the Court. In brief, Richberg maintained that 
he was defending the legislature's prerogative, explicitly acknowl-
edged by the courts, to determine public policy through agencies 
of its own creation, such as the me. Ratemaking and valuation were 
clearly matters of public policy, not subject to determination by 
judicial fiat. Therefore, the Senate had a direct interest in the 
O'Fallon proceedings and would be justified in asking the Court 
to hear a representative on its behalf. Richberg cited Myers, Ad-
ministratrix, v. United States (272 U. S. 52, 65-88, 176-77 
[1926]), where the Court itself had once sought representation 
from the Senate in a case involving the legislature's policyrnaking 
prerogatives.10 
9 Richberg to Norris, March 20, 1928; Norris to Richberg, March 26, 
1928; Richberg to Norris, March 28, 1928; Richberg to [Norris], May 6, 
1928, Norris Papers, Tray 8, Box 8; Richberg, My Hero, 122-23; Rich-
berg, Tents, I 54; U. S., Congressional Record, 7oth Cong., ISt sess., 69, 
pt. 7: 7856-57, 7950-59; Chicago Daily Tribune, May 8, 1928. 
10 Richberg, My Hero, 123; Richberg to [Norris], May 6, 1928, Norris 
Papers, Tray 8, Box 8. See also Richberg, Brief in Behalf of the National 
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Richberg filed his petition to intervene, and the Supreme Court 
granted it, allowing him equal time with other supporters of the 
ICC valuation. Whether the Court had been persuaded by the 
Senate resolution or some other factor cannot be determined with 
certainty, although the deputy clerk of the Court later advised Rich-
berg, "I wouldn't do it again if I were you." 
Despite Richberg's efforts, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled 
against the ICC and reversed the O'Fallon decision in I 929. The 
Valuation Conference thus lost its most crucial test of the original 
cost theory. Yet with the onset of the Great Depression shortly 
afterward, valuation became a less urgent problem for the railway 
unions, which had been the chief backers of the Valuation Con-
ference. Soon deflation, unemployment, and railroad mergers and 
consolidations became more relevant than valuation to Richberg 
and his clients. These were problems better handled through the 
Railway Labor Executives' Association.11 
Besides the Valuation Conference, Richberg was involved in 
another attempt to organize labor power before the formation of the 
RLEA in 1926-this time, one avowedly political in both its pur-
poses and methods. The Conference for Progressive Political Ac-
tion had a brief life from 1922 to 1924 and was strongly supported 
by the railway labor unions, along with the Farmer Labor party, 
the Socialist party of America, and the AFL. Taking a major de-
parture from the traditional nonpartisan political policy set by the 
AFL and generally followed by most of the labor movement, the 
railway unions backed what amounted to a third-party movement, 
fielding Senator Robert La Follette as a candidate for the presi-
Conference on Valuation of American Railroads, As Amicus Curiae, St. 
Louis & O'Fallon Railway Co. and Manufacturers Railways Co. v. United 
States of America and the Interstate Commerce Commission, Supreme Court 
of United States, October Term, 1928, No. 131 and 132, 1-13, printed 
brief in Norris Papers, Tray 8, Box 8. 
11 Richberg, My Hero, 123-24; Richberg to Norris, Jan. I, 1929, Norris 
Papers, Tray 8, Box 8; Richberg, Brief on Behalf of the National Conference 
on Valuation of American Railroads, As Amicus Curiae, Supreme Court, 
October Term, 1928, No. 131-32; St. Louis & O'Fallon Railway Company 
et al. v. United States et al., 279 U.S. 461, 478-88 (1929). 
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dency on the Progressive ticket in I924. The AFL gave implicit 
support to the ticket, although its Executive Council never explicitly 
endorsed La Follette and his running mate, Senator Burton 
Wheeler of Montana.12 
Richberg, as the railway unions' chief attorney in the shopmen's 
strike and their leading lobbyist on behalf of the Railway Labor 
Act, and as chief counsel of the Valuation Conference and a friend 
of La Follette, not surprisingly became chairman of the resolutions 
committee of the I 924 Progresive nominating convention. Before 
I 924, La Follette had tried to convince Rich berg that he should run 
for the Senate in Illinois, not in the hope that he could win, but 
in order to begin marshaling votes for the future so that perhaps 
the Progressives might carry the state some day. Richberg was un-
able to consider the proposition for personal reasons-his divorce 
and remarriage in the fall of 1924-and so did not become a candi-
date for elective office but remained behind the scenes.13 
The original plan for the convention, as drawn up by La Follette, 
called for Richberg to deliver the keynote address, but this was 
subsequently changed upon his arrival in the convention city, 
Cleveland, when it was decided he should take charge of the reso-
lutions committee. Richberg and his committee prepared one of 
the shortest platforms on record. Four pages in length, it endorsed 
"the progressive principle of cooperation" against "monopoly," "au-
tocracy," and "mastery" in economic affairs. Richberg regarded 
the party program of I 924 as essentially similar to that of I 9 I 2. 
Though he doubted that the old issues would arouse the electorate 
as they had before, Richberg had no choice except to defer to the 
political judgment of La Follette.14 During the campaign itself, he 
served as the party's national counsel and devoted his time to seeing 
that candidates were placed on ballots in all the states. As always, 
Richberg worked up publicity material for the campaign, helped by 
his legal assistant, David E. LilienthaP5 
12 Taft, The A. F. of L. in the Time of Campers, 48o-85. 
13 Richberg, My Hero, 136-38; Richberg, Tents, 133· 
1'Richberg, My Hero, 138; Richberg, Tents, 135-38; "Report of Com-
mittee on Resolutions," Cleveland, 1924, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 33· 
16 Rich berg, My Hero, 1 38; La Follette and La Follette, Robert M. La 
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Richberg had no illusions about the Progressives' chances for 
winning. His own belief was that La Follette was running not 
because of personal ambition but because I 924 was "his last chance 
to lead a great battle for the ideals to which he had given his life."16 
The nominees of the Democrats and Republicans had left him little 
choice. Once the election was over, an election in which La Follette 
polled about 4,8oo,ooo votes to the Democrats' 8,4oo,ooo and the 
Republicans' 1 5, 7oo,ooo, Rich berg saw little hope for the Progres-
sive Conference. In an address entitled "Future Prospects of the 
Progressive Movement" he predicted that there were no future 
prospects unless the quality of American life undenvent a drastic 
change. The prerequisite for a successful reform effort was a spirit-
ual revolution against the "cynical materialism that dominates the 
Republican and Democratic parties." What a real reform move-
ment required was a "religious purpose," one where life was treated 
as "divine" and hence where every man had worth and democracy 
was actually practiced. Instead, politics was dominated by the self-
interest of an autocratic minority who reigned regardless of the 
effects of their selfishness on other people's lives. To Richberg, 
"the progressive movement [was] a political expression of spiritual 
unrest." 
The vote at the November election held out little prospect that 
such an intangible revolution was in the offing. The voters ap-
parently found comfort in the materialism of the New Era. Con-
sequently, Richberg put aside any ideas of a permanent third 
party; though he had no faith in the Democrats and Republicans, 
after the election he likewise had "no interest in exerting myself 
in the organization of another party in which I shall equally lack 
faith but feel a greater sense of responsibility." On February 25, 
1925, the railway labor unions, more interested in immediate gains 
than a spiritual revolution, pulled out of the Conference for Pro-
gressive Political Action, thereby abandoning efforts at reform 
Follette, 2: I I2I-24; David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilien-
thal, Vol. I: The TVA Years, I939-1945, Including a Selection of Journal 
Entries from the I9I7-I939 Period (New York, 1964), I5. 
16 Rich berg, My Hero, I 38. 
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through a third party and sealing the fate of the 1924 movement.17 
Of all the attempts at organizing railroad labor power, however, 
it was the Railway Labor Executives' Association, called into being 
by the need to defend the Railway Labor Act of I 926, that emerged 
as the most enduring alliance of the unions. Putting aside polit-
ical programs like that of the Conference for Progressive Political 
Action, the RLBA was bipartisan in politics and dedicated to 
achieving the goals of railway labor through the courts, legisla-
tion, and publicity. Its objectives were anything but radical, and 
in a memorandum prepared on the occasion of the founding of the 
Association, Richberg described "the practical and dominating pur-
pose of any labor organization" as being "to increase wages and to 
improve working conditions." He suggested that this could be done 
by defending the Railway Labor Act in the courts and by creating 
a research and statistical committee to provide the data needed to 
back up demands for increases in real wages and for maintaining 
the wage differentials between railroad workers and other trades. 
Richberg warned that "if the chief executives . . . have in mind 
only a limited cooperation to promote the separate o~jects of their 
organizations in special instances when temporarily joint action 
may seem helpful, this new association will add little to the existing 
powers of the component organizations." But if the several unions 
worked together instead of pursuing contradictory goals, "this asso-
ciation may inaugurate a development of the powers of the com-
ponent organizations far beyond their previous possibilities.1118 
As chief counsel of the RLEA, Richberg's primary job was to make 
the Railway Labor Act work by promoting a frienc!ly administra-
tion of the law and protecting it in the courts. Beyond this, most 
of his activity centered on developing programs for future action, 
preparing legislation, and lobbying on behalf of the unions. 
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 did not depend as much on 
government initiative for its enforcement as on the willingness of 
17 Richberg, Future Prospects of the Progressive Movement, An Address 
to the City Club of Chicago, Nov. 20, 1924, 3-5, 12, Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box 19; Taft, The A. F. of L. in the Time of Campers, 485-86. 
18 Rich berg, "A Memorandum for the Railway Labor Executives' As-
sociation," Aug. 16, 1926, 1, 3, Richberg Papers, C.H.s., Box 5· 
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labor and management to invoke the machinery provided for set-
tling disputes. Because several of the railroads had accepted the 
bill with little enthusiasm, Richberg and the union executives had 
to be on constant guard against evasions of opportunities to utilize 
the law. Admittedly, they were handicapped by the law's non-
punitive character. In 1927, Richberg advised the Board of Media-
tion, which had consulted him concerning the construction of the 
Act, that the "law was not intended as compulsory arbitration . . . 
but that its proponents had taken [the] position that if parties 
could not agree themselves--or agree with the aid of mediators-
then the pressure of facts-the logic of events-would practically 
compel them voluntarily to agree to submission of their disagree-
ment to arbitration."19 
Richberg's assumption that the "logic of events" would of itself 
provide sufficient pressure to bring about settlements soon proved 
unwarranted. In January 1928 the RLEA directed a subcommittee 
of four, headed by Bert Jewell of the AFL Railway Employees' De-
partment, to consult with Richberg about preparing amendments 
to the Railway Labor Act. Two main problems had emerged in the 
first year-and-a-half of the operation of the new law: a breakdown 
in the system for creating Boards of Adjustment to settle grievances 
over the enforcement of contracts, and a continuation of company 
unions in the face of the statute's guarantee that employees had the 
right to organize free from employer interference.20 
Richberg and the Executive Committee of the RLEA met on 
June I, 1928, with members of the Board of Mediation to discuss 
the problem of creating Boards of Adjustment by agreement be-
tween management and labor as provided in the Railway Labor 
Act. Little progress had been made in establishing such Boards to 
handle grievances because the roads favored separate Adjustment 
Boards for each different railroad system, whereas the unions fa-
vored national or at least regional Adjustment Boards. The dis-
19 Richberg, Memorandum, March 12, 1927, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 5· 
20 Bert Jewell to Richberg, Jan. 21, 1928; J. G. Luhrsen to Richberg, 
Jan. 21, 1928; Richberg to Jewell, March 20, 1928, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 6. 
THE WAYWARD LIBERAL 
agreement was related to the problem of company unions. System 
Boards would provide a sphere of operations suited to the continua-
tion of management-influenced company unions; national or re-
gional Boards covering several railroad systems would mean a more 
general recognition of the standard railway unions, which were na-
tional in jurisdiction and far less susceptible to pressure from any 
one management. Since the Boards had to be created by agreement 
and were not to be set up at government initiative, the failure to 
agree simply meant that in most cases there were no Boards of Ad-
justment available to adjudicate grievances over the enforcement 
of contracts. Furthermore, the Mediation Board, to which appeals 
from Adjustment Boards might be sent, refused to take jurisdic-
tion in any grievance case unless it had first gone through a Board 
of Adjustment. The failure to agree on Boards thus stymied the 
rest of the Act.21 
Richberg vigorously dissented from the view that the Mediation 
Board could not consider grievances unless an Adjustment Board 
had previously attempted to bring about a settlement. But his argu-
ment at the June I meeting and his later efforts to convince the 
Mediation Board that it could intervene failed to alter its position.22 
In fact, the reports Richberg received indicated that the Media-
tion Board was simply pursuing a holding action to avoid any sub-
stantial change in the labor situation on the railroads. His chief 
source of inside information was John Marrinan, secretary of the 
Board of Mediation, who resigned in late I 928 as a protest against 
the Board's "'sit on the lid' performance." Though a disgruntled 
witness, Marrinan's picture of the Board's operations confirmed 
21 D. B. Robertson to Richberg, March 22, 1928; Richberg to Robertson, 
"Report of Conference with Board of Mediation Concerning Adjustment 
Boards Held in Washington, June I, 1928," June 4, 1928, Richberg Papers, 
c.H.S., Box 6; Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the Ameri-
can Worker, 1920-1933 (Boston, 196o), 218-2o; Bernstein, The New 
Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkeley, Calif., 1950), 42-43. 
22 Richberg to Robertson, "Report of Conference with Board of Media-
tion," June 4, 1928; Richberg to John Marrinan, Sept. 27, 1928; Merrinan 
to Richberg, Sept. 29, 1928, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 6; Samuel E. 
Winslow to Richberg, Nov. 13, 1928; Winslow to Richberg, Dec. 1, 1928; 
Winslow to Robertson, Dec. 13, 1928, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 7· 
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what Richberg already suspected. In a letter dated December 16, 
1928, Marrinan reported, "At the recent [Mediation] Board meet-
ing of some ten days duration a member of the Board informed me 
that nothing had been done about the adjustment board question." 
Similarly, the problem of recognition of independent unions over 
company unions "has never been given anything more than casual 
consideration." In sum, the record of the Board had been such that 
steps would have to be taken "to require the Board to function."23 
Thus, a year after the RLEA had ordered Richberg to begin look-
ing into the matter of amending the Railway Labor Act, the situa-
tion in regard to Adjustment Boards remained essentially un-
changed. Amendments were clearly required in the face of the 
Mediation Board's unwillingness to break the logjam blocking the 
formation of grievance machinery. Richberg inaugurated what de-
veloped into a long campaign for amending the Act, a campaign 
that culminated in I934, after he had left the railway unions to 
serve in the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Others fin-
ished the work he had begun, though Richberg remained the un-
ions' leading advocate in this as in other aspects of railway labor's 
legislative program right up until the spring of 1933. But much of 
this work lay in the future. 24 
Of more immediate concern was the second great problem faced 
by the RLEA: employee organization. Here court action seemed to 
be the most fruitful approach. The Adjustment Board question had 
depended upon the parties' willingness to agree, but the right of 
workers to form their own unions unhindered by management was 
clearly spelled out in the law. This provision of the Act did not 
depend on good will alone. 
Richberg was not anxious to test the Railway Labor Act too soon, 
not because he had any doubt about its constitutionality, but be-
cause he wanted enough time to pass so that the law would have a 
chance to prove itself in operation. He hoped that a strong public 
23 Marrinan to Robertson, Dec. 4, 1928; Marrinan to Richberg, Dec. 16, 
1928, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 7· 
24 Bernstein, The New Deal, 42-56; Richberg, "Report of Donald R. 
Richberg to Meeting of Railway Labor Executives' Association," Cleveland, 
Ohio, July 24, 1930, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 44· 
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sentiment would develop in its favor. Further, Richberg did not 
want to rush into a court test just for the sake of a test, preferring 
to wait until the best case came along, one that would require the 
railroads opposing employee organization to present their conten-
tions on constitutional grounds. Consequently, after the Railway 
Labor Act had been in effect for over a year, Richberg recom-
mended that the RLEA sponsor a test case that had arisen on the 
Texas and New Orleans Railroad, a subsidiary of the Southern 
Pacific Railroad Company. The T. & N.O. had conspired to avoid 
collective bargaining with the Brotherhood of Railway and Steam-
ship Clerks. Instead, the road had established its own company 
union, the Association of Clerical Employees-Southern Pacific 
Lines, and had recognized it to the exclusion of the independent 
union. The company discharged members of the Brotherhood from 
its employ, while at the same time providing financial support and 
direction to its own organization.25 
Richberg did not handle the case in the lower courts, but took 
over when it reached the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he 
suggested a strategy for introducing into the record certain issues 
during the initial proceedings; his purpose was to lay the ground-
work for raising constitutional questions later in the Supreme Court. 
First, there was the clear provision of the law itself, unambiguous in 
its assertion of the employees' rights. There were grounds for 
conspiracy charges against anyone who cooperated with others to 
deny a citizen his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution or laws 
of the United States. Second, Richberg believed that denying 
workers the right to organize freely deprived them of property 
rights-those growing out of their right to work, those had by 
virtue of a contract with an employer, and those "as members of an 
organization which the carrier is seeking to destroy." These property 
rights might be "as much entitled to the protection of a court of 
equity as the property rights of an employer in his business." 
25 Richberg, My Hero, 142-43; Richberg to E. H. Fitzgerald, June 27, 
1927, quoted in Fitzgerald to Robertson, June 30, 1927, Richberg Papers, 
c.H.S., Box 5; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 218; Texas & New Orleans Rail-
way Company et al. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks et al., 
2.81 U.S. 548, 554-57· 
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Finally, Richberg saw grounds for a case in court precedents which 
prevented unions from seeking to persuade employees to violate 
yellow-dog contracts, in that the same reasoning might be applied 
to employers, who thereby could not seek to induce employees to 
break faith with their independent unions by joining another 
organization, the company union.26 
The Clerks went to court and won a temporary and a permanent 
injunction against the railroad, ordering the disbanding of the 
company union. The Fifth Circuit Court upheld the ruling on 
June 10, I 929, by a vote of two to one. Rich berg then went on to 
win what was the single most important decision sustaining the 
validity of the Railway Labor Act. Richberg felt that the recent 
controversy over the appointment of Charles Evans Hughes as 
chief justice may have helped his cause. Labor generally had op-
posed the Hughes nomination on grounds that he had long repre-
sented big business in his legal practice. Richberg was sure that 
the dispute tended to guarantee Hughes's objectivity in hearing a 
case involving management-labor conflicts. On May 26, 1930, the 
Court handed down a unanimous decision, written by Hughes. 
The heart of the Railway Labor Act was secure, the Court holding 
that "the entire policy of the Act . . . must depend for success 
on the uncoerced action of each party through its own representa-
tives to the end that agreements satisfactory to both may be reached 
and the peace essential to the uninterrupted service of the instru· 
mentalities of interstate commerce may be maintained."27 
Although the Railway Labor Executives' Association was non-
partisan, its plans for developing a legislative program necessitated 
becoming involved in the political process. It made a difference who 
was elected to office. In 1928, the RLEA endorsed several mem-
28 Richberg to Fitzgerald, June 27, 1927, quoted in Fitzgerald to Robert-
son, June 30, 1927, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 5· 
27 Edward Berman, "The Supreme Court Interprets the Railway Labor 
Act," The American Economic Review 20 (Dec. 1930): 619-39; Bern-
stein, The Lean Years, 218; Richberg, My Hero, 143-44; Richberg, 
Interpretation of the Railway Labor Act ([Washington, D. C.], 1931), in 
Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 6; T. & N.O. v. Brotherhood of Railway and 
Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 554-57, 569 (1930). 
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hers of Congress without regard to party label and solely on the basis 
of their labor records. It took a neutral position on the presidential 
race, since there was a division of allegiance among the union 
executives themselves, but allowed each executive to work as an 
individual for whichever candidate he chose. Richberg and D. B. 
Robertson, president of the RLEA, were both enthusiastic backers 
of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover-even before the 
Republican convention-and worked actively for his nomination 
and election. They felt Hoover could be relied on as a progressive.28 
Robertson made contact with Hoover about securing a satis-
factory labor plank and vice-presidential candidate, and directed 
Richberg to prepare a draft statement for consideration by the 
Republican platform writers. Bert Jewell of the AFL Railway Em-
ployees' Department assisted Richberg, also at Robertson's request. 
The result of Richberg and Jewell's handiwork-a reaffirmation of 
the principles of employee organization and collective bargaining-
was turned over to John Marrinan, secretary of the Board of 
Mediation under the Railway Labor Act and a Hoover promoter. 
Marrinan presented the plank to Hoover and also cleared it with 
Frank Morrison and William Green of the AFL. It seemed that the 
Hoover forces were receptive to suggestions from Robertson and 
that he might play a larger role in the campaign.29 
Consequently, Richberg undertook to serve as the go-between to 
bring Marrinan and Robertson together for organizing the labor 
vote on Hoover's behalf. Except for their efforts before the conven-
tion, however, neither Robertson nor Richberg played a major part 
28 Robertson to Herbert C. Hoover, Feb. I, I929, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 7; Robertson to Jewell, Aug. 7, I928; Robertson, "Statement by D. B. 
Robertson, Chairman, Railway Labor Executives' Association, and Pre-
sident, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen," Aug. 6, 
I928, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 6. 
29 Marrinan to Richberg, May 28, I928; Robertson to Jewell, June I, 
I928; Jewell to Richberg, June 7, I928; Richberg to Martin F. Ryan and 
J. A. Franklin, June 4, I928; Ryan to Richberg, June 6, I928; Jewell to 
Richberg, June I2, I928; Jewell to Members, Railway Labor Executives' 
Association, June I3, I928; [Richberg and Jewell], "Proposed Labor Plank 
for Presentation to Republican Convention," Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 6. 
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in the subsequent presidential race, as William Doak of the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen took over the management of the labor 
side of the Republican campaign instead, despite Hoover's apparent 
interest in Robertson initially. Doak had a longstanding ambition 
to become secretary of labor in the new administration and suc-
ceeded in being selected to head up the Republican labor cam-
paign-according to Robertson-partly through misrepresenting 
the labor situation to Hoover. Doak apparently maintained that 
Roberston was unacceptable to a large part of the labor movement 
and would therefore lose rather than gain votes. As a result, Robert-
son and Richberg found themselves on the sidelines for the 1928 
campaign.30 
By election time, Hoover's stance on questions important to 
railway labor had alienated Richberg anyway, so that he went over 
to the Democratic camp at the last moment. At the beginning of the 
campaign, Richberg was inclined to regard the friendly labor state-
ments of Alfred E. Smith, the Democratic candidate, as so much 
rhetoric not likely to be followed up with action. He felt Smith's 
entire political career revealed a tendency for a gap to develop 
between promises and deeds. Hoover had a better record, in Rich-
berg's opinion, on delivering what he promised. In time, Richberg 
became more friendly to Smith because Hoover seemed to be mak-
ing no important commitments to labor at all; instead, Richberg 
felt he was "excessively desirous of not offending ultra conservative 
people" whereas Smith was "willing to risk offending them." Smith 
had even endorsed the efforts of railway labor to obtain a bill out-
lawing injunctions in labor disputes. In the end, Rich berg voted for 
Smith. Robertson likewise was disappointed in Hoover's perfor-
mance.31 
30 Robertson to Richberg, July 4, I928; Jewell to Robertson, July I6, 
I928; Robertson to Richberg, Aug. 5, I928; Robertson to Richberg, Aug. 
3 I, I 928; Robertson to Rich berg, Sept. I 9, I 928, Rich berg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 6; Marrinan to George Barr Baker, Oct. 5, I928; Robertson to Hoover, 
Feb. I, I929; Robertson to Richberg, Feb. 27, I929, Richberg Papers, 
C.H.s., Box 7· 
31 Richberg to Frederic C. Howe, Aug. 30, I928; Richberg to Robertson, 
Aug. 28, I 928; Robertson to Rich berg, Aug. 3 I, I 928; Rich berg to Robert-
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The Republican victory in 1 928 consequently was not a step 
forward for labor, at least as Richberg viewed it. Hoover's non-
commital attitude toward the labor movement in general during 
the campaign was an accurate foreshadowing of what Richberg and 
the railway labor executives would be up against during his tenure 
in the White House. Though at the beginning of the campaign 
Richberg had high hopes that he could count on Hoover as a pro-
gressive, his disappointment at Hoover's failure to enunciate a 
clear-cut labor program meant that his battles on behalf of the rail-
road unions probably would be as tough as ever.32 Despite the prog-
ress of the past several years, with the passage of the Railway Labor 
Act, the organization of the National Conference on Railroad Val-
uation, and the creation of the Railway Labor Executives' Associa-
tion, Richberg was to face the same opposition forces that he had 
encountered prior to the Hoover administration. As the Adjust-
ment Board dispute and the O'Fallon and T. & N.O. cases showed, 
the opposition was not going to surrender without a struggle. Con-
sequently, Richberg's work was far from done. 
son, Sept. 10, 1928; Richberg to Howe, Sept. 24, 1928; Richberg to Robert-
son, Sept. 27, 1928; Richberg to Marrinan, Sept. 27, 1928; Marrinan to 
Richberg, Oct. 1, 1928, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 6; Richberg to Marri-
nan, Oct. 31, 1928; Marrinan to Richberg, Nov. 3, 1928; Mrs. Glenn E. 
Plumb to Richberg, Nov. 6, 1928; Richberg to Marrinan, Nov. 5, 1928, 
Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 7; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 395· 
32 Richberg to Marrinan, Sept. 27, 1928, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 6. 
CHAPTER V 
Consolidation 
The inauguration of the Hoover administration, something that 
Donald Rich berg had worked for almost to the end of the I 928 
campaign, brought little in the way of change as far as railway 
labor was concerned. The kinds of problems and the nature of the 
opposition that Richberg encountered remained much the same as 
before. Most of his work continued to be concentrated in the Rail-
way Labor Executives' Association, though again he became in-
volved in related but separate reform projects, such as a Conference 
of Progressives called by Senator George Norris of Nebraska in 
1931. Richberg's RLEA work followed the pattern that had already 
been established, fighting court battles and formulating new legis-
lation, although in the latter regard the RLEA moved significantly 
to broaden its overall program, especially with the onset of the 
Great Depression in 1929. 
For Richberg, the greatest legislative battle of this period was the 
movement to win legislation limiting the use of injunctions in labor 
disputes-a movement sparked principally by George Norris. The 
plight of the coal miners had motivated Norris initially, but his bill 
was intended to benefit the labor movement as a whole and he was 
strongly supported by Richberg and other leading legal experts 
throughout the country. Norris consulted Richberg not as an official 
representative of the RLEA, though it was vitally interested in the 
outcome and supported his contributions, but as a labor lawyer of 
high repute in his own right.1 
Norris invited Richberg, Felix Frankfurter and Francis Sayre 
86 THE WAYWARD LIBERAL 
of Harvard Law School, E. E. Witte of the Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Library, and Herman Oliphant of Columbia University 
to come to Washington and write a substitute anti-injunction bill 
to replace one that he and his colleagues on a Senate Judiciary Sub-
Committee, Thomas Walsh of Montana and John J. Blaine of Wis-
consin, had decided to reject. The original measure, S. 1482, had 
been presented by Senator Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota and 
limited the jurisdiction of equity courts to protecting property de-
fined only as something "tangible and transferable.m 
The Shipstead bill was really the brainchild of Andrew Furuseth, 
president of the International Seamen's Union and a friend of the 
Minnesota senator.3 Furuseth was without any legal education and 
failed to comprehend the havoc his proposal would create if, in an 
effort to protect employee organization against injunctions, property 
ceased to be defined as an intangible right and was limited exclu-
sively to concrete things. Despite Richberg's opinion that Furuseth 
"doesn't know what he is talking about," he was destined to create 
considerable difficulties for the substitute bill. Furuseth's persistence 
attested to his sincerity if not to his legal understanding. He 
steadfastly opposed the bill written in response to Norris's plea by 
Richberg, Frankfurter, Oliphant, Witte, and Sayre, and temporarily 
swayed the AFL.4 
The Norris group gathered in Washington for two days of in-
tensive consultation at the beginning of May 1928 and produced 
the first draft of a new law. There then followed several weeks of 
correspondence among the conferees to hammer the language into 
1 George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, I945), 308-Io; Irving 
Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933 
(Boston, I96o), 391-95, 415; Donald Richberg to George W. Norris, Feb. 
I I, I930, George W. Norris Papers, Library of Congress, Tray 79, Box 7· 
2 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 395-97; Norris to Felix Frankfurter, April 
2.I, I928, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 29. 
3 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 395; Norris to Frankfurter, June 1 I, I 92.8, 
Frankfurter Papers, Box 63. 
4 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 396-97; Richberg to Norris, June 18, 192.8; 
Frankfurter to Norris, June 21, 1928, Frankfurter Papers, Box 29; Richberg 
to Frankfurter, June 18, 1928; Frankfurter to Richberg, June 2o, 192.8, 
Frankfurter Papers, Box 32. 
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final shape.' The object of these efforts, as stated by Witte, was not 
geared primarily to formulating revisions of the substantive law, 
because "the courts will hold them unconstitutional" anyway, but 
to attacking the problem of injunctions "through procedural 
changes" designed to protect the rights of the workers. Such pro-
cedural revisions would "stand a good chance of being enacted into 
law and also of being sustained by the courts." Frankfurter and 
Richberg seconded this view.6 Although all the conferees contrib-
uted to the refinements of the original draft, the final touches were 
made by Frankfurter and Oliphant because further personal con-
ferences were not possible and because Richberg and Witte were 
located too far away to make frequent consultation feasible. Every-
one, however, kept in close touch by mail and all approved the 
ultimate version.7 
Norris introduced the draft bill into the Senate on May 29, 
I928. In brief, it made yellow-dog contracts unenforceable in fed-
eral courts as contrary to a statement of public policy set forth in 
the bill. The new law would deny the federal courts jurisdiction to 
issue injunctions in labor disputes under several enumerated con-
ditions; no injunction might be issued to enjoin workers from re-
fusing to work, joining or remaining a member of a labor organiza-
tion, paying strike benefits from union treasuries, aiding others 
involved in a labor dispute by any lawful means, giving publicity 
G Norris, Fighting Liberal, 312-13; Frankfurter to Richberg, April 24, 
1928; Richberg to Frankfurter, April 26, 1928, Frankfurter Papers, Box 32; 
Norris to Frankfurter, May 5, 1928, Frankfurter Papers, Box 29; E. E. 
Witte to Frankfurter, May 12, 1928; Witte to Richberg, May 12, 1928; 
Frankfurter to Richberg, May 14, 1928; Richberg to Frankfurter, May 16, 
1928; Richberg, "Memorandum for Messrs. Oliphant, Frankfurter, and 
Witte,'' May 16, 1928; Witte to Richberg, May 17, 1928; Frankfurter to 
Herman Oliphant, May 18, 1928; Oliphant to Frankfurter, May 21, 1928; 
Oliphant to Norris, May 25, 1928, Frankfurter Papers, Box 63. 
11 Witte to Francis B. Sayre, May 26, 1928; Frankfurter to Witte, May 29, 
1928, Frankfurter Papers, Box 63; Richberg, "Comment upon Briefs (for 
Employer Organizations) Filed in Opposition to the Sub-Committee Anti-
Injunction Bill," May 5, 1930, Norris Papers, Tray 85, Box 4· 
7 Richberg to Frankfurter, May 16, 1928; Witte to Richberg, May 17, 
1928; Witte to Frankfurter, May 17, 1928; Oliphant to Frankfurter, May 
21, 1928, Frankfurter Papers, Box 63. 
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to the dispute by any means except force or violence, assembling 
peaceably, or cooperating with others to do such acts. A separate 
provision specifically directed that no injunction could be issued 
on grounds of unlawful combination or conspiracy in carrying out 
any of the above. Union officials and members were exempted 
from liability for unlawful acts in a strike unless it could be shown 
that they actually authorized or participated in such crimes. Defi-
nite guidelines were laid down prescribing the procedure for is-
suing an injunction; these attempted to insure that no order would 
be issued unless substantial injury would otherwise ensue, and 
then only after personal notice had been given to those against 
whom the injunction was directed. Temporary restraining orders 
might not be effective longer than five days. Those who failed to 
comply with the law in a labor conflict would be ineligible for in-
junctive relief. Criminal contempt cases arising out of an injunc-
tion would be subject to jury triaJ.S 
No action was taken on the Norris bill at the first session of the 
Seventieth Congress, but after Congress adjourned, the 1928 AFL 
convention met in New Orleans. Largely through Furuseth's in-
fluence, the Norris bill was not endorsed but instead referred to a 
special committee headed by Matthew Woll of the Photo-Engravers 
Union. In June 1929 Woll and his colleagues recommended that 
the Norris bill be endorsed in amended form. The AFL Executive 
Council approved the Committee report on August 16. In October 
the AFL's Toronto convention backed a revised version of the Norris 
bilJ.D 
Norris now had to decide how, or whether, to reconcile his bill 
with that of the AFL. Again he turned to Richberg, Frankfurter, 
Oliphant, Witte, and Sayre. Though differing on specifics, they all 
agreed that the proposed amendments would weaken rather than 
strengthen the Norris bill.10 It was Frankfurter, however, who 
8 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 397-400. 
9 Ibid., 400-403. 
10 Ibid., 403; "Comparison of Anti-Injunction Bills," n.d., Norris Papers, 
Tray 42, Box 8; Oliphant to Norris, Dec. 2, 1929; Witte to Norris, Dec. 6, 
1929; Witte to Frankfurter, Dec. 6, 1929; Oliphant to Frankfurter, Dec. 9, 
1929; Richberg to Frankfurter, Jan. 7, 1930; Witte to Frankfurter, Jan. 21, 
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pointed out the crucial role that Richberg would have to play in 
placating organized labor. Frankfurter felt it "undersirable that 
Senator Norris' Committee should so much as appear to be intro-
ducing a bill precisely in the form in which the A.F. of L. drew 
it, as the Senate Committee would be merely a conduit for the 
A.F. of L." Its amendments would in some cases weaken the bill; 
in others, they would be harmless, but of no great advantage either; 
in all events, full acceptance by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
would be a major liability in getting the bill through Congress. As 
a representative of the RLEA and the AFL Railway Employees' De-
partment, Richberg could make the AFL see the problem; Frank-
furter believed this was the "one thing which you can say that 
none of us can say."11 
Taking up Frankfurter's suggestion, Richberg advised Norris 
against giving the appearance of capitulating to organized labor, 
urging that "if the committee on the judiciary should report out a 
somewhat revised bill there would be more disadvantage than ad-
vantage in incorporating all the suggestions of the A.F. of L." As a 
friend of labor, Richberg could and did criticize what he and the 
legal experts had decided were ill-founded or pointless amend-
ments, politically inexpedient at best.12 
Norris introduced a revised bill on May 19, 1930. The law was 
now substantially in its final form; he had not incorporated the 
AFL amendments. In a Washington conference of December 1931, 
I93o; Frankfurter to Norris, Jan. 28, I93o, Frankfurter Papers, Box 63; 
Frankfurter, Oliphant, and Witte, "Observations on Amendments Proposed 
by the American Federation of Labor to the Injunction Bill Drafted by the 
Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary," n.d., Norris 
Papers, Tray 79, Box 7; Frankfurter to Richberg, Jan. 28, I93o, Frankfurter 
Papers, Box 32; Richberg to Frankfurter, Feb. 6, I930, Frankfurter Papers, 
Box 78; Richberg to Norris, Feb. I I, I93o, Norris Papers, Tray 79, Box 7; 
Richberg, "Memorandum Concerning Amendments to Anti-Injunction Bill 
Suggested by the American Federation of Labor," n.d., Norris Papers, Tray 
42, Box 8; Norris to Richberg, March 6, I93o; Frankfurter to Norris, March 
II, 1930; Witte to Norris, March 13, 1930; Witte to Richberg, March 13, 
1930; Witte to Frankfurter, March 13, 1930, Frankfurter Papers, Box 63. 
11 Frankfurter to Richberg, Jan. 28, 1930, Frankfurter Papers, Box 32. 
12 Richberg to Norris, Feb. II, 1930, Norris Papers, Tray 79, Box 7· 
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Richberg and Norris met with AFL chiefs and ironed out their dif-
ferences. The AFL agreed to eliminate most of its suggestions, 
though some would be offered from the floor of the Senate as 
amendments to the Norris bill when it came up for consideration. 
The bill could not thereby be labeled as an AFL ultimatum. It 
would be more than a year and a half after its introduction, how-
ever, before the revised Norris bill was reported out of committee 
favorably.13 
In defense of the proposed bill, Richberg sent Norris a com-
mentary on briefs submitted in the spring of 1930 by counsel rep-
resenting management, James A. Emery, Daniel Davenport, and 
Walter Gordon Merritt. As was his customary strategy when back-
ing new legislation, Richberg emphasized that the bill did not de-
part from established principles of jurisprudence. In attacking the 
injunction and yellow-dog contract, he argued that he was simply 
defending the right of workers to make legally binding contracts. 
Agreements made under compulsion of any kind would be invalid 
anyway. Richberg affirmed that "to write this doctrine into the law 
is not to propose anything novel." 
Richberg denounced the idea implicit in the arguments of man-
agement that "innocent acts done in combination may constitute a 
conspiracy." Such an idea indicated a failure to understand "the 
original and time-honored definition of a conspiracy" as essentially 
combining for "the accomplishment of a lawful purpose by unlaw-
ful means; or, the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose by law-
ful means." But the object of the labor movement was hardly un-
lawful, nor could the constitutional rights of free speech and 
assembly be transformed into unlawful acts by a court decree sim-
ply because these rights were invoked by a combination of men 
13 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 403, 4 I I; Legislative Representative of 
AFL to Alexander Fleisher, Nov. 9, I93I; Fleisher to Edward F. Mc-
Grady, Dec. 8, 193I, American Federation of Labor Papers, Wisconsin 
State Historical Society, Series I I, File B, Box 4; Roger Baldwin to Frank-
furter, Dec. 8, I931; Richberg to Baldwin, Dec. I2, I93I, Frankfurter Pa-
pers, Box 55; Frankfurter to Baldwin, Dec. 9, 193I; Norris to Baldwin, 
Dec. 12, I93I; Baldwin to Norris, Dec. 14, 193I, Norris Papers, Tray 79, 
Box 7· 
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rather than individuals acting alone. Richberg concluded that em-
ployer "hostility to the proposed legislation provides strong evi-
dence that it is soundly conceived to compel the courts of equity to 
relinquish the exercise of unfair partisan powers which they have 
been induced to assume and to exercise under the persuasion of the 
attorneys who now oppose this bill."14 
At the suggestion of Richberg and Alexander Fleisher, prominent 
in the work of the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU in 
mid-1930 formed a special Committee on Labor Injunctions to 
marshal support among eminent liberals on behalf of the Norris 
bill. Roger N. Baldwin, leader of the ACLu, and especially Fleisher 
were active in carrying out the Committee's work.15 
In the meantime, Richberg found himself the object of attempts 
to bring about a compromise in Senator Norris's position. On Janu-
ary 3, 1931, Secretary of Labor William Doak, formerly of the 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, telephoned Richberg in Chi-
cago and asked him to come to Washington. Doak claimed that he 
was acting at the suggestion of President Hoover. Despite heavy 
commitments to other clients. Richberg agreed to meet the secre-
tary on January 7· Doak led Richberg to believe that the president 
was concerned that the Norris bill would be pressed for passage at 
the current session of Congress, and therefore wanted to bring the 
opposing forces together in the hope of effecting compromises satis-
factory to both sides. Accordingly, the secretary of labor had ar-
ranged for a conference that same day between Richberg and the 
management representatives, James Emery and Walter Gordon 
Merritt. Doak and counsel from his department would also attend. 
Richberg objected that such a conference would be useless, as 
Emery and Merritt were representing forces opposed to any com-
promise with organized labor. Further, Richberg feared that such 
a conference would put him in a false position as one of the authors 
of the bill and as one intimately connected with the Judiciary Com-
14 Richberg, "Comment upon Briefs (for Employer Organizations) Filed 
in Opposition to the Sub-Committee Anti-Injunction Bill," May 5, 1930, 
Norris Papers, Tray 85, Box 4-
15 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 41o; Fleisher to Norris, June 19, 1930, 
Norris Papers, Tray 79, Box 7· 
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mittee, the RLEA, and the AFL Railway Employees' Department. 
But Doak was insistent. 
As Richberg had anticipated, the meeting proved fruitless. He 
found Emery and Merritt still opposed to the basic objects of the 
proposed bill. They were only out to get concessions. Equally im-
portant, Richberg "was constantly oppressed with the feeling that 
merely engaging in such a debate might be subject to future mis-
representation." This feeling was confirmed later when he received 
a memorandum summing up the exchange of views that had taken 
place. Richberg thereupon consulted Norris and learned that there 
was little likelihood of the bill passing at the current session of 
Congress. He informed Doak of this and used it as an excuse to 
avoid any further conferences. Richberg left Washington on Janu-
ary 8. 
That Secretary Doak was out to make a bargain was even more 
clear from a question he put to Richberg during the course of their 
conference. As Richberg recalled it, Doak inquired whether he 
"would be interested in an appointment to the Federal bench," 
perhaps a district judgeship. Doak made no offer of a specific trade 
of a judicial post in exchange for scuttling the injunction bill, but 
simply indicated "that he might be able to exert considerable in-
fluence in this direction." Richberg did not see the suggestion as an 
outright bribe, but believed that Doak "was merely using the com-
mon political method of inducing a helpful attitude by holding out 
the possibility of a future favor." Norris thought the offer suffi-
ciently incriminating, however, to use it against Hoover in the 1932 
presidential campaign, and Richberg backed up his efforts in state-
ments to the press.16 
Despite the administration's hostility, events were moving to-
ward passage of the bill. The Depression of I 929, of course, was 
forcing both the electorate and its leaders to the left, so that the 
shibboleths of the business community against labor legislation no 
16 The quotations and general outline of facts are from Richberg to Nor-
ris, Sept. 27, 1932, Norris Papers, Tray I, Box 3· Also see Norris to Rich-
berg, Sept. 17, 1932; Richberg to Norris, Sept. 23, 1932; John P. Robertson 
to G. M. Johnson, Dec. 31, 1932, Norris Papers, Tray I, Box 3; New York 
Times, Oct. 21, 1932. 
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longer seemed as convincing as in the past. The 1930 congressional 
elections gave the Democrats a slim majority in the House of Rep-
resentatives and reduced the Republican majority in the Senate to 
one. The side-effects of the election resulted in a reorganization of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee to the advantage of the Norris bill. 
A growing sympathy for the anti-injunction movement was like-
wise apparent in the states, where a number of new labor laws 
dealing with injunctions and yellow-dog contracts were in the 
works. Furthermore, two of Hoover's judicial nominations resulted 
in severe criticism and drew public attention to injunction abuses 
and the need for remedial legislation. On March 21, 1930, the 
president recommended Judge John J. Parker for a vacancy on the 
United States Supreme Court, and on January 12, 1932, he sought 
Senate approval of Judge James Wilkerson for a place on the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals. Richberg actively lobbied against 
his old enemy Wilkerson, who had granted the Daugherty injunc-
tion in the 1922 shopmen's strike. Parker had issued the so-called 
Red Jacket injunction of 1927 against organizing efforts and strikes 
by the United Mine Workers in West Virginia on grounds that the 
miners were bound by valid yellow-dog contracts. The Senate re-
jected Parker, and the opposition to Wilkerson was such that he re-
quested that Hoover withdraw his name from consideration.11 
With the opposition crumbling, the Norris bill was finally re-
ported out of committee favorably on January 27, 1932, at the 
height of the Wilkerson controversy. It passed the Senate with only 
token opposition, 75 to 5. House action followed much the same 
course, and the vote was 362 to 1 4· Hoover reluctantly signed the 
bill on March 23, 1932, because-as Norris told Richberg-"he 
lacked the courage to veto it" and knew that the majorities in both 
Houses were sufficient to override him if he balked. In spite of it-
self, the Hoover administration had witnessed a long step forward 
in labor relations.18 
17 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 406-12; E. J. Manion, form letter to mem-
bers of the United States Senate, Jan. 15, 1932; Richberg to Norris, March 
18, 1932; Richberg to Norris, April 28, 1932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 14. 
18 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 41 o, 412-1 5; Norris, Fighting Liberal, 
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Despite heavy commitments to the RLEA throughout these years, 
Rich berg still found time to devote to other pursuits. In I 930, he 
published his first autobiographical effort, Tents of the Mighty. It 
was not a simple recitation of the facts of his own life, but rather 
the story of a larger theme: the conflict between a public policy 
based on individual self-interest and one based on a scientific deter-
mination of the needs of the whole community. As such, it repre-
sented another attempt on Richberg's part to examine his own in-
dividual existence in terms of what he could contribute to the larger 
public good. He placed his career in the context of what he believed 
was a long-range trend toward the scientific analysis and solution of 
social problems.19 
Richberg did more than just write about this ideal. He tried to 
apply it to the realities of the political process by responding to a 
call for a Conference of Progressives issued by Senators George 
Norris of Nebraska, Edward Costigan of Colorado, Bronson 
Cutting of New Mexico, Robert La Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin, and 
Burton Wheeler of Montana. The Conference took place in Wash-
ington. D. C., on March I I and 12, I93I, with the announced 
purpose of "discussing and outlining a program of legislation to be 
presented at the next session of Congress."20 
Norris was chairman of the meeting, which was nonpartisan and 
not called with the idea of founding any third party. The con-
ferees were impelled by the Great Depression which had begun in 
I 929 and which they believed the Hoover administration was in-
cable of reversing. They undertook to prepare programs in five sub-
ject areas: unemployment and industrial stabilization, public util-
ities, agriculture, tariffs, and representative government. David 
Robertson, head of the RLEA, participated along with Richberg and 
313-I5; John P. Robertson to William J. Froelich, March I5, 1932, Norris 
Papers, Tray 79, Box 7· The quotation is from Norris to Richberg, Sept. 17, 
1932, Norris Papers, Tray I, Box 3· 
19 Richberg, Tents of the Mighty (New York, 1930). 
20 Progressive Conference, I 93 I, Proceedings of a Conference of Progres-
sives to Outline a Program of Constructive Legislation Dealing with Eco-
nomic and Political Conditions for Presentation to the First Session of the 
Seventy-Second Congress, 3, pamphlet in Norris Papers, Ac. 69oo, Tag 
No. 49, Box 20. 
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addressed the meeting on unemployment. Richberg, because of his 
experience in utility rate regulation and railroad valuation, chaired 
and addressed the session on public utilities. He also prepared are-
port on the conclusions of his session, aided by a Committee on 
Public Utilities made up of eminent experts in the field and in-
cluding Paul U. Kellogg, editor of Survey, William E. Mosher of 
Syracuse University, James C. Bonbright of Columbia University, 
Theodore Kronshage and David Lilienthal of the Wisconsin Pub-
lic Service Commission, Amos Pinchot, the old Progressive, and 
several others.21 
The report of the Public Utilities Committee recommended 
stronger state and federal regulation and the creation of publicly 
owned enterprises to compete with private utility companies and 
establish standards of rates and services. Pinchot and Norris wanted 
to come out unreservedly for an all-inclusive public ownership of 
electrical and other utilities. As chairman of the Committee, Rich-
berg resisted outright public ownership, believing instead that "the 
only effective method of regulation which has been found is com-
petition and that the government should definitely adopt the pol-
icy of public competition as a policy of regulation," much on the 
model of the Tennessee Valley Authority to be instituted during 
the administration of Franklin Roosevelt largely through Norris's 
efforts. He felt "wholesale public ownership" was "impractical," 
and yielded no farther than the yardstick idea of the future TVA in 
preparing the Committee report.22 
Though the Richberg Committee succeeded in submitting a re-
port to Norris, it produced nothing in the way of specific legisla-
tion for recommendation to Congress. Despite the proclaimed pur-
pose of the I 93 I Progressive Conference, the idea of formulating 
21Jbid., 3, I09-II, 135-40; "The members of the Committee on Public 
Utilities appointed by the Progressive Conference, which met at Washing-
ton in March, 1931," mimeographed list in Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 11. 
22 Richberg, "Report of Committee on Public Utilities of the Progressive 
Conference," Oct. 8, 1932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box II; Amos Pinchot 
to Richberg, Aug. 3, 1931; Norris to Richberg, Aug. 13, 1931; Pinchot to 
Norris, Aug. 19, 1931, Norris Papers, Tray 8, Box 4; Norris to Richberg, 
Oct. 14, 1931, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 12. The quotation is from 
Richberg to Norris, Aug. 15, 1931, Norris Papers, Tray 8, Box 4· 
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legislation did not even come up. Much like the National Progres-
sive Service of an earlier day, the Committee found that devising 
concrete legislative proposals would prove far more difficult than 
enunciating general principles. Besides, the Committee was an in-
formal organization working completely through correspondence 
rather than personal conferences. Largely for this reason, the final 
report was the work of Richberg, and his ideas prevailed, though 
most of the Committee approved his efforts.23 
Despite outside activities, including continued participation in 
Chicago affairs, Richberg devoted by far the greatest part of his 
energies to developing the program of the Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Association and to fighting its battles in the courts and at the 
negotiating table. Especially with the onslaught of the depression, 
it was crucial to expand railway labor's legislative program into 
areas hitherto left unexplored. New crises had to be faced while at 
the same time preventing the worsening of old ones. 
The usual procedure in formulating a new plank in the RLEA 
platform was for the union executives to decide among themselves 
the broad outlines of policy and then turn the problem over to 
Richberg as general counsel for further analysis and suggestions, 
and ultimately for the construction of a concrete proposal either in 
the form of legislation or unilateral RLEA action. Richberg was thus 
as much involved in the internal functioning of the RLEA as in 
lobbying in the halls of Congress. Furthermore, he had the oppor-
tunity to initiate ideas as well as to carry them out.24 
23 Norris to Richberg, March 2I, I93I; Richberg to Norris, March 30, 
I93I; Alice Houlihan to S. Burton Heath, June 6, I93I, Richberg Papers, 
c.H.s., Box 11; Richberg to Norris, Oct. I, I93I; Richberg to Norris, Oct. 
9, I93 I, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box I2. 
24 For a sampling of how Richberg and the RLEA executives worked to-
gether, see J. A. Farquharson to Richberg, May 23, I93I, Richberg Papers, 
c.H.s., Box I I; "Memorandum Concerning Work on Federal Workmen's 
Compensation and Retirement Insurance-COld Age Pensions)," Dec. 28, 
I93I, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 12; Richberg to David B. Robertson, 
March I, I932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box I4· Examples of Richberg's 
initiation of policy or suggestions are in Richberg to George M. Harrison, 
May I9, I93I; S. N. Berry to Richberg, May 27, I93I, Richberg Papers, 
c.H.s., Box I I; Richberg to "Dear Sir" [selected members of the RLEA], 
Aug. 5, 1932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 15. 
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Of primary concern to the RLEA as a result of the depression was 
management's proposal that several railroad lines be merged or con-
solidated as a step toward economizing operating expenses, a step 
forced by the drastic decline in railroad revenues. What might hap-
pen to thousands of jobs, to seniority rights, and to contracts pro-
tected by the Railway Labor Act of 1926 were life-and-death ques-
tions for railway workers. 
Richberg and the labor leaders of the RLEA lobbied vigorously 
against any plans for reducing the work force in the name of econ-
omy. They believed that such a step was particularly misleading in 
that the economies thereby created were false because they reduced 
the available consuming power needed to support prosperity. To 
destroy jobs while dividends were still being paid on railroad stocks 
Hew in the face of common sense; such a policy would only increase 
over-saving by the well-to-do and further withdraw consumptive 
power from the one sector of the economy-the working people-
where it would surely be used, thereby creating markets and jobs. 
Furthermore, too often mergers were for the benefit of the finan-
ciers who would profit from organizing the new combinations. Con-
solidation would likewise mean reduced or canceled railroad serv-
ice to some communities, further spreading the depression by 
destroying jobs and creating obstacles to the exchange of goods. To 
the railroad employees, this not only meant unemployment and 
displacement but also raised the risk that railroad service to many 
communities might permanently be replaced by trucking.25 
25 Richberg, Memorandum Brief in Support of S. J. Res. z6z, April 16, 
I93o, including "Statement of Railway Labor Executives' Association Con-
cerning Railroad Consolidation" of March 31, I930, Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box 6; U. S., Congress, Senate, 72nd Cong., ISt sess., Committee on Man-
ufactures, Emergency Financing for Unemployed Workers, Hearings on 
S. 4947 (I932), 7-20, copy in Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 43; Richberg, 
"Report of Donald R. Richberg to Meeting of Railway Labor Executives' 
Association, Cleveland, Ohio, July 24, 1930," 1-3, and Richberg, "The 
Spread-Work Folly," Aug. 17, 1932, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 44; Da-
vid B. Robertson, "In Re: Subject of Legislation Affecting Railroad Con-
solidation," April I8, 1929, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 7; Timothy Shea 
to Members, Railway Labor Executives' Association, April I 5, I 930, Rich-
berg Papers, c.H.s., Box 9; Richberg to David B. Robertson, March I, 1932, 
Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box I4. 
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On much the same grounds, Richberg also spoke out against the 
so-called spread-work movement for increasing employment by re-
ducing the hours of the workday and making up the difference by 
hiring more workers. Unless the plan envisioned paying the same 
wages for a six-hour day as for an eight-hour day, it would only 
spread poverty around. What was really needed, Richberg believed, 
were not plans to spread the same total wages among more people, 
but some way to increase total wages and consequently consuming 
power. When the RLEA supported proposals for the six-hour day, it 
was on the understanding that the same wages would be paid for 
less work.26 
Railroad consolidations and unemployment were thus the most 
immediate crises facing the RLEA as the depression deepened. Rich~ 
berg and David Robertson sought to marshal management coopera-
tion on the consolidation question through Alfred P. Thorn, gen-
eral counsel of the Association of Railroad Executives, but made 
little headway.27 Consequently, much of Richberg's energy was de-
voted to preparing legislative programs to block sanctioning by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission of consolidations that would vio-
late contracts or procedures for negotiation as guaranteed by the 
Railway Labor Act; this would at least assure that labor would be 
consulted before changes were introduced. Richberg supported 
these efforts by testifying before congressional committees and 
working closely with friendly members of Congress, such as Sena-
tors George Norris, Edward Costigan, James Couzens, Robert 
Wagner, and Robert Howell, and Representative Fiorello La 
Guardia.28 
26 Richberg to members of the RLEA, Aug. 5, I932, Richberg Papers, 
c.H.s., Box I5; Richberg, "The Spread-Work Folly," Aug. I7, I932, Rich-
berg Papers, L.c., Box 44· 
27 David B. Robertson to Rich berg, March 28, I 929; David B. Robertson, 
"In Re: Subject of Legislation Affecting Railroad Consolidation," April I8, 
I929, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 7· 
28 Richberg to A. G. McKnight, April 9, I930, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box 9; Richberg, Memorandum Brief in Support of S. ]. Res. r6r, April I6, 
I93o, 3-Io, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 6; Richberg, "Report of Donald R. 
Richberg to Meeting of Railway Labor Executives' Association, Cleveland, 
Ohio, July 24, I93o," I-3, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 44; Richberg to Da-
vid B. Robertson, March I, I932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box I4; U. S., 
CONSOLIDATION 99 
Ultimately, two pieces of legislation, which took cognizance of 
the arguments he and the labor executives had made, passed before 
Richberg left the RLEA to serve in the Franklin D. Roosevelt ad-
ministration. The first was the Bankruptcy Act of 1933, signed by 
President Hoover on March 3· Largely because of the concern of 
the railway labor unions that economies would be made at their 
expense, Senator George Norris introduced a series of amendments 
to the original bill which Congress accepted and which required 
receivers in corporate reorganizations to conform to the terms and 
procedures of the Railway Labor Act in renegotiating contracts 
with employees. Financial reorganization of bankrupt roads thus 
might not provide an excuse for unilateral cancellation of contracts 
or reduction of wages. Furthermore, the principle of employee or-
ganization free from management coercion or influence as set forth 
in the Railway Labor Act was reasserted, as was the mandate of the 
Norris-La Guardia Act against yellow-dog contracts. 
The second piece of legislation was the Emergency Transporta-
tion Act approved by President Franklin Roosevelt on June r6, 
I933· This was the last major legislative project that Richberg 
worked on before severing his ties with the RLEA and moving into 
the new administration. The new law created a Federal Coordina-
tor of Transportation empowered to eliminate waste and duplica-
tion in rail service by promoting consolidation and financial re-
organization. Partly in response to the fears of railway labor as 
articulated by Richberg and the union executives in congressional 
hearings on the bill, guarantees were written into the law to pro-
tect jobs, to improve the grievance provisions of the Railway Labor 
Act by creating regional Adjustment Boards, and to assure com-
pliance with the terms of the Bankruptcy Act.29 
While the Emergency Transportation Act represented a forward 
Congress, Senate, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., Committee on Interstate Com-
merce, Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, Hearings on S. 
1580 (1933), 77-129; U. S., Congress, House, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Emergency Railroad Trans-
portation Act, 1933, Hearings on H.R. 5500 (1933), 69-113, 161-88; 
Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1950), 43-47· 
29 Bernstein, The New Deal, 44-47. 
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step in labor's attempt to hold the line against unemployment, it 
was of only one year's duration. What was needed was permanent 
legislation, a need met by amending the Railway Labor Act in 
I934- For several years Rich berg had been working on amendments 
to the I926 Act at the direction of the railway labor leaders. Al-
though he did not participate in the final successful thrust which 
began in the fall of 1933, after he joined the Roosevelt administra-
tion, he had laid the groundwork for the ultimate result. By Octo-
ber I 932 Rich berg had formulated a labor program in the form of 
several specific amendments to the Railway Labor Act providing 
for strengthened guarantees of unhindered employee organization, 
empowering the Board of Mediation to determine the accredited 
representatives of either the carriers or the employees (by elec-
tions if necessary), granting district courts the power to issue or-
ders enforcing the procedures for negotiation defined in the Act, 
providing penalties for carriers who conspired to violate the Act 
and to deny employees their rights of collective bargaining and 
freedom of representation, and requiring all district attorneys to in-
stitute prosecutions against carriers violating the law. Equally im-
portant, grievances arising out of the failure of disputants volun-
tarily to create Adjustment Boards could be referred to the Board 
of Mediation even though such Boards had not considered the 
question initially as contemplated in the original Act; this would 
break up one of the worst roadblocks in the functioning of the 
grievance machinery of the Act.30 
Fighting consolidations and amending the Railway Labor Act 
were not the only remedies to railway labor's problems; an expanded 
RLEA program, negotiations with management, and court action 
provided additional solutions to additional problems. The enlarged 
program of the RLEA required Richberg to develop analyses and 
proposals dealing with truck and bus transportation, hours of work, 
workmen's compensation, employers' liability, old-age pensions, 
public works, and emergency financing for unemployed workers. 
30 Ibid., 47-56; A. F. Whitney to Members, RLEA, Oct. 12, 1932, Rich-
berg Papers, c.H.s., Box 1 6; Rich berg, "Report of Donald R. Rich berg to 
Meeting of Railway Labor Executives' Association, Cleveland, Ohio, July 2, 
1930," 3, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 44· 
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While few concrete proposals for legislation emerged from these 
discussions for which Richberg and the RLEA could claim exclusive 
credit, these concerns did indicate a significant broadening of per-
spective by the railway organizations. And Richberg made sure that 
the views of the RLEA were well known in the halls of Congress.81 
Additionally, Richberg took part in numerous negotiations, arbi-
trations, and mediations under the Railway Labor Act. He also en-
gaged in extensive litigations to enforce state laws limiting the 
length of trains and providing for minimum numbers of men on 
crews operating trains. This work took Richberg all over the coun-
try; as general counsel of the RLEA he was called upon by rail un-
ions from east to west to assist them in local or state as well as na-
tional controversies.32 
Of all the collective bargaining Richberg took part in, perhaps 
the most significant was that leading to a 10 percent wage cut for 
railway employees in 1932. Faced with declining revenues and the 
need to meet interest payments and other obligations on capital in-
31 Richberg, "Report of Donald R. Richberg to Meeting of Railway La-
bor Executives' Association, Cleveland, Ohio, July 24, I93o," Richberg Pa-
pers, L.c., Box 44; Richberg to David B. Robertson, April Io, I93I, Rich-
berg Papers, c.H.s., Box I I; Richberg to B. M. Jewell, Manion, J. G. 
Luhrsen, July I6, I93I, enclosing Richberg, "Report of Old Age Pensions 
to the Railway Labor Executives' Association"; "Memorandum concerning 
Work on Federal Workmen's Compensation and Retirement Insurance-
COld Age Pensions), " Dec. 28, I 93 I, Rich berg Papers, C.H.s., Box 12; 
Richberg to David B. Robertson, Feb. 22, I932; Richberg to David B. Rob-
ertson, March I, I932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 14; Richberg to Da-
vid B. Robertson, July 27, I932; [Richberg] to Robert M. La Follette, Jr., 
June 25, I 932, Rich berg Papers, c.H.s., Box I 5; Whitney to Members, 
RLEA, Oct. I2, I932; Richberg, "Workmen's Compensation for Railway 
Employees," Dec. 29, I932, Richberg Papers, C.H.s., Box I6; Richberg, 
"Financing a Public Works Program," March 3I, I933, Richberg Papers, 
L.c., Box 44· 
32 Richberg, "Report of Donald R. Richberg to Meeting of Railway Labor 
Executives' Association, Cleveland, Ohio, July 24, I93o," 4-7, Richberg 
Papers, L.a., Box 44; Richberg, "Memories for My Grandchildren," I7-24, 
Manuscript in possession of Mrs. John H. Small III, Charlottesville, Va.; 
Richberg, "My Hero," Draft #2, chapt. Io, 4-12, Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box I4; Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but 
Unheroic Life (New York, I954), I4I-46. 
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vestment, the railroads proposed increased rates and a wage cut as 
the solution. Exploratory talks got underway in the fall of 1931; 
most of the rest of the year was spent in maneuvering over the 
agenda of a proposed national conference which would deal not 
only with the wage question but also with consolidations, the six-
hour day, stabilization of employment, pension plans, employment 
bureaus, motor transportation, and other grievances. Another issue 
in the preliminary arrangements was the question of obtaining as-
surances from the management side that its representatives would 
be empowered to make a binding agreement when the conference 
was finally held; the unions had been disappointed in a meeting of 
November 193I when the management spokesmen appeared with-
out power to conclude agreements. When railway labor obtained 
such assurances in December I 93 I, it had passed a landmark in 
management-labor relations. The proposed conference was to be the 
first time in railroad history that nationwide collective bargaining 
was agreed to by management. The RLEA had succeeded in win-
ning over management to the position it had taken in a resolution 
of November 2, I93I, that "both the managements of the railroad 
systems and their employees are organized so that they are able to 
deal nationally with problems and emergencies affecting the entire 
transportation industry ."33 
Although the union leaders themselves determined policy 
throughout the conference, Richberg was close at hand and assisted 
both in the planning of long-range strategy and in the negotiations 
themselves. In January I932 the I,2oo railway delegates at the 
conference authorized him to formulate their agreement to take a 
33 Daniel Willard to David B. Robertson, Nov. 14, I 93 I; David B. Rob-
ertson to Willard, Nov. I7, I93I; Willard to David B. Robertson, Nov. 2I, 
I93I; David B. Robertson to Willard, Nov. 2I, I93I; C. E. Seehom, W. C. 
Keiser, A. B. Miller, B. L. Summers, R. B. Wilkins, W. G. Metcalfe, to 
General Chairmen and Local Chairmen, Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men and Enginemen, in U.S., Dec. I6, I93I; Willard to David B. Robert-
son, Dec. I8, I93I; "Press Notice," Dec. I8, I93I; David B. Robertson to 
Willard, Dec. 2I, I93I, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 12; Bernstein, The 
Lean Years, 314-I6. The quotation is from "Resolution Adopted by Rail-
way Labor Executives' Association," Nov. 2, I93I, enclosed in David B. 
Robertson toR. H. Aishton, Nov. 2, 193I, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box I2. 
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10 percent wage cut. Richberg viewed this as a realistic step taken 
in recognition of the exigencies of the railroads' financial situation, 
and he strongly supported the action. On the management side, it 
was Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio and 
chairman of the employer representatives, who induced the chief 
recalcitrants-the Union Pacific, the Burlington, and the Southern 
Pacific-to go along with a 1 o percent cut rather than hold out for 
the I 5 percent which they originally sought. As a result of the 
efforts on both sides, an agreement was reached mutually, thus 
avoiding the likelihood of unilateral action by the railroads had the 
conference failed.34 
Though the railway workers accepted a wage cut, they had pre-
vented the roads from acting separately in serving notice, under the 
terms of the Railway Labor Act, of an intention to change the exist-
ing contracts. Some roads did give notice, but the successful involve-
ment of the managements of most of the country's railroads in a 
nationwide collective bargaining session was a major victory for 
railway labor. Furthermore, the roads had wanted a I 5 percent 
cut; the compromise that came out of the January 1932 conference 
resulted in a xo percent cut to be restored automatically within one 
year unless extended by mutual agreement. At a time when workers 
in other industries were suffering reductions in pay imposed uni-
laterally by management, the railway unions established a precedent 
for nationwide collective bargaining and succeeded in limiting the 
extent of their losses. They also procured promises from manage-
ment to take all possible steps to stabilize employment and to in-
vestigate a number of the complaints that had been discussed in 
the course of the conference.35 
Before the railway wage question came to a culmination, Rich-
34 Richberg, "My Hero," Draft #2, chapt. 10, 19-25, Richberg Papers, 
L.c., Box 14. In addition, see Richberg, "Memories for My Grandchildren," 
28-3I; Richberg, My Hero, I47-48; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 3I5-16. 
35 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 3I3-I6; C. M. Rodgers, Seehorn, Miller, 
Fred R. Bean, H. H. Burnett, R. L. Glenn, T. M. Spooner to General 
Chairman, BLFE et al., Jan. I 2, I 9 3 2; "Report of Railway Labor Executives' 
Association with Reference to Negotiations with Committee of Railway 
Presidents concerning Questions of Unemployment and Wages," Feb. I, 
I932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 14· 
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berg's own financial status came under review-at his own instiga-
tion. Years after he had severed his ties with the RLEA, Richberg 
took pride in the fact that he had never held a permanent retainer 
from the unions; he always worked on a job-by-job basis. This, he 
believed, enabled him both then and later to look upon labor ques-
tions with a detachment and objectivity not possible to one perma-
nently dependent on one group of clients.36 This thought may very 
well have been simply an unconscious rationalization of his later 
anti-union outlook, for in 1930-1931 he attempted to procure just 
such a retainer from the RLEA, albeit unsuccessfully. 
The issue arose when Richberg was offered an opportunity to 
undertake work for another client, not connected with the railway 
unions, on a permanent, full-time basis. He anticipated that the 
new work would be acceptable to him and would enable him to 
spend more time with family and friends in Chicago than was possi-
ble while representing the unions. In the hope of having the RLEA 
equal this other bid for his services, which thus far had been on a 
per diem basis, Richberg suggested several propositions for a re-
tainer, with the definite implication that he might not continue to 
represent the RLEA unless "a satisfactory, permanent relationship" 
could be worked out. Financial difficulties prevented the RLEA 
from settling the question, so the union executives continued their 
previous per diem arrangement. Nevertheless, Richberg did not 
leave. He preferred to work for clients he could identify with the 
public interest; this identification provided a justification for his 
work which could never be equaled by service to strictly private 
clients. This need for justification, as well as the many personal 
relationships he had built up over the years in union circles, plus 
the small amount of public attention that his work sometimes 
brought, probably helped to keep Richberg in the service of the 
railway unions for a while longer despite other offers. His rela-
tionship with the RLEA continued as before.37 
36 Richberg to the Editor, Chicago Journal of Commerce, July 8, I933, 
Richberg Papers, L.a., Box I; Richberg, My Hero, I62. 
37 Martin F. Ryan to Richberg, Feb. I4, I93I; Richberg to Ryan, March 
5, I93I; Jewell to Ryan, March Io, I93I, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box I 1. 
The quotation is from Richberg to David B. Robertson, Jan. 23, I93 I, Rich-
berg Papers, c.H.s., Box I 1. 
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As the depression deepened, it became clear to Richberg that 
he and railway labor would have to look elsewhere if the Republi-
can party renominated President Hoover in 1932. In the precon-
vention campaign of I 928, Rich berg and David Robertson had 
sought to marshal railway labor behind Secretary of Commerce 
Hoover, only to be disappointed in his failure to enunciate a pro-
gressive labor program during the course of the election campaign. 
Developments in the years that followed confirmed the worst fears 
of Richberg that Hoover's commitment to labor was lukewarm at 
best. The administration had resisted the movement to pass an anti-
injunction bill despite widespread support for the measure once 
the abuses of judges such as Wilkerson and Parker became gen-
erally known. Informal, nongovernmental efforts at reform, such as 
the 1931 Progressive Conference sponsored by Senator George 
Norris, resulted in rhetoric rather than accomplishment. The de-
velopment of an enlarged RLEA program signified not only a broad-
ening perspective on the part of railway labor but also an increasing 
need. The wage cuts suffered by rail and other industrial workers 
as the decade of the 1930s opened were symbolic of the need for 
a new approach to the problems of the depression. 
Although Richberg personally was tempted to take up a more 
economically secure occupation than representing railway labor, 
his need to be part of a movement he believed was graced with 
the public good, and his rapture with participating in public or 
semipublic work, helped to keep him receptive to calls for service. 
He continued to work for railway labor, and thus was in a strategic 
position to participate in the new administration when the oppor-
tunity came. In fact, his association with the new regime began 
during the campaign, well before the election of 1932. When the 
call came, Rich berg was ready. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Door to Preferment 
After the disappointments of the Hoover years, Donald Richberg 
was receptive to any sign that the Democrats rather than the Re-
publicans would carry on his concept of the progressive tradition. 
Hoover's desire for vindication and his control of the party ma-
chinery virtually assured that he would be the Republican nominee 
in 1932. To Richberg, the Republican party could only promise 
more of the same. The Democrats thus became the center of his 
interest. Of course, after the initial phase of Hoover's 1928 cam-
paign, Richberg had no personal stake in the administration, and 
this undoubtedly was a factor in turning him toward the Demo-
crats. His disillusionment with Hoover's labor policy, the prospect 
that a second term for the president would mean no new ideas in 
dealing with the depression, and his personal career situation made 
it all but certain that 1932 would find Donald Richberg in the 
Democratic camp. 
Richberg's initial contact with the Democratic organization oc-
curred in July 1932, after Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New 
York had won his party's presidential nomination. Roosevelt took 
the initiative by asking Richberg to arrange for a conference with 
members of the Railway Labor Executives' Association. As in 
the I 928 campaign for Hoover, he served as the go-between for the 
nominee and David B. Robertson, chairman of the RLEA. Rich-
berg's involvement with the candidate was the result of his official 
position as general counsel of the RLEA, for he and Roosevelt were 
not personally acquainted and knew each other only by reputation 
prior to the summer of 1932.1 
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The conference took place on August 29 with Richberg and 
representatives of fifteen of the railway labor organizations present. 
The union executives provided Roosevelt with a capsule summary 
of the RLEA program, including their position on railroad consoli-
dation, retirement insurance and pensions for railway workers, the 
six-hour day, and unemployment relief. Richberg considered the 
meeting a success in more ways than one. Not only did the RLEA 
have an opportunity to present its views to the Democratic candi-
date as a guide to developing his labor platform, but Richberg him-
self established personal contact with the probable victor in the 
coming elections. As Richberg later fondly recalled, Roosevelt told 
one of his associates after the meeting that he was "a man I want 
to have near me in Washington.m 
Richberg was anxious to participate in the campaign and was 
alert to the opportunities that came his way. He acquired what he 
called an "associate membership" in the Brain Trust, Roosevelt's 
informal policy committee headed by Raymond Moley of Colum-
bia University, when he offered to help on railroad questions. Rich-
berg was an ideal counselor in view of his reputation as one of 
the country's leading labor lawyers and his part in bringing Roose-
velt and the RLEA together for their August conference. Roosevelt 
readily accepted his offer. Along with Adolph Berle of Columbia, 
future Secretary of the Treasury William Woodin, Joseph B. East-
man of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Ralph Budd of the 
Burlington Railroad, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee counsel Walter Splawn, and other experts, he partici-
pated in the preparation of a railroad speech for Roosevelt under 
Maley's supervision.3 
1 Donald Richberg to Louis McHenry Howe, July 14, 1932, Donald 
Richberg Papers, Chicago Historical Society, Box I 5; Richberg, My Hero: 
The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic Life (New York, 
I954), 154· 
2 "Memorandum for Conference with Governor Roosevelt on August 29, 
I 932," and "Representatives of Standard Railway Labor Organizations," 
Aug. 29, I932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 15. The quotation is from 
Richberg, My Hero, 1 55· 
3 Richberg, My Hero, I55i Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New 
York, 1939), 45; Richberg to Moley, Sept. 30, I932; "Copy of Revision of 
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Another avenue of approach to the Roosevelt campaign organiza-
tion was the National Progressive League for Franklin D. Roose-
velt. Senator George Norris of Nebraska became honorary chair-
man and Senator Edward Costigan of Colorado was honorary vice-
chairman. Though he lacked enthusiasm for the project initially, 
Richberg was made executive chairman of the group. The purpose 
of the Progressive League was to mobilize support among former 
Progressives, especially those who left the Republican party in 
1912, on behalf of the Democratic ticket. At first, Richberg felt 
that the results of such an effort would not be worth the trouble 
and expense, and further raised the possibility that the Republicans 
might try the same tactic and conceivably marshal more support 
from old Progressive-Republicans than the Democrats. But the 
group's possibilities for giving him access to Roosevelt were ulti-
mately compelling. Richberg had no intention of consciously using 
the League for his own private ends, but his desire to do battle for 
reform causes undoubtedly supplied much motivating power and 
made him willing to become active in the project. It was a handy 
outlet for his desire to participate in the campaign. The League it-
self was of little consequence in the election, but as a vehicle for 
Richberg's ambitions it served him well.4 
With the predictable Democratic victory at the November elec· 
tions, Richberg's name became the subject of speculation as to a 
possible appointment in the new administration. He was one of 
many figures on the outer fringes of the Roosevelt group, though 
in private he grossly exaggerated the possibility of a high-level 
appointment for himself. Publicly, he would have nothing to do 
with talk about appointments, whether for himself or for anyone 
else. He even refused to recommend those who sought his support 
for their own ambitions, including his former law partner, Harold 
Ickes. One of the apparent reasons for his public reluctance re-
garding himself was his financial situation. Even a top-level post in 
9/12/32," draft speech on railroads for Franklin D. Roosevelt, Richberg 
Papers, C.H.s., Box I 5. 
'Richberg, My Hero, I 56-57; Basil Manly to Richberg, Aug. 26, I932; 
Richberg to Manly, Sept. 3, I932; Richberg to Manly, Sept. 26, I932; 
Richberg to Manly, Sept. 30, I932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 15. 
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government would mean a drastic cut in income. Richberg still had 
several relatives dependent upon him for support; this was an old 
problem made more acute by the depression.5 
Privately, however, Richberg hoped that such obstacles some-
how could be overcome. While not openly seeking an appointment, 
nor wishing to force himself upon the president, he worked behind 
the scenes and hoped that he would be drafted for a suitable posi-
tion. For much of the winter and spring, Richberg set his sights on 
the cabinet itself, and at various times had dreams of the Interior, 
Labor, and Justice departments. He was sorely disappointed at the 
selection of Harold Ickes as secretary of interior. Afterwards, he 
scolded Ickes for having sought his support for the job; Richberg 
wrote Ickes that such a request amounted to asking "me to take 
myself entirely out of the cabinet picture so that you might put 
yourself in." Richberg reasoned that if the cabinet was to be politi-
cally and geographically balanced, there would not be enough room 
for two Progressive lawyers from Chicago. Furthermore, Richberg 
explained, to back Ickes for a position would repudiate "the efforts 
of my friends to obtain my appointment." Richberg's hopes rose 
briefly later in the spring of 1933. The unexpected death of Senator 
Thomas Walsh of Montana, who had been Roosevelt's first choice 
for attorney general, seemed to reopen the door to preferment, how-
ever tenuously. Despite the backing of the railway labor execu-
tives, Richberg lost out again.6 
5 Richberg to A. F. Whitney, Nov. 21, 1932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., 
Box r6; Richberg to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 14, 1933, Felix Frankfurter 
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 32; Richberg, My Hero, I 58-6o. 
6 David Lilienthal to Richberg, Dec. 8, 1932; Richberg to Lilienthal, 
Dec. 19, 1932, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box r6; Richberg to Frankfurter, 
Jan. 14, 1933, Frankfurter Papers, Box 32; Gilson Gardner to Roosevelt, 
Jan. 19, 1933; [Richberg] to Clarence N. Goodwin, Jan. 27, 1933; Rich-
berg to Ickes, Feb. 24, 1933, C.H.s., Box 17; Ickes to Richberg, Feb. 20, 
1933; Richberg to Ickes, Feb. 2o, 1933; Richberg to Moley, Feb. 20, 1933, 
Donald Rich berg Papers, Library of Congress, Box I; Rich berg to Manly, 
March 7, 1933; 'Wire sent to all Chief Executives by Mr. A. F. Whitney," 
March 7, 1933; Bert Jewell to Whitney, March 7, 1933; J. G. Luhrsen to 
Roosevelt, March 7, 1933; E. J. Manion to Roosevelt, March 7, 1933; 
Leo J. Hassenauer to Richberg, March 8, 1933; Jewell to George Norris, 
March ro, 1933, Richberg Papers, c.H.s., Box 17; Richberg, My Hero, 
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Actually, the cabinet was beyond Richberg's grasp. Raymond 
Moley relates in his memoirs that Rich berg was considered for three 
positions, none of cabinet rank.7 Though hardly a disinterested 
witness, Harold Ickes later recorded in his Secret Diary that Roose-
velt never had any intention of appointing Richberg to a cabinet 
position. One day in September 1933 Ickes had been talking to 
Roosevelt about Richberg and mentioned "that Richberg thought 
he was being seriously considered for the Cabinet and might have 
landed it if I hadn't crowded him out." According to Ickes, "The 
President threw back his head and laughingly said that he had 
never for a moment thought of Richberg in connection with the 
Cabinet."8 But in view of the almost fortuitous manner in which 
Ickes himself had gained appointment, largely because of Roose-
velt's inability to find a suitable man willing to undertake the In-
terior post and despite his lack of any prior acquaintance with 
Ickes, the possibility-remote though it was-that Richberg might 
have been offered a place in the cabinet was not to be ruled out 
in such a facile manner. 
There were other, more realistic opportunities besides the cabi-
net available to Richberg. The most desirable was the job of solici-
tor general. Roosevelt had already offered the position to Felix 
Frankfurter of Harvard Law School, but he turned it down, feel-
ing that he could be of greater assistance to the president by re-
maining outside the administration. Roosevelt asked him to recom-
mend someone else, so Frankfurter decided to sound out Richberg 
as a possibility. Richberg's immediate response was negative be-
cause the job's low salary would not cover his financial and family 
obligations. Yet on the very day of his refusal, he changed his 
mind and tried to reach Frankfurter to tell him that he wanted to 
reconsider his decision. Frankfurter seemed reluctant to recommend 
him, however, and Richberg was always mystified as to the reason. 
I 57-59. The quotations are from Richberg to Ickes, Feb. 24, I933, Rich-
berg Papers, c.H.s., Box I 7; a copy of this letter has recently been placed in 
the Richberg Papers at the Library of Congress. 
7 Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York, 1966), 290 n. 
8 Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. I: The First Thousand 
Days, 1933-1936 (New York, 1953), 87. 
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Frankfurter had decided that Richberg could render greater service 
to the Roosevelt administration by retaining his position as coun-
sel to the railway labor executives.9 Roosevelt considered Richberg 
for other posts as well, among them comptroller of currency and 
counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. None of these pro-
posals ever came to fruition.10 
Richberg's eventual draft into administration service came about 
as the result of his assistance in preparing the president's legislative 
program during the "Hundred Days," the first three months of 
Roosevelt's tenure during which the basic measures of the early 
New Deal were drawn up, sent to Congress, and signed into law. 
Richberg was frequently in Washington on RLEA business and was 
requested to assist with the administration program, as he reported 
to A. F. Whitney, Robertson's successor as chairman of the RLEA, 
"particularly so far as it concerns the railroads." He was especially 
interested in the legislation that eventually emerged as the 
Emergency Transportation Act of 1933. In addition, Senators 
La Follette and Costigan called on him to help draw up a pro-
gram for the progressive group in Congress to supplement the ad-
ministration's ideas on recovery. Thus, Richberg was much in de-
mand and found himself in an excellent position to keep track of 
developments regarding a possible appointment. For the time be-
ing, his situation remained indefinite, and as late as March 22, 
1933, he was still considering whether to renew the lease on his 
Chicago office. Yet conditions were fluid, and on March 28 Rich-
berg wrote to David Lilienthal, "Regarding the Washington situa-
tion-the picture is still blurred. But every now and then, as in a 
mirror, one seems to see a face."11 
9 Richberg, My Hero, 159; Frankfurter to Roosevelt, March 14, 1933, 
and Frankfurter, memorandum, March 15, 1933, Frankfurter Papers, Box 
34· The quotations are from Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilien-
thal, Vol. 1: The TVA Years, 1939-1945, Including a Selection of Journal 
Entries from the 1917-1939 Period (New York, I964), I 55· 
10 Richberg, My Hero, I 59-6o; Moley, First New Deal, 290 n; Ickes, 
Secret Diary, I :6-7. 
11 Edward P. Costigan and Robert M. La Follette, Jr., to Richberg, March 
6, 1933; Frances Perkins to Richberg, March 22, 1933; Richberg to Moley, 
March 27, I933, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box I; Richberg to Alice Houlihan, 
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What led Richberg into greater and greater involvement in the 
administration was not his interest in railroad legislation but the 
assistance he lent on an industrial recovery bill. Although Roosevelt 
had no intention of presenting Congress with a comprehensive 
measure for dealing with the business depression when he called 
a special session for March 9, his hand was forced when a proposal 
by Senator Hugo Black of Alabama to limit the workweek to thirty 
hours passed the Senate on April6, 1933. 
Prior to this, the president had ordered his chief policy adviser, 
Raymond Maley, to study the innumerable plans for restoring pros-
perity that had flowed into Washington since the inauguration. But 
Maley later recalled that as of April 4, "thinking in business and 
government circles on the subject had not crystallized sufficiently 
to justify any further moves at the time." One of Maley's associ-
ates, James War burg, had prepared a detailed analysis of the sev-
eral plans, but Maley decided that the results of Warburg's study 
were inadequate. Roosevelt agreed and told Maley to shelve fur-
ther work on the problem for the future.12 
The passage of Senator Black's thirty-hour bill changed every-
thing. Considerable support was gathering behind the measure, 
and Roosevelt would have to act quickly to regain the initiative. 
Otherwise, he ran the risk of seeing a recovery bill pass without 
his having had a hand in it. Yet he was reluctant to rally behind 
Black. As Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins hopefully interpreted 
the president's position, Roosevelt was "committed to the idea of a 
dynamic economy, an economy of greater expansion of production 
and distribution than we had known, rather than an economy of 
curtailment of production"; therefore, he doubted that a simple 
spread-work movement without any concomitant increase in pur-
chasing power would solve the unemployment problem. And 
something had to be done to rid the proposal of its rigidity. Every 
kind of work, whether in industry or agriculture, could not be 
March 22, 1933, Richberg Papers, C.H.s., Box 17. The quotation to Whit-
ney is from Richberg to Whitney, March 6, 1933, and the quotation to 
Lilienthal is from Richberg to Lilienthal, March 28, 1933, both in Rich-
berg Papers, c.H.s., Box 17. 
12 Moley, After Seven Years, I 84-86. 
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tied to a six-hour day and a thirty-hour week; as Roosevelt put it 
in regard to the dairy industry, "There have to be hours adapted 
to the rhythm of the cow." Furthermore, there were grave doubts 
about the constitutionality of the Black bill. 
For the time being, Roosevelt authorized Secretary Perkins to 
submit amendments to the Black bill designed to introduce a meas-
ure of flexibility and discretion in applying the thirty-hour stand-
ard. She also proposed minimum-wage standards to be recom-
mended by special industrial boards on which labor, management, 
and government would be represented. Another board might con-
sider limited exemptions from the law, and the secretary of labor 
would have discretion to impose machine-hour limitations. Perkins's 
amendments for saving the bill, however, caused as much con-
troversy as the original measure itself. Opposition came from both 
labor and business quarters, and Roosevelt regarded the support 
of both, but especially the latter, as essential for any recovery bill. 
Before the Black bill got any farther, the administration withdrew 
its backing for the Perkins amendments and set forth an entirely 
newplan.13 
At the same time that the president had allowed the secretary 
of labor to try amending the Black bill, he reversed his decision 
of April 4 not to press the preparation of a comprehensive indus-
trial recovery measure, and on April I I put Moley back to work 
coordinating the several proposals that had been suggested. With-
out informing Moley, Roosevelt also encouraged a number of others 
to try a hand at solving the same problem. Senator Wagner of 
New York was working on a draft recovery bill, assisted by former 
New York congressman Meyer Jacobstein, Harold Moulton of 
the Brookings Institution, David Podell and Gilbert Montague, two 
trade association lawyers, Fred Kent of the Bankers Trust Com-
pany, Malcolm Rorty and James Rand, two progressive business 
13 Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York, 1946), 192-97. 
The quotation from Roosevelt is cited by Perkins, 1 94· Also see Irving 
Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkeley, Calif., 
1950), 29-31; Moley, After Seven Years, 186-87; Moley, First New Deal, 
284, 287-88; Ellis Wayne Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of 
Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, N. J., 1966), 
21-23. 
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executives, W. Jett Lauck, a labor economist for the United Mine 
Workers, and members of Congress such as M. Clyde Kelly and 
Robert La Follette, Jr. Undersecretary of Commerce John Dick-
inson also had a proposal; from time to time he had worked on this 
problem with Jerome Frank and Rexford Tugwell of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and Labor Secretary Frances Perkins. Even-
tually, Dickinson and Wagner got together and produced a com-
mon draft.14 · 
In the meantime, Moley was making little headway; he was al-
ready overburdened with several other equally important projects. 
By April 25, he realized that he could not deliver a recovery bill 
in time to block the Black bill or the Perkinsc substitute, and would 
have to assign the task to someone else. By chance, Moley ran into 
Hugh Johnson in a hotel lobby in Washington. Johnson was an 
economic adviser to business tycoon Bernard Baruch and an ex-
cavalry officer and General in the Army. During the First World 
War, he had helped to organize the draft and served as army liaison 
with the War Industries Board. He later went into the agricultural 
implement business. After Roosevelt won the nomination in 1932, 
Baruch loaned Johnson to the Democratic campaign organization, 
and he became a full-Hedged member of the Brain Trust, special-
izing on farm and business policy. Moley now turned to Johnson 
for help. He found him an office in the old State, War, and Navy 
Building and put him in charge of writing an industrial recovery 
bill. Johnson, eager to participate in the administration, needed no 
encouragement, and plunged right into a task that would keep him 
in Washington for the next year and a half.15 
Johnson had well-developed ideas as to what was needed. He 
had frequently discussed the problem of industrial recovery with 
Baruch and Alexander Sachs of the Lehman Corporation. In addi-
tion, his service with the War Industries Board during the First 
World War provided him with experience in the only comparable 
effort to mobilize the economy for a national objective. Johnson's 
14 Moley, After Seven Years, r86-88; Hawley, The New Deal, 23-25. 
15 Moley, After Seven Years, r88; Moley, First New Deal, 283-85; 
Hugh S. Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth (Garden City, N. Y., 
1935), 193· 
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first draft of a bill proposed suspending the antitrust laws, empow-
ering the president to sanction business agreements on labor and 
competitive standards, and providing for federal licensing as a 
means of insuring compliance with the law. The version being de-
veloped by Senator Wagner's group, with the cooperation of 
Undersecretary of Commerce Dickinson, suggested combining a 
program of public works and government loans with industrial 
self-government through trade associations; it also guaranteed 
labor's right to collective bargaining.16 
Neither Moley nor Johnson felt competent to deal with the 
labor provisions of a comprehensive recovery bill, nor did they 
consider them central to their objectives. Consequently, Moley 
suggested that Johnson get help from Donald Richberg as a ges-
ture to win labor support for the measure. In view of his help in 
the campaign and his current work on railroad legislation, it was 
not surprising that Moley should think of Richberg rather than 
someone else. Though officially he represented only the railroad 
brotherhoods, Richberg seemed to have the confidence of the labor 
movement generally and would serve as a good spokesman to rep-
resent its interests, thereby encouraging labor to support the result-
ing bill.17 Furthermore, Richberg's ideas about industrial recovery 
generally conformed to those then circulating within the adminis-
tration and among its friends. Though differing on particulars, he 
was thinking along the same lines as Moley and Johnson and saw 
the solution to the depression in proposals that would "recognize 
the necessity of a planned economy."18 
Richberg had well-developed ideas about industrial recovery 
and had worked them out in the form of a program which he pre-
sented before the Senate Committee on Finance in February 1933· 
Testifying on the causes and remedies of the depression, he em-
16 Hawley, The New Deal, 23-25; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 193, 196-97; 
Bernstein, The New Deal, 31-32. 
17 Moley, First New Deal, 29o; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 201; Richberg, The 
Rainbow (Garden City, N.Y., 1936), 107; Bernstein, The New Deal, 32. 
18 Richberg, Depression Causes and Remedies, Testimony before the 
Committee on Finance, U.S., Congress, Senate, Feb. 23, 1933, 12-15, 25, 
pamphlet in Rich berg Papers, L.a., Box 1 9· 
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phasized the need for business-government planning to bolster 
consumption through higher wages and lower prices rather than 
retrenchment through cutting production and raising prices; in 
other words, he emphasized moving toward an economy of plenty 
and away from an economy of scarcity. 
To accomplish this objective, Richberg enumerated several pro-
posals. "Self-Government in Industry" was one answer. Once the 
working classes were adequately organized, it would be practical "to 
create industrial councils composed of representatives of managers, 
investors and workers and then to create a national council com-
posed of similar representatives of all essential industries." The 
workers would double as consumer representatives, so that "ulti-
mately, in the national council, all producing and consuming in-
terests would be so represented that one group could hardly obtain 
sanction for a policy clearly contrary to the general welfare." Prof-
iteering would be eliminated by "a legal limitation upon profit-
making in the essential industries"; profits should be adequate only 
to meet the interest charges necessary to attract capital for invest-
ment. Profit limitation could be effected through the taxation sys-
tem. 
Though investors and government were already adequately or-
ganized to participate in such a scheme, unionization had not yet 
advanced to the point where labor could play its part in a national 
council to determine national economic policy. The Richberg plan 
thus called for encouraging and protecting the right of labor to or-
ganize free from interference by other interest groups. Richberg 
did not want others to speak on behalf of labor, but wanted it to be 
able to stand up for its own interests. Therefore, he saw unioniza-
tion as the sine qua non of any plan for industrial self-government 
through a national economic council. 
In the meantime, while this fundamental reorganization of in-
terest groups was being carried out, Richberg proposed that several 
ameliorative actions be put into effect immediately: 1) appropria-
tions for direct relief to supplement and maintain the work of state 
welfare agencies; 2) a program to create mass purchasing power and 
to increase employment quickly, by extending credit to unem-
ployed heads of households and to industries willing to resume or 
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increase employment and production; 3) creation of a national 
council to plan further emergency measures on an experimental, 
trial-and-error basis as a way of developing proved recovery devices 
until fundamental reform could be realized/9 In addition, prior to 
testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, Richberg had 
worked with Senators La Follette, Costigan, and Cutting on a pub-
lic works bill, and so could be numbered among those sympathetic 
to pump-priming as a way to revive the economy.20 
It was obvious that Moley could count on Richberg as one at-
tuned to what he and Johnson were trying to do in their proposed 
National Industrial Recovery bill. Richberg agreed to help out, 
and drafted a labor provision for the bill based on his experiences 
with the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and the Norris-La Guardia 
Anti-Injunction Act of 1932.21 
By early May, the Wagner-Dickinson and the Johnson-Richberg 
drafts had progressed to a point where either one or the other would 
have to be selected or the two reconciled. Roosevelt thereupon held 
a conference with everyone working on the problem to decide the 
main points to be included in an administration bill. Having 
worked on both the industrial recovery measure and, prior to that, 
a public works bill, Richberg expressed confidence during the 
meeting that the two different approaches could be reconciled in 
a comprehensive program. He subsequently was included in a com-
mittee appointed by the president to combine the principal fea-
tures of the two drafts in a single bill. 22 
The joint drafting committee appointed by Roosevelt included 
Richberg, Hugh Johnson, Senator Wagner, Budget Director Lewis 
Douglas, John Dickinson, Rexford Tugwell, and Frances Perkins. 
After Tugwell smoothed over a few misunderstandings present at 
the outset, he, Dickinson, and Perkins dropped out of the picture, 
leaving the rest of the committee free to draw up a compromise 
bill, assisted (in Johnson's words) only by "a few 'homers-in' from 
19 Ibid., 14-26. 
20 Richberg, The Rainbow, xo6; Richberg, My Hero, 163. 
21 Richberg, The Rainbow, 107; Richberg, My Hero, 164; Bernstein, 
The New Deal, 32. 
22 Richberg, The Rainbow, 107-Io8; Richberg, My Hero, 164. 
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time to time." The resulting bill directed that the attack on the de-
pression be carried out on two coordinated fronts: business-govern-
ment cooperation to control the damaging effects of unrestrained 
competition, and public works to prime the pump of the economy. 
Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NrRA) allowed 
each industry, as an ad hoc group or through trade associations, to 
propose a code of fair competition governing trade and labor prac-
tices, which upon approval by the president would be exempt from 
the antitrust laws and would have the authority of law in the codi-
fied industry. The Act empowered the president to license busi-
nesses to secure compliance. Title II set up a Public Works Ad-
ministration with an appropriation of $3.3 billion to provide a spur 
to production and, in turn, consumption.23 
The bill that was signed into law on June 16, 1933, contained 
the soon-to-be-famous Section 7a of Title I, the clause requiring 
that every code of fair competition guarantee the right of collective 
bargaining and unimpaired union organization. Richberg later 
claimed that 7a originated in the draft prepared by himself and 
General Johnson.24 Although Moley and Johnson had called upon 
Richberg for help as a labor expert, the evolution of Section 7a was 
a far more complex undertaking. Certainly the Wagner group was 
thinking along similar lines. In the process of drafting and redraft-
ing, individual contributions were reworked and sometimes altered 
beyond recognition. And given the concessions to business, it would 
have been difficult to enact the program without labor provisions, 
so that some sort of Section 7a was likely to be drafted by someone. 
In view of the general consensus in administration circles, the 
question of individual authorship was less crucial than if there had 
been sharp divergences of opinion among those whom Roosevelt 
23 Richberg, The Rainbow, 107-10; Richberg, My Hero, 164-65; Moley, 
After Seven Years, 188-89; Moley, First New Deal, 290-92; Hawley, The 
New Deal, 25. For the text of the law as passed by Congress, see U. S., 
Statutes at Large (1933), 48: I95· The quotation is from Johnson, Blue 
Eagle, 204. 
24 Richberg to Natasha von Hoershelman, Sept. 26, 1933, with "Memo-
randum concerning Section 7(a)," National Recovery Administration Pa-
pers, Record Group 9, National Archives, Series 47, Box 581; U. S., Stat-
utes at Large (1933), 48:195, 198-99. 
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relied on. The truly significant fact was that opinion in the admin-
istration had coalesced behind a series of related ideas which were 
brought together in the final bill: business-government cooperation, 
reliance on trade associations for implementing the program, tem-
porary suspension of the antitrust laws, imposition of trade and 
labor standards through codes of fair competition, and public works. 
As Moley later recalled, it was probable that a recovery bill would 
have evolved even if he had never run into Hugh Johnson in a 
hotel lobby and turned the job over to him; so many people were 
working on relatively similar projects that some kind of a law was 
almost bound to develop.25 
The bill that emerged from the joint drafting committee and 
passed through Congress by mid-June was thus the product of a 
growing consensus in the business community and the nation at 
large. And so were Richberg's own ideas about industrial recovery; 
originality was not one of his strong points. As Henry I. Harriman, 
president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, described 
the situation to Roosevelt, "The psychology of the country is now 
ready for self-regulation of industry with government approval of 
agreements reached either within or without trade conferences."26 
Richberg's initiation into the new recovery administration grew 
directly out of his association with Johnson. The General was hard 
at work drawing up a plan of organization and recruiting personnel 
even before the bill passed Congress; in fact, he moved in this di-
rection before any orders to do so had been issued from the White 
House, and simply assumed that he would be in charge of the 
agency he had helped to create. The crusty ex-cavalryman had 
taken a liking to the Chicago labor lawyer and determined to have 
him in the National Recovery Administration (NRA), as the agency 
for implementing Title I was to be called. Besides, Richberg ap-
parently had the confidence of the labor movement and would sat-
isfy the AFL. At the same time, he was no radical and seemed to 
subscribe to most of the ideas and assumptions of Johnson and 
Moley. Ultimately, after much haggling, Johnson and Richberg 
25 Maley, After Seven Years, I 88. 
26 Henry I. Harriman to Roosevelt, May I I, I933, Franklin Roosevelt 
Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 466. 
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were to agree on the job of general counsel as most appropriate.27 
Richberg was anxious to have a part in the experiment; as he 
later recalled, "There was the lure of a great adventure and the 
possibility of sharing in a great achievement." Furthermore, h~s 
position was not unlike that of Johnson. Having contributed to 
planning the NRA he regarded it with something of a paternal inter-
est. But Richberg was still confronted with the obstacle of his family 
obligations; a government salary would simply not meet his needs.28 
In order to get Richberg, Johnson took an extraordinary step to 
meet his wage demands and accepted a lower wage for himself, 
even though the post of general counsel was subordinate to that 
of administrator. The NRA general counsel thus received $14,120 
per year (before Roosevelt's economy program effected a 15 percent 
reduction). Except for the president and his cabinet, Richberg was 
the highest paid member of the administration.29 
Johnson went farther. Perhaps realizing that Richberg needed 
to justify his work as something special and as contributing to the 
public interest, Johnson emphasized that the president also wanted 
him to join the NRA. This was just the sort of appeal to which Rich-
berg was vulnerable. He later fondly recalled that he had "a direct 
understanding with the President himself" and agreed to serve only 
at Roosevelt's "personal request." Roosevelt was willing to give 
Richberg the attention and assurances that he wanted, but may 
have created a misunderstanding in doing so. The president con-
fided that he needed a watchdog on Johnson, not being sure what 
kind of an administrator he was going to make. Richberg was thus 
given the definite impression that he enjoyed a special relationship 
to the president and that actual authority in the NRA was divided 
between him and Johnson-at least unofficially. Whether this was 
a correct interpretation of Roosevelt's assurances or not, it was the 
27 Johnson, Blue Eagle, 2oi, 212; Richberg, The Rainbow, I Io-12; Rich-
berg, My Hero, I65; "Proceedings of Meeting No. I of the Special Indus-
trial Recovery Board," June I9, I933, 2I, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 
466. 
28 Rich berg, The Rainbow, I I o-I 2. 
29 Alvin Brown to Richberg, Oct. z6, 1933, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 
47; Richberg, My Hero, z66-67. 
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one Richberg carried away from his meeting with the president.30 
Although the future difficulties that would someday develop be-
tween Richberg and Johnson were based on actual differences of 
opinion over policy and administration, Richberg' s concept of his 
watchdog role in the NRA undoubtedly contributed to Johnson's 
later fears that Richberg was after his job. 
Richberg thus entered the NRA with an exaggerated sense of his 
own importance. Furthermore, having been involved in the project 
from its inception, he came to regard the NRA uncritically. From 
the first, this approving attitude blinded him to dangers which he 
should have noticed as the tacit representative of the labor interest 
at the policy level of the NRA organization. 
Moley and Johnson originally had turned to Richberg for help 
in drafting the NIRA as one who had the confidence of labor and 
could speak on its behalf. This same reasoning played a part in 
Johnson's desire to see Richberg join the NRA organization once the 
drafting process was over. Many in the railway brotherhoods and 
the AFL likewise looked on Richberg as a labor man in the new 
setup. And so did many in the industrial community, as Hugh 
Johnson found out when he was swamped with protests from busi-
nessmen upon announcing Richberg's appointment as general 
counsel. Grace Abbott of the Department of Labor, who was wor-
ried whether there would be adequate protection for labor in the 
code-making process, sought the counsel of Felix Frankfurter as to 
what might be done about the problem; Frankfurter's response 
typified the way in which many authorities regarded Richberg's 
position: "The inclusion of Donald Rich berg as general counsel 
goes a long way to introduce the interests committed to the Secre-
tary of Labor at the policy-making stages of what will be done un-
der the Act."31 
30 Richberg, The Rainbow, I I I-12; Richberg, My Hero, I65-66. 
31 Maley, First New Deal, 29o; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 20I, 2I2; Ar-
thur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 2: The Coming of the 
New Deal (Boston, I959), I62-63; Miss Grace Abbott, "Memorandum for 
F. F. re: the Labor Department and the Administration of the Industrial 
Recovery Bill," May 25, I933, and Frankfurter to Abbott, May 30, I933, 
both in Frankfurter Papers. Box 6l., 
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Yet Richberg's view turned out to be different. Once he was 
appointed, he did not conceive of his role as being an unofficial 
representative and protector of labor. Instead of forthrightly facing 
the fact that everyone expected him to be labor's man in the NRA, 
Richberg perceived himself as playing what he regarded as a higher 
role: that of a disinterested arbiter smoothing over the conflicts 
among business, labor, and government.32 
Richberg had always resented the idea of the lawyer as the rep-
resentative of private or special interests. In place of such a con-
cept, he saw the lawyer as an officer of the court, a public official 
bound to serve the general good. But in an organization like the 
NRA where most of the officeholders regarded themselves as the 
agents of opposing interests, labor could not afford to have a repre-
sentative who was going to try to be impartial. Herein lay the seeds 
of the eventual estrangement between organized labor and Donald 
Rich berg. 
Even before the new organization officially got underway, Rich-
berg's favorable identification with the NRA and his role in it inter-
fered with his perception of what was happening. In staffing the 
NRA, Johnson got Bernard Baruch, his former boss, to mobilize what 
he dubbed "the very Brahmins of Big Industry" for help in re-
cruiting the "best material in industry" to man the new organiza-
tion.33 Johnson's almost complete indifference to the labor move-
ment as a source of personnel set the tone of the project from the 
first and should have alerted Richberg to the direction NRA was 
taking. Labor was going to need a protector. But if Richberg per-
ceived what was happening, he failed to react. Wishing the best 
for a project he had helped to launch, and concerned with finding 
a niche in it for himself, his senses were dulled to the dangers that 
lay ahead. 
Richberg thus began his tenure in the administration under two 
misconceptions: he perceived his relationship to Johnson as admin-
istrator in a way that was likely to lead to a clash at both the policy 
32 Richberg to the Editor, Chicago Journal of Commerce, July 8, 1933, 
Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 1; Richberg, My Hero, 162-63; Richberg, The 
Rainbow, 1o1-1o5, 115-21, 252-59, 275-84. 
33 Johnson, Blue Eagle, 2o6, 212-19; Hawley, The New Deal, 56-57. 
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and the personal levels; and he failed to understand that he was 
supposed to be a labor representative in the NRA and instead ab-
dicated this role in favor of an Olympian concept of representing 
all economic interests, even though the assumptions underlying 
the NRA and the way it was staffed made it clear that business inter-
ests would be dominant and that labor would need defending. Hav-
ing misconstrued his role-situation, Richberg was almost bound 
to run into trouble. 
In some ways, Richberg's personal experiences were symbolic 
of what was happening to the National Recovery Administration 
itself. Vaguely defined in the law, with few policy standards or 
organizational guidelines, the NRA was all things to all men. Each 
could interpret the law according to his own predilections. Advo-
cates of contrary approaches to industrial recovery could read their 
own ideas into the Act. It seemed to satisfy everyone in the begin-
ning, but for the same reason was destined to satisfy no one in the 
end. Like Richberg, most of the supporters of the NRA launched 
the experiment amid a series of misunderstandings and a failure to 
perceive the realities of the situation.84 To them, it hailed a new 
era of business-government cooperation that had in fact not yet 
arrived, as was to become all too evident in the subsequent history 
of theNRA. 
As the NRA proved to be founded upon an uncertain dream, so 
too Richberg's belief that he could stand above the clash of selfish 
interests was to prove equally ephemeral. When he spumed the 
role of defending labor's interests and ignored the dangers of busi-
ness dominance of the NRA in favor of seeking an unattainable level 
of impartiality, he seale_d his own fate. Richberg was like most men 
and just as incapable of achieving perfect objectivity. Turning 
away from labor influences in a gesture of fair-mindedness to all 
interests, he was destined to succumb to business influences-
which, after all, were the stronger of the two in the NRA. But it was 
this last point that Richberg failed to take adequate account of. 
34 Hawley, The New Deal, 26-52. 
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Donald Richberg's understanding of the task facing the National 
Recovery Administration was ambivalent and sometimes contra-
dictory. On the one hand, he condemned the business community 
for bringing the country to the verge of economic disintegration, 
and on the other, he believed that the answer to the depression lay 
in combined action, under a government watchdog, among these 
same businessmen to control the destructive characteristics of com-
petition and to set fair labor standards.1 What Richberg did not 
count on was that the businessmen would make friends with the 
government watchdog, so that the NRA did not keep the upper hand 
in guarding against abuses of the privileges it allowed by tempo-
rarily suspending the antitrust laws. 
Richberg's vacillation between a punitive and a benevolent atti-
tude toward business collusion was apparent in his first major ad-
dress as general counsel of the National Recovery Administration, 
a speech that Felix Frankfurter of Harvard Law School especially 
liked because it was "an admirable blend of suaviter and fortiter, 
the more so because the fortiter has slightly the edge on the suaviter 
in the cocktail.m In what was advertised as "officially approved by 
Administrator Hugh S. Johnson as a statement of Administration 
policy,"3 Richberg warned his listeners at the Merchants' Associa-
tion of New York on July 6, 1933, that the depression had taught 
the American people a lesson they would not soon forget. They 
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would not keep in power "men who have no plan, no program for 
the general welfare, no understanding of the obligations to the 
common good that arise out of power to control the industries of 
the nation." While Richberg had no desire to see "the political so-
cialization of industry," he prophesied that "unless industry is suffi-
ciently socialized by its private owners and managers so that the 
great essential industries are operated under public obligations ap-
propriate to the public interest in them-the advance of political 
control over private industry is inevitable." 
Believing that the responsible businessman had been sufficiently 
chastened by the depression, Richberg assured the Merchants' As-
sociation that "the National Industrial Recovery Act was written in 
the confident belief that the great majority of businessmen are 
ready to take intelligent action, to accept their responsibilities cou-
rageously, and to cooperate with their fellows and with their gov-
ernment." This was the rationale of the whole NRA scheme, for the 
codes of fair competition would "not be in any sense the product 
of a dictatorship." Instead, industry itself would prepare the codes, 
so that they "will represent the uncoerced desire of . . . industry to 
govern itself wisely and in the public interest." By writing such a 
law as the NIRA, the New Deal reaffirmed its faith in the capitalist 
system, for "one of the primary purposes of the law is to avoid any 
necessity for government control of business; to encourage private 
initiative, to rely on self-discipline; to put faith in voluntary, collec-
1 Donald Richberg, "Gold-plated Anarchy: An Interpretation of the Fall 
of Giants," The Nation 136 (April 5, 1933): 368-69; Richberg, Depres-
sion Causes and Remedies, Testimony before the Committee on Finance, 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Feb. 23, 1933, 7, q, 16-17, 20-22, pamphlet in 
Donald Richberg Papers, Library of Congress, Box 19; Richberg, "Mutual-
ism," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 13 (June 1928): 
185-94; Richberg, Laborism in This Changing World, Address before the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Erie, Pa., Aug. 28, 
1932, pamphlet in Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 19; Richberg, The Rainbow 
(Garden City, N. Y., 1936), 106-44. 
2 Felix Frankfurter to Richberg, July 7, 1933, Richberg Papers, L.a., 
Box I. 
3 National Recovery Administration Release No. 29, July 3, 1933, Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 466. 
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tive agreements as the means of fixing and stabilizing human rela-
tions in and between units of industry." The burden of justifying 
the faith of the administration thus rested with business itself.4 
The reaction to Richberg's policy pronouncement was generally 
unfavorable, and the New York Herald Tribune detected "the dis-
tinct touch of the iron hand beneath the velvet glove."5 Yet such a 
reaction misinterpreted the trend of Richberg's thinking since the 
days of the Progressives. He conceived of the Railway Labor Act 
of 1926, for example, not as a measure to wield government force 
on behalf of labor, but simply as a device to guarantee that labor 
would have the opportunity to run its own affairs by being allowed 
to organize itself and bargain collectively. The law was a way of 
freeing labor to do something for itself, not to force the government 
to take over its functions. 
Despite his frequently impassioned denunciations of the abuses 
of the capitalist system, there was no doubt in Richberg's mind that 
the private sector of the economy was to be the dominant element 
in NRA. And within the private sector, it was to be the managerial 
elements, exercising the traditional rights of property, rather than 
labor or the consumer, that would initiate and administer the codes 
in most instances. Although Richberg believed that "self-govern-
ment in industry" meant "an adequate representation" of manage-
ment, labor, and consumers "in the control of industry," he added 
a crucial qualification to this definition: 
That doesn't mean the substitution of government control for manage-
ment. Nor does it mean labor participation in management. On the 
contrary, I not only think there is a fundamental inconsistency in that 
conception, but curiously enough, the American labor movement itself 
has never been very keen about guiding and participating in manage-
ment. They have as a rule rather objected to the possibility of their 
being asked to accept such responsibilities. But it does mean that man-
agement, while exercising its proper prerogatives, must take into con-
4 Richberg, Address to Merchants' Association of New York, July 6, 
1933, NRA Release No. 30, in Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 19. 
5 New York Herald Tribune, July 7-8, 1933; Philadelphia Ledger, July 
9, 1933; New York Evening Post, July 7, 1933. The quotation is from the 
Herald Tribune of July 7, 1933. 
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sideration and must have a basis of conference and some corrective 
force for its own judgment on behalf both of those who do the manual 
or minor intellectual work of the industry, and of the public whose 
support must be obtained by the industry in the disposition of its 
products.6 
Presumably, collective bargaining and the free choice of the mar-
ketplace would be sufficient to insure participation by labor and 
the consumers, rather than a more direct role in writing and en-
forcing the codes. Government's role in the NRA scheme would be 
to serve as a court of last resort for driving recalcitrants into line 
and for protecting labor and the consumer where private action 
proved inadequate. Richberg firmly believed in the NRA as an ex-
periment in self-regulation, not government-regulation.7 
Richberg's commitment to capitalism was evident in his acute 
sensitivity to his reputation as a radical, a reputation that had grown 
out of his representation of the railway labor unions and was wholly 
out of proportion to reality. Richberg seemed to feel somewhat 
guilty about his past connections, and took special precautions to 
explain that he was by no means a roistering revolutionary and was 
undeserving of the name "Comrade Richbergski" given him by a 
West Coast trade magazine.8 He vehemently protested a descrip-
tion of him as a "lobbyist at large for organized labor" by the Chi-
cago Journal of Commerce.9 And in the autumn of 1933, he com-
6 [Richberg], "Sunday Breakfast Club," Philadelphia, Pa., Nov. 5, I933, 
4, mimeographed speech in Richberg Papers, L.a., Box I9. 
7 Richberg, "Progress of the National Recovery Administration," Address 
over Columbia Broadcasting System, July 26, I933, NRA Release No. 93; 
Richberg, Address over National Broadcasting Company, July 3I, I933, 
NRA Release No. I45; Richberg, "The Background of the N.R.A.," Address 
at Ottumwa, Iowa, Sept. 4, I933, NRA Release No. 624; Richberg, "The 
Great Adventure of the N.R.A.," Address at Memphis, Tenn., Sept. 4, 
I933, NRA Release No. 6I7; Richberg, "Underlying Principles of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act," Address at Babson Institute, Wellesley 
Hills, Mass., Sept. 8, I933, NRA Release No. 628, all in Richberg Papers, 
L.a., Box I 9· 
8 "Comrade Richbergski Issues Another Threatski," Grow's Pacific Coast 
Lumber Digest, April I5, I935, I5· 
9 Richberg to the Editor, Chicago Journal of Commerce, July 8, I933, 
Richberg Papers, L.a., Box I. 
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plained of finding himself "constantly facing the difficulty of get-
ting to an understanding with people who are perfectly sure that 
I am headed in a direction which is exactly opposite from the direc-
tion in which I am headed." Rich berg felt compelled to use his pub-
lic addresses as a platform for defending his "economic faith" in the 
hope of countering rumors that he was "some sort of wild radical, 
or a Socialist, with probably strong communistic leanings." Instead, 
he presented himself as "a convinced opponent of state socialism," 
one who did not "believe in the efficacy of state regulation of indus-
trial operations" but did "believe very much in democratic processes 
and in the value of what I would call competitive individualism." 
Although the latter "must be qualified by a social conscience and a 
social responsibility," this was a matter of private morality and not 
something imposed by government decree. To Richberg, the NRA 
was "the half way house" between "undisciplined individualism" 
and "state socialism" that would save the free enterprise system 
from its self-destructive tendencies.10 
This anxiety to explain away his apparent radical reputation and 
his labor affiliations revealed Richberg's deep-seated need for ac-
ceptance. It undoubtedly played a part in bringing him more and 
more under business influences in the NRA as he tried to justify his 
career to his colleagues and the business community. Johnson's 
policies in selecting personnel for NRA meant that Richberg daily 
brushed shoulders with men from the business world. As he sought 
and won their acceptance, he toned down his former labor bias 
more and more. Despite the sometimes melodramatic rhetoric con-
demning businessmen for leading the United States into the de-
pression, Richberg's belief in the fundamental rationality of man, 
his faith in the possibility of cooperative efforts among opposing 
interests, his commitment to private rather than political domina-
tion of business, plus his sensitivity about his radical reputation 
revealed a trend in his thinking which the business community had 
no need to fear. Here was another element in the eventual estrange-
ment between Richberg and organized labor. 
Strictly speaking, Richberg's duties as NRA general counsel were 
10 [Richberg], "Sunday Breakfast Club," Philadelphia, Nov. 5, 1933, 
1-3, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 19. 
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those of a technical legal expert charged with interpreting the law 
for the administrator, Hugh Johnson.11 But his understanding with 
the president, upon accepting appointment, involved a much larger 
role, one in the policy-making sphere. Most of the day-to-day ad-
ministrative matters of the NRA Legal Division were left to his assist-
ant, Blackwell Smith, and a growing army of young lawyers who 
had come to Washington to join the New Deal. Always fascinated 
by questions of theory and principle, Rich berg concentrated on mas-
tering the larger issues which bore on policy. Even had he chosen, 
he could not have supervised everything in the Legal Division, as 
the mass of detail in writing and administering the several hundred 
codes that eventually were approved was simply too great. Instead, 
Richberg devoted most of his time to working with Johnson, medi-
ating special problems in code writing or industrial disputes, and 
making speeches in defense of a planned economy and the NRA.12 
In the realm of policy, Richberg's interpretation of Section 7a 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act proved to be the acid test 
of his shifting attitude toward labor-management relations. Early 
in July, General Johnson in an NRA press release moved to counter 
propaganda emanating from organized labor that the only way 
workers could benefit from the NRA was by joining unions; at the 
same time, he challenged a similar advertising campaign sponsored 
by management that the company union was the workers' salvation. 
J h d d b th «· , " , d . d d o nson enounce o as mcorrect, erroneous, an mten e 
"to foment misunderstanding and discord." Furthermore, he de-
clared, "It is not the function or the purpose of the Administrator 
to organize either industry or labor."13 As Johnson confided to the 
11 Dudley Cates to Hugh Johnson, Aug. 21, 1933, Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box 4)· 
12 Thomas I. Emerson, "The Reminiscences of Thomas I. Emerson," 
I :239, 244-46, 26I-62, 26)-66, 269-74, Oral History Research Office, 
Columbia University; Richberg, The Inside Story of the N.R.A., Address to 
Massachusetts State Recovery Board and County Chairmen, Dec. I), I 9 3 3, 
pamphlet in Rich berg Papers, L.c., Box I 9· For an example of the struggles 
involved in writing one code, that for the bituminous coal industry, see 
James P. Johnson, "Drafting the NRA Code of Fair Competition for the 
Bituminous Coal Industry," Journal of American History )3 (Dec. I966): 
)2.1-41. 
13 Johnson, NRA Release No. 34, July 7, I933, NRA Papers, Series 223. 
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Special Industrial Recovery Board, the supervisory body appointed 
by the president to oversee NRA policy, on August 14, 1933, "This 
law should bring about open shops-shops where a man will be 
employed regardless of whether he belongs to any union or not," 
although Secretary Perkins prodded him into admitting that it need 
not "force open shops."14 Despite this concession, Johnson's position 
was clear. 
Rich berg was in wholehearted agreement. The Johnson-Richberg 
position was soon elaborated in one of several policy statements in-
terpreting Section 7a. Issued August 23, 1933, over the signatures 
of both General Johnson and Richberg, it purported to outline "the 
plain meaning of Section 7(a)." The words "open shop" and 
"closed shop" were banned from all codes and from "the dictionary 
of the N.R.A.," but only because they had "no agreed meaning." 
Employee rights of organization and collective bargaining as guar-
anteed by 7a meant "only one thing, which is that employees can 
choose anyone they desire to represent them, or they can choose 
to represent themselves." The ramifications of this were that "em-
ployers . . . can make collective bargains with organized employ-
ees, or individual agreements with those who choose to act indi-
vidually." The representatives of the majority of the workers would 
not speak on behalf of all the workers; individuals and minorities 
could do their own bargaining and make their own separate con-
tracts. 
The August 23 statement went farther. The NIRA injunction 
against an employer's requiring a worker to join a company union 
as a condition of employment did not preclude company unions al-
together: "The law does not prohibit the existence of a local labor 
organization, which may be called a company union and is com-
posed only of the employees of one company." What management 
must avoid was maintaining such an organization by "interference, 
restraint or coercion," or forcing a worker to join the company 
union or to refrain from joining a different union. Though a man 
could not be compelled to join a local or company union, he could 
14 "Proceedings of Meeting No. 9 of the Special Industrial Recovery 
Board," Aug. 14, 1933, 9-10, Office of Government Reports Papers, Record 
Group 44, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md., Series 10, Box 57· 
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do so if he freely chose it.15 Lest there be any misunderstanding, 
Richberg reiterated this policy a few days later over a nationwide 
radio hookup on the National Broadcasting Company: "The law 
is not intended to enthrone any national labor organizations or to 
dissolve any local organization."16 But the Johnson-Richberg stand 
against the majority rule principle seriously undermined the bene-
fits organized labor could expect to obtain from 7a's guarantees of 
organization and collective bargaining. And their approval of the 
company union offered management an opportunity for evading the 
provisions of the law for protecting independent labor organization. 
Johnson and Richberg thus emerged early in the life of the NRA 
as spokesmen for a compromising approach to labor policy. Al-
though they definitely respected the legal right of union organiza-
tion and collective bargaining, they appeared to suggest little that 
would threaten established relations between management and la-
bor. The rights guaranteed by 7a did not compromise those of an 
employer so long as he did not interfere with unions or refuse to 
bargain with them. Even in the latter regard, bargaining did not 
mean that agreement must be reached. In the words of Richberg 
and Johnson, "The N.R.A. will not undertake in any instance to 
decide that a particular contract should be made, or should not be 
made between lawful representatives of employees and employ-
ers."17 As had always been Richberg's point of view, labor condi-
tions and wages were a matter for private determination between 
managers and workers. 
The fate of the National Labor Board (NLB), created on August 
5, 1933, revealed in stark terms the dilemma created by the 
Johnson-Richberg policy. The NLB had no powers of enforcement, 
but was to serve as a vehicle for adjusting industrial disputes and 
15 Johnson and Richberg, Joint Statement of Aug. 23, 1933, Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 45· Another copy and several drafts are in National Re-
covery Administration Papers, Record Group 9, National Archives, Series 
47, Box 581. Also see New York Times, Aug. 24, 1933. 
16 Richberg, "Capital and Labor under the N.R.A.," Address over Na-
tional Broadcasting Company, Aug. 29, I 933, Rich berg Papers, L.c., Box 
19. 
17 Johnson and Richberg, Joint Statement of Aug. 23, 1933, Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 45· 
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as a way of bringing publicity to bear on those who defied Section 
7a. The most the Board could do was to ask NRA to remove a recal-
citrant employer's Blue Eagle, the special insignia of compliance 
displayed by those who adhered to a code or signed an agreement 
with the president to maintain minimum labor standards. It might 
also recommend that the Justice Department look into possible vio-
lations of the law. 
In a series of interventions and decisions, the National Labor 
Board evolved a policy on the question of determining employee 
representatives for collective bargaining with management. The 
NLB favored free elections utilizing secret ballots. More important, 
it favored having representatives of the majority speak on behalf of 
all the workers in negotiations-i.e., the principle of majority rule. 
This ran directly counter to the Johnson-Richberg position in favor 
of proportional representation. The NLB felt that majority rule was 
simply a commonsense approach to making collective bargaining 
effective. 
While the Board enjoyed some early successes in winning em-
ployer acceptance of its position, they were short-lived. By fall, the 
National Association of Manufacturers launched a campaign 
against the NLB and such companies as Weirton Steel and Budd 
Manufacturing openly resisted NLB efforts to hold free elections to 
determine employee representation. By early 1934, the Board's au-
thority, which never had depended on anything more than the 
good will of management and labor, was seriously eroded. President 
Roosevelt moved to clarify and strengthen the Board's duties in 
Executive Orders issued on December 16, 1933, February 1, 1934, 
and February 23, 1934. The latter two gave the NLB specific au-
thority to hold elections and to present its findings to the Justice 
Department for possible prosecution of violators of Section 7a. No 
instructions were issued as to whether the principle of majority 
rule or proportional representation should guide the Board in de-
termining employee spokesmen. But a few days after the February 1 
Order had been promulgated, Johnson and Richberg stepped in 
and issued an interpretation which seemed to undercut the presi-
dent's attempts to bolster the NLB's prestige. Roosevelt probably 
did not intend to make the Board too powerful, as he still harbored 
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a hope that he could win the cooperation of the business community 
in making the NRA a success. The Johnson-Richberg statement 
served to reassure industry .18 
Johnson and Richberg explicitly reaffirmed the position taken 
in their joint communique of August 23, 1933. They asserted that 
the president's Order of February 1 empowering the NLB to hold 
elections simply provided "a method whereby any specific group 
of employees or all the employees of a plant or of one employer may 
select, by a majority vote, representatives clearly empowered to 
act for the majority in their relations with their employer." Yet this 
"does not restrict or qualify in any way the right of minority groups 
of employees or of individual employees to deal with their em-
ployer." The president's "affirming this right of collective action" 
placed "no limitation upon individual action." Furthermore, it was 
not true that "employees if permitted to act in their own free choice, 
may not select a company union (meaning local plant union)." Al-
though Roosevelt's Executive Order was accompanied by a press 
release asserting that its issuance had been inspired by the spread 
of company unions and their use as camouflage by management for 
anti-union activities, Johnson and Richberg mitigated the impact 
of this accusation: "In so far as the statement in the press release 
might be read as saying that employees' representatives in all com-
pany unions are chosen by employers it was not so intended as there 
is no evidence that such is the case."19 
Despite the president's Orders, the confusion in administration 
circles negated whatever gains might have been made. Reacting to 
pressure from at least two sides, the president wanted a Board better 
able to deal with labor disputes, yet at the same time did not wish 
to alienate the business community. Roosevelt's uncertainty opened 
18 Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berke-
ley, Calif., 1950), 57-62; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roose-
velt, Vol. 2: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958), 144-51; Sam-
uel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt with a Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President 
Roosevelt, Vol. 2: The Year of Crisis, 1933 (New York, 1938), 318-19, 
524-25. 
1
' Johnson and Richberg, NRA Release No. 3125, Feb. 4, 1934, NRA Pa-
pers, Series 223. 
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the breach that Richberg and Johnson slipped into, and neither 
received a presidential rebuke. It also spelled doom for the National 
Labor Board. 
The deterioration of the NLB's position was apparent to no one 
more than to Senator Robert Wagner of New York. As chairman 
of the NLB he had fought to win presidential support for a more 
forceful stand against abuses of Section 7a. Defeated by the am-
biguities of the president's own policy, and by the business bias of 
Johnson and Richberg, in early 1934 he proposed new legislation 
to create a board that would have real power to make binding de-
cisions. Wagner consulted neither Johnson nor Richberg in drafting 
the legislation, and he failed to win Roosevelt's support. In the face 
of administration reluctance, Wagner accepted a compromise 
backed by the president, Public Resolution No. 44, which author-
ized the creation of a National Labor Relations Board similar in 
structure and power to the old National Labor Board. The president 
turned to Richberg and Labor Solicitor Charles Wyzanski, Jr., for 
aid in preparing the proposal, and the result was a holding device 
which failed to settle the question of majority rule or proportional 
representation. With the off-year elections coming up, Roosevelt 
was really postponing a decision on the main issue; many congress-
men were equally anxious to do so, and Public Resolution No. 
44 passed in June. The real question was left unresolved with 
the prospect that a stalemate over NRA labor policy would 
continue.20 
The ambiguities and contradictions surrounding the evolution 
of NRA labor policy were duplicated in other areas of activity as 
well, though Richberg figured most prominently in labor questions. 
Trade practices, price fixing, and monopolies, as well as the writing 
and enforcement of the codes themselves, all opened up a Pan-
20 Bernstein, The New Deal, 62-83; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 
2: 150-51; Frances Perkins, Robert F. Wagner, Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 
and Richberg to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 21, 1934, Franklin Roosevelt 
Papers, OF 716; Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Ad-
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt with a Special Introduction and Explana-
tory Notes by President Roosevelt, Vol. 3: The Advance of Recovery and 
Reform, 1934 (New York, 1938), 322-27. 
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dora's box. Although the greater part of Richberg's energy was de-
voted to labor-management relations, his support of General John-
son and his positive identification with the NRA implicated him in 
all its policies. This was not something he acknowledged reluc-
tantly, but with enthusiasm. Although prepared to own up to faults 
of execution and administration, Richberg defended the funda-
mentals of NRA policy on virtually every question. In fact, he exhib-
ited far too much sensitivity to criticism and took much of it per-
sonally. This is a critical weakness in any public official, and in 
Richberg's case, with his high-strung personality and need for ap-
proval, was especially trying. 
Rich berg's reaction to the report of a special NRA review board 
was illustrative. In the spring of 1934, General Johnson recom-
mended the appointment of a National Recovery Review Board 
to investigate alleged monopolistic tendencies in the operation of 
the codes of fair competition. This was in response to criticisms 
of NRA made most vocally by Senators Gerald Nye of North Da-
kota, George Norris of Nebraska, and William Borah of Idaho. 
Johnson and Richberg agreed to appoint Clarence Darrow, a re-
nowned civil libertarian and an old friend of Richberg's from Chi-
cago, chairman of the Review Board. They soon regretted their 
choice. Darrow produced an openly partisan and biased report after 
perfunctory hearings in which the NRA was given little chance to 
defend itself and in which critics of economic planning were given 
free rein to denounce the NRA as a conspiracy of the large corpora-
tions against small business.21 
Richberg gave as good as he received and pilloried Darrow for 
conducting "a haphazard, one sided investigation" designed "to 
justify a preconceived opposition to the fundamental theories and 
purposes of the National Industrial Recovery Act." Holding the 
report up to ridicule, he pointed out glaring inconsistencies. The 
most important was its assertion that "all competition is savage, 
selfish and relentless," so bad that "one may as well dream of mak-
21 Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth (Garden City, N. Y., 
1935), 271-76; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: 132-35; Ellis Wayne 
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Eco-
nomic Ambivalence (Princeton, N. J., 1966), 82-85, 95""""97· 
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ing war lady-like as of making competition fair." Contrasted with 
this was the report's proclamation that "a return to the antitrust 
laws for the purpose of restoring competition" was "one of the 
great needs of the times.m2 
Richberg was hurt all the more by the report because Darrow 
was an old friend. His reaction to a good-natured comment by 
H. L. Mencken measured the depth of his disappointment. 
Mencken thought the Darrow Report "a masterpiece of trans-
parent sophistry," so well-calculated to fail in its purpose of indict-
ing the NRA that he wrote Richberg, "In the Baltimore Sun of to-
day I am suggesting maliciously that you wrote the report yourself, 
and palmed it off on those poor innocents." Richberg revealed the 
strain on his sense of humor when he shot back, "I think it par-
ticularly malicious of you to suggest that I wrote the Darrow Re-
port in the same paragraph in which you proclaim it to be a mas-
terpiece of transparent sophistry." Mencken had to explain, "But 
there is manifestly an enormous difference between unconscious 
sophistry and the kind that takes in and flabbergasts an antago-
nist! My charge was that you concocted the latter variety."23 
Richberg was not the only one under a strain after a year of NRA. 
The Blue Eagle campaign to bring all employers under a special 
President's Reemployment Agreement establishing minimum la-
bor standards, the preparation and approval of hundreds of codes, 
the mediation and settlement of numerous strikes, and the con-
flict between NRA and NLB over labor policy had brought Hugh 
Johnson to the end of his tether. Both men were the victims of 
overwork, but whereas Richberg manifested this in hypersensitiv-
ity to criticism and worry over the future of NRA and his place in 
it, Johnson took refuge in drink, periodic explosions of temper, and 
occasional unexplained absences from work. 
Under a great deal of pressure himself, Richberg tended to see 
all the troubles of NRA in terms of Johnson's breakdown. He as 
22 Richberg, "Commentary on majority report of National Recovery Re-
view Board," n.d., Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 46. 
23 H. L. Mencken to Richberg, June 4, 1934; Richberg to Mencken, June 
5, 1934; Mencken to Richberg, June 7, 1934, all in NRA Papers, Series 47, 
Box 582. 
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well as others in the administration determined to do something 
about Johnson, for his failings were real enough. But given Rich-
berg's position in the NRA and his own ambitions, it was not sur-
prising that Johnson questioned his motives. What had begun as 
a highly compatible relationship between the two men by the 
spring of I934 deteriorated into rivalry and mistrust.24 
The president was reluctant to make a move. As David Lilienthal 
later recorded in his diary, Roosevelt hoped that "some eleventh 
hour miracle would intervene to save him the painful necessity of 
pulling Johnson out." He tended to avoid decisions of a difficult 
nature that had a personal side to them, and excused many of John-
son's shenanigans with the comment,· as Harold Ickes recalled it, 
that "every Administration had to have a Peck's Bad Boy."25 
But the signs of Johnson's breakdown became more and more 
apparent as time went on. Rumors circulated that the General en-
joyed an illicit relationship with his secretary, Miss Frances Robin-
son, popularly known as "Robbie." A more serious charge was that 
she and not the General made policy decisions when Johnson was 
on one of his binges. The General took Robbie with him every-
where and they shared an apartment, apparently to save living ex-
penses. Robbie figured in the deteriorating relationship between the 
NRA administrator and general counsel. Richberg remembered a 
number of occasions when he and Robbie had clashed, and he defi-
nitely considered her a disruptive factor in the functioning of the 
NRA.26 
24 Hawley, The New Deal, Io4-Io5; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 
2: I 52-55; Rich berg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but 
Unheroic Life (New York, I954), I74-75; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 212, 
37I-76, 382-91. 
25 David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. I : The 
TVA Years, 1939-1945, Including a Selection of Journal Entries from the 
1917-1939 Period (New York, 1964), 99; Harold L. Ickes, The Secret 
Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. I: The First Thousand Days, I933-1936 
(New York, I953), I47-48. 
26 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: I 52-54; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 
214, 372-73; Raymond Clapper, diary, Nov. 15, 1933, May 3, 5, 1934, all 
in Raymond Clapper Papers, Library of Congress, Box 8; Clapper, reference 
file, March 2, 1936, Clapper Papers, Box 16o. 
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Far more important than the possibility of scandal was the sim-
ple fact that Johnson's periodic incapacity interrupted the smooth 
functioning of NRA. As Richberg confided to David Lilienthal in 
May of 1934, "Johnson has worn himself out, to the point where 
he doesn't want to work," but "the whole thing is built up so that 
only he can decide." As Lilienthal recorded in his diary, Richberg 
felt himself compelled to take "the bit in his teeth frequently to 
straighten things out."27 Richberg's feeling of duty to the presi-
dent, who had from the beginning given him special assurances of 
his watchdog role in the NRA, plus his positive identification with 
the administration and his place in it, all provided him with a con-
vincing rationale to move against Johnson before he wrecked the 
NRA. 
By June of 1934, both Johnson and Richberg were talking about 
a drastic reorganization for NRA. Johnson believed that most of the 
code writing was nearly concluded, so that the NRA could tum more 
of its energy to code administration-supervising and participating 
in the actual process of industrial self-government. Richberg be-
lieved that the main problem was Johnson himself; if he would 
leave, everything would work out. Richberg and Secretary of La-
bor Perkins, who bore a grievance against the General over labor 
policy and temporarily allied herself with the NRA general counsel, 
made certain that Roosevelt was apprised of the allegedly deteriorat-
ing conditions in NRA.28 
Richberg and Johnson discussed the possibility that both might 
resign and leave the president free to bring in a new management. 
In these conversations, Johnson told Richberg that he would prob-
ably have to stay on duty for a while longer to see the reorganiza-
tion plan through, but implied that it would be acceptable for Rich-
berg to resign anyway. On the other hand, as Richberg later 
recalled, "In long talks with the President he made me clearly 
understand that he thought General Johnson should retire." 
Furthermore, Roosevelt "wanted me to continue in the service to 
27 Lilienthal, Journals, I :42. 
28 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2:154-55; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 
373-81; Johnson to Roosevelt, June 26, 1934, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 
45; Richberg, My Hero, 174-75; Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew 
(New York, 1946), 235-49. 
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aid in the reorganization," though both the president and Richberg 
agreed that he could not actually succeed Johnson as adminis-
trator.29 
Deciding that something must be done about the General, Roose-
velt tried the indirect approach first. He turned to Bernard Baruch 
with the suggestion that Johnson take a trip to Europe and leave a 
committee in charge of running NRA. When he found out about 
this, Johnson exploded. The General harbored suspicions against 
Richberg and credited him with scheming for his dismissal. Rich-
berg was worried that Johnson suspected something and tried to 
assure him that there was no conspiracy afoot.30 But after raising 
the matter of his own resignation in a preliminary way with the 
president on June 4, Richberg sent in an official resignation to both 
Roosevelt and General Johnson on June 26. He gave a pointed sum-
mary of his personal situation to Roosevelt: 
Recently . . . my position has become intolerable. Many persons have 
been urging that General Johnson should take a long over-due vacation 
and because of my position I have been mentioned as one of several 
persons who might be made, individually or jointly, responsible tempo-
rarily. This being brought to the attention of the General, he quite 
evidently regards me as engaged in undermining his position. I would 
not think of continuing to work under anyone holding that attitude. 
The only way to clear up the situation and maintain self-respect is for 
me to resign forthwith. I cannot see that I can be of any future service 
to anyone if I permit my reputation to be destroyed and myself placed 
in the false position of being forced out because of an intrigue against 
my superior.81 
Roosevelt tried to calm both Johnson and Richberg. But he was 
determined to reform the NRA; the only question was how to do it. 
For the time being, he urged the General to take a much needed 
vacation and consulted with Richberg about reorganizing the in-
29 Richberg, My Hero, I74-75. 
30 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: I 54-55; Ickes, Secret Diary, 
I: I72; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 373-75, 382-85. 
31 Richberg to Marvin Mcintyre, June 4, I934; Richberg to Roosevelt, 
June 4, I934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 466; Richberg to Johnson, 
June 26, I934; Richberg to Mcintyre, June 26, I934; Richberg to Roose-
velt, June 26, I9347 Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2. 
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dustrial recovery program. In fact, Richberg included with his letter 
of resignation a plan outlining the ideas he and the president had 
been discussing. Johnson and Robbie would take a vacation for 
thirty to sixty days, and an "Acting Board of Administration" 
would guide the NRA in his absence. A new "Industrial Council" 
would be created and temporarily replace the National Emergency 
Council, an agency set up in I 933 to coordinate all recovery activi-
ties. The director of the proposed Industrial Council would carry 
out the instructions of the president "in approving codes or pre-
scribing regulations, or otherwise in the exercise of the powers con-
ferred upon the President in the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
which have not been already delegated by the President to the Ad-
ministrator for Industrial Recovery." According to the final phase 
of the plan, the director of the new Industrial Council would be 
Richberg.32 
Richberg prepared a draft Executive Order implementing the 
plan, and Roosevelt issued the Order with only inconsequential 
changes on June 30, 1934- Richberg was made director of the new 
council, called the Industrial Emergency Committee, and appointed 
executive secretary of the Executive Council, another previously 
established coordinating agency, and executive director of the Na-
tional Emergency Council. In addition, the Order granted Rich-
berg a leave of absence as NRA general counsel, though he retained 
the title of that office as well. In effect, all coordinating activities 
had been consolidated in Richberg's hands, at least on paper, and 
later in the year some of these agencies would be consolidated in 
name as well as in fact. 33 
Johnson also submitted a proposal for NRA reorganization on 
June 26. The most important of his recommendations was an idea 
for replacing the administrator by a board of directors with its own 
chairman and president. The board would decide policy questions 
32 Richberg to Roosevelt, June 26, 1934, with attached "Outline of a 
Program," and draft "Executive Order," Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2. Also 
see Richberg, draft of "Outline of Program," June 26, 1934, Franklin 
Roosevelt Papers, oF 466. 
33 Ibid.; "Executive Order: Creating the Industrial Emergency Commit-
tee," June 30, 1934, National Emergency Council Release, July 2, 1934, 
mimeograph copy in OGR Papers, Series 76, Box 749· 
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and its president would execute them. His ideas were not incom-
patible with Richberg's feeling that one-man rule in the NRA should 
end. In fact, Johnson said as much himself.34 
The president had thus taken the first step toward replacing 
Johnson, and the General went off on a vacation in the West for 
several weeks. Richberg was not entirely satisfied, for officially the 
solution was a temporary one, and the General might yet return to 
power in the NRA. Johnson's status as administrator remained in-
tact. In the meantime, Richberg took a short vacation in July. His 
absence undoubtedly eased the General's fears about leaving Wash-
ington himself.35 But throughout the summer, Richberg's reports to 
the National Emergency Council as executive director emphasized 
the deteriorating situation regarding NRA presumably arising out of 
uncertainty over its reorganization. Richberg painted a picture of 
unrest, indecision, and lack of compliance with the codes, and at-
tributed it to the failure to settle the NRA crisis once and for all. His 
reports would become more optimistic as autumn and Johnson's de-
mise drew nearer. 56 
By mid-August, Richberg increased the pace of his campaign to 
unseat Johnson. He saw the president personally and prepared 
memoranda outlining the situation and its solution. On August I 6, 
he emphasized the need for action on several grounds: I) "Major 
matters of policy are pressing so for decision that the alternative is 
confusion and disintegration for lack of decision, or a grave risk of 
decisions which will cause increased difficulty"; 2) "Distrust and 
dissatisfaction throughout the country are increasing daily the re-
sistance to the program"; 3) "The quality of N.R.A. personnel is 
steadily declining. Important officials are leaving"; 4) "The Gen-
eral himself is, in the opinion of many, in the worst physical and 
mental condition and needs an immediate relief from responsibil-
84 Johnson to Roosevelt, June 26, 1934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 
466. 
35 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2:154-5 5; Richberg, My Hero, 
178-81; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 375; Roosevelt to Johnson, July 2, 1934, 
Franklin Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File 702. 
36 Memoranda from Donald Richberg to Members of the National Emer-
gency Council, dated July xo, 24, Aug. 7, Oct. 2, 16, 1934, all in OGR 
Papers, Series I, Box 5'. 
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ity." Richberg recommended a conference between himself, John-
son, and the president to settle on a plan of permanent reorganiza-
tion, to arrange a further leave for the General, and to give out a 
face-saving understanding that Johnson might still do some work 
for the administration in the future.87 Unless the plan were carried 
out, Rich berg wrote on August I 8, "A violent slide down hill for 
the Industrial Recovery Program is inevitable." In addition, Rich-
berg was "holding up the renting of a house after October I," and 
hinted that he would leave the administration unless something 
were done soon. If the president would dispose of Johnson, every-
thing would be all right: "At present one man by personal obsti-
nacy and for personal reasons is absolutely blocking a reformation 
that every other informed person knows is necessary to save the 
N.R.A."88 Besides Secretary Perkins, Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr., and Rexford Tugwell of the Agriculture Depart-
ment, among others, supported this viewpoint.39 
Once again the president attempted to make a move. He called 
Johnson to a conference at the White House on August 20, along 
with Perkins and Richberg. The president suggested that the Gen-
eral go abroad with a commission to study recovery programs in 
Europe; he could take Bernard Baruch, Gerard Swope of General 
Electric, or other industrialists with him. Roosevelt assured John-
son that he need not worry about what would happen to NRA, but 
the General was convinced that Richberg and Perkins had suc-
ceeded in deposing him at last. Johnson left the White House and 
within a matter of hours placed a letter of resignation in Roosevelt's 
hands. Still reluctant to hurt the General, Roosevelt asked Johnson 
back for another conference and tried to smooth things over. For 
the time being, he would continue in office, though Roosevelt ad-
vised him that he would take over the NRA personally for a while to 
learn its problems firsthand. In the meantime, Johnson was to for-
37 Richberg to Mcintyre, Aug. 16, 1934, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 45· 
88 Richberg to Mcintyre, Aug. 18, 1934, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 45· 
89 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: 1 55; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., 
"Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.," Record Group 23, Franklin D. Roose-
velt Library, 2: 17; Rexford Tugwell to Roosevelt, Sept. 5, 1934, and Tug-
well to Roosevelt, Sept. 7, 1934, both in Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 466. 
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mulate his plan of NRA reorganization. In reality, Johnson was 
through as administrator .4.() 
In the meantime, the press had a field day in rumor mongering. 
Presidential Secretary Steve Early suspected that Johnson's secre-
tary, Robbie, was responsible for some of the stories. She seemed 
to be working with a publicity agent, James Cope, formerly em-
ployed by the Associated Press, and together they were giving out 
items that Early felt should not be released. He wanted Johnson to 
be ordered to stop this. Rumors circulated that Robbie was urging 
Johnson to walk out on NRA without further ado. On the other side, 
there were stories that Blackwell Smith, acting chief of the Legal 
Division, and Leon Henderson, chief of the Research and Plan-
ning Division, were prepared to resign in protest over Johnson's re-
luctance to get out of NRA. Somehow, Richberg managed to keep 
from saying anything for publication which would have added fuel 
to the fire.41 
Privately, Richberg continued to press Roosevelt for a final de-
termination of the question of Johnson's status. On September 5, 
he prepared a memorandum once again describing the desperate 
condition of the NRA. He was encountering difficulties in retaining 
and adding high quality personnel; plans for the efficient adminis-
tration of NRA were all ready to go, if only the word were given; un-
til Johnson was removed, no plan would be availing, for "a team of 
horses can't be driven in harness with a wild bull." Richberg 
painted the picture in terms which revealed his own tensions and 
nervousness, as he told how "the people intimately concerned with 
this situation in Washington are struggling against inclinations to 
hysteria," and how "those responsible for keeping N.R.A. going 
talk to me with tears in their voices and sometimes actually in their 
eyes." He advised the president to stop wasting time by allowing 
Johnson to draw up an elaborate plan of reorganization. Richberg 
40 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: 1 55-56; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 
377-97; Richberg, My Hero, 175-76; Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Per-
sonal Letters, 1928-1945 (New York, 1950), 3=412-13. 
41 Stephen Early to Mcintyre, Aug. 27, 1934; Early to Mcintyre, Aug. 
30, 1934; Early to Mcintyre, Aug. 31, 1934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, 
OF 466. 
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had all the plans that were needed; the only obstacle was Johnson.G 
At Roosevelt's direction, Rexford Tugwell took a sampling of 
opinion among Richberg, Perkins, Agriculture Secretary Henry 
Wallace, Harry Hopkins, the head of the Federal Emergency Re-
lief Administration, and Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes. The 
consensus seemed to be that Johnson had outlived his usefulness 
and that his continued presence in NRA would only be a disruptive 
factor. They recommended that an administrative board be set up 
to run NRA and to supervise its reorganization.43 On September 9, 
Johnson submitted his plan for a reorganized NRA, also recommend-
ing a board to replace the single administrator. In the meantime, 
Richberg was working on drafts of the necessary Executive Orders 
for implementing reform and preparing lists of candidates for the 
new board. Johnson finally yielded to the inevitable on Septem-
ber 24, and submitted his resignation effective October I 5. This 
time Roosevelt accepted it.44 
On September 27, the president issued an Executive Order cre-
ating a new National Industrial Recovery Board (NmB) and appoint-
ing Clay Williams of Reynolds Tobacco, Arthur D. Whiteside of 
Dun and Bradstreet, Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers of America, and two college professors, Leon Marshall 
and Walton Hamilton. Two Richberg allies, Leon Henderson and 
Blackwell Smith, were made economic adviser and legal adviser to 
the Board. As director of the Industrial Emergency Committee, 
Richberg would remain influential in NRA policy, for the president's 
Order authorized the new NmB to administer NRA "subject to the 
general approval of the Industrial Emergency Committee." 
G Richberg to Mcintyre, Sept. 5, I934, with attached "Memorandum," 
Sept. 4, I934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 466. 
43 Tugwell to Roosevelt, Sept. 5, I934i Tugwell to Roosevelt, Sept. 7, 
I934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 466; Ickes, Secret Diary, I: I95· 
44 Johnson to Roosevelt, Sept. 9, I934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 
466; Johnson, Blue Eagle, 39I-97i Mcintyre to Early, Sept. I3, I934i Rich-
berg to Roosevelt, Sept. q, I934, with attached "Memorandum on Presi-
dent's Special Board," "Tentative Draft of Statement," and "Tentative 
Draft of Letter" to Johnson, all in Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 466; Rich-
berg to Mcintyre, Sept. I 5, I934, with attached "Memorandum," Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 46. 
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Furthermore, Richberg had personal ties with some members of 
the Board, especially Williams and Whiteside.45 
Richberg had to withstand one further challenge to his influence 
before the situation stabilized. Secretary of Interior Ickes and Labor 
Solicitor Charles Wyzanski, Jr., suggested to Roosevelt that Robert 
M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, be made 
chairman of the NIRB; they felt his appointment would allay the 
bad publicity attendant on Johnson's resignation by bringing an ef-
fective administrator to the leadership of the new Board. Roosevelt 
directed Ickes to sound Hutchins out. He was able to obtain a leave 
of absence from the University's Board of Trustees, but Richberg 
stepped in and blocked his appointment. Richberg protested on the 
grounds that Hutchins would not appeal to the business commu-
nity, whose cooperation was essential for the success of NRA. The 
NIRB threatened to resign en masse if the appointment went 
through. Ickes blamed the Board's attitude on Richberg, firmly be-
lieving that the NIRB "has been carefully hand-picked by himself," 
so that he might control NRA "in his devious, indirect way since 
there is not a strong or outstanding man on it." In the face of the 
possible resignation of the NIRB, Roosevelt backed down, and 
Hutchins gradually lost interest. Eventually Clay Williams became 
chairman of the NIRB. As Ickes, by now no friend of Richberg, 
summed it up, "Richberg, through his self-appointed N.R.A. Com-
mittee, is in pretty firm control of the situation and he will fight 
any man who threatens to jeopardize that control."46 Yet Ickes's 
perception was distorted by his own ambitions, and Richberg's ac-
tual power position turned out to be much more vulnerable than 
he estimated. 
45 Rosenman, Public Papers of Roosevelt, 3:40 5-407; Schlesinger, The 
Age of Roosevelt, 2: I 57; Richberg, My Hero, I86, 298. 
46 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: I 57-58; Robert M. Hutchins to 
Roosevelt, Oct. 4, I934; Hutchins to Roosevelt, Oct. 5, I934; Early to 
Roosevelt, Oct. I5, I934, all in Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 466; Rich-
berg to Early, Oct. I7, I934, and Richberg to Roosevelt, Oct. I7, I934, 
both in Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 45; Ickes, Secret Diary, I: I97-98, 2oo-
20I, 208-I I, 2I9-2I, 235-36, 242-43. The quotations are from Ickes, 
Secret Diary, I :2Io, 220. 
CHAPTER VIII 
The President's 
Counselor II 
Donald Richberg's emergence as chief coordinator of the recovery 
program and overseer of the National Recovery Administration not 
surprisingly inspired an outpouring of political commentary about 
his rising fortunes. He appeared on the cover of Time magazine for 
the week of September 10, 1934, and was soon dubbed "Assistant 
President," much to his outward displeasure. His various coordinat-
ing assignments were further consolidated on October 31, 1934, 
when the Executive Council was merged with the National Emer-
gency Council, and the Industrial Emergency Committee was 
made a subcommittee of the National Emergency Council. Rich-
berg continued as director of NEC, while still holding the title of 
NRA general counsel and remaining on leave from that post. The 
official duties of the NEe were "to provide for the orderly presenta-
tion of business to the President"; "to coordinate inter-agency prob-
lems of organization and activity of Federal agencies"; "to coordi-
nate and make more efficient and productive the work of the field 
agencies of the Federal Government"; "to cooperate with any 
Federal agency in performing such activities as the President may 
direct"; and "to serve in an advisory capacity to the President and to 
the Executive Director."1 
In his November 4 diary entry, Secretary of Interior Harold 
Ickes recorded that the newspaper stories of Richberg as "sort of 
an Assistant President," who "outranks the whole Cabinet," had 
q6 
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begun to "annoy the President very much indeed." As Ickes re-
called with relish, "To listen to the President, one would never 
think that Richberg was more than an exalted messenger boy, but 
to read the newspapers, one would think that the President really 
shares his power with him." He suspected that Richberg's staff was 
responsible for many of the news items and concluded, "There 
seems to be little doubt that Richberg is reaching out in every di-
rection for all the power he can possibly gather unto himself."2 
After reading one of columnist Arthur Krock's pieces about Rich-
berg, Roosevelt himself complained to Steve Early, "Tell [Krock] 
that this kind of thing is not only a lie but that it is a deception and 
a fraud on the public. It is merely a continuation of previous lies 
such as the headlines that Moley was running the government; 
next that Baruch was Acting President; next that Johnson was the 
man in power; next that Frankfurter had been put over the Cabinet 
and now that Richberg has been put over the Cabinet."3 
If Richberg had any illusions of grandeur, he was soon disap-
pointed. Whatever influence he had as executive director of NEe 
depended on the confidence the president placed in him. To co-
ordinate Cabinet officers and the heads of independent agencies, 
all superior to him in real political power, required the authority 
of the presidency itself. To succeed, Richberg had to enjoy a greater 
intimacy with the president than anyone else. But he did not pos-
sess this kind of contact. However close he may have been to 
Roosevelt, it was not close enough.4 Except on NRA policy where 
1 Time 24 (Sept. Io, I934): cover; Donald Richberg, My Hero: The In-
discreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic Life (New York, I954), 
I83; Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt with a Special Introduction by President Roosevelt, Vol. 3: 
The Advance of Recovery and Reform, 1934 (New York, I938), 44I-44· 
2 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. I: The First 
Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York, I953), 220-21. 
3 Franklin Roosevelt to Stephen Early, Nov. 3, I934, Franklin D. Roose-
velt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 788. A perceptive 
contemporary assessment of Richberg's actual position is Mark Sullivan, 
"Richberg's New Duties Expected to Relieve Burden So President May 
Concentrate on Big Affairs," New York Herald Tribune, Nov. I I, I934· 
4 Herman Miles Somers, Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mo-
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he carried great weight with the National Industrial Recovery 
Board because of his previous position and his friendship with 
Board members, Richberg lacked the authority to meet his responsi-
bilities. 
Despite Ickes's worst fears, which were undoubtedly a product 
of his own jealousy, the most that Richberg could do was to con-
duct a holding action to keep the Recovery Administration func-
tioning smoothly, make reports and prepare an agenda for the 
president's consideration at NBC meetings, and carry out whatever 
specific instructions Roosevelt might issue. Richberg had no source 
of power apart from the president, so unless Roosevelt gave him 
specific authority to act, he was stymied. 
Even if Richberg had been in a position to reshape the recovery 
program, it was unlikely that he would have done so. Despite the 
less-than-successful results of the NRA's first year of operation, Rich-
berg believed as firmly as ever in the original assumptions under-
lying the plan of recovery through industrial self-government. 
Richberg believed that the NRA's troubles were primarily adminis-
trative in nature, so that he was not the man to seek a revision of 
the basic principles guiding the experiment. 
As it turned out, the new recovery regime inaugurated by the 
National Industrial Recovery Board and the National Emergency 
Council proved remarkably similar to the old Johnson regime. Con-
flicts over basic policy questions which had developed in the first 
year of NRA continued unresolved into its second year. Minor im-
provements had been made and would continue to be made in such 
areas as price fixing, consumer and labor representation on code 
authorities, and supervision of code enforcement. But so much of 
the pressure for change had developed only after most codes were 
already written that it proved difficult to extend reform retroac-
tively to a significant segment of industry. Furthermore, earlier at-
tempts to meet criticism through new policy guidelines had often 
bilization and Reconversion (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), 206-207. Richberg 
sometimes had difficulty in obtaining appointments of adequate duration to 
discuss National Emergency Council business with the president. See Rich-
berg to Marvin Mcintyre, Nov. 10, 1934, and Richberg to Mcintyre, Dec. 
8, 1934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 788. 
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inspired a reaction among interests opposed to change, causing the 
NRA to draw back from its own announced reforms. Caught in the 
middle of conflicts among industry, labor, and consumers, the ad-
ministration faced a genuine dilemma in finding policies satisfac-
tory to all its constituents. The new arrangement under Richberg 
at the head of the NEe and Clay Williams at the head of the NIRB 
would ultimately fail to break the impasse in the recovery program.5 
Symptomatic of the continuing stalemate was labor policy. The 
old Johnson-Richberg theory of proportional representation of all 
workers in collective bargaining remained NRA policy, despite the ef-
forts of the new National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to promote 
majority rule. The same old arguments between NRA and NLRB were 
thrashed out all over again. The basic conflict was defined in the 
late summer of 1934, when the NLRB ruled in the Houde Engi-
neering Corporation case that employee representation in collective 
bargaining should be on the basis of majority rule, even though 
earlier in the year the president had settled a strike in the auto in-
dustry by putting into effect a plan of proportional representation 
and creating a special Automobile Labor Board which would ad-
just disputes.6 
A related but distinct controversy centered on the Newspaper 
Industrial Board. Provision for the Board had been written into the 
newspaper publishing code to handle labor complaints, but it failed 
to function smoothly and was in a constant state of deadlock. The 
result was a major policy confrontation between Richberg and the 
National Industrial Recovery Board on one side and the National 
Labor Relations Board on the other. Because of the failure of the 
Newspaper Industrial Board to function, the NLRB accepted an ap-
peal from Dean Jennings, who had been dismissed from the San 
5 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 2: The Coming of 
the New Deal (Boston, 1959), 158-61; Ellis Wayne Hawley, The New 
Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence 
(Princeton, N. J., 1966), 72-110. 
6 Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berke-
ley, Calif., 1950), 6o, 84-86; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2:397-98; 
New York Times, Sept. 4, 1934; New York Journal of Commerce, Sept. 15, 
1934; New York Evening Post, Nov. 22, 1934; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 
3. 1934· 
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Francisco Call-Bulletin for union activities, and ruled that he 
should be reinstated. A great outcry from publishers greeted the 
decision, and Richberg bombarded the president with requests that 
he prevent the NLRB from intervening in codes that had their own 
machinery for handling labor questions. But in view of the NLRB's 
stand on the majority rule principle, Richberg's objections had far 
more significance than jurisdictional concerns. Eventually he won 
out, and Roosevelt instructed the NLRB not to consider labor dis-
putes in industries where codes provided adjustment machinery 
like the Newspaper Industrial Board.7 
Equally significant in Richberg's drift toward the businessman's 
point of view in labor relations was his role in extending the auto-
mobile code in the spring of 1935. Despite the objections of or-
ganized labor to proportional representation and NIRB reservations 
about the functioning of the Automobile Labor Board, the presi-
dent decided to extend the code beyond its expiration date until 
June 1935· The prospect of continuing the status quo in the auto 
industry was unacceptable to the American Federation of Labor, 
especially since it felt that the president had given assurances that 
there would be no extension without consultation with the unions. 
John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers pronounced the judg-
ment of organized labor on Richberg's role in the extension: "Mr. 
Richberg secretly conspired with the leaders of the automobile in-
dustry to deceive the President and bludgeon labor. Like medieval 
ruffians, they lay in secret during the day and emerged after night-
fall to perpetrate their deeds and announce the consummation of 
7 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2:398-4oo; Richberg to Mcintyre, 
Dec. I3, I934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 788; Richberg to Louis Mc-
Henry Howe, Dec. I 8, I 934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 466; Rich berg 
to Howe, Dec. 2I, I934, with attached draft letter from Roosevelt to Na-
tional Labor Relations Board; Elisha Hanson, "Memorandum on Exclusive 
Jurisdiction of Newspaper Industrial Board in Labor Controversies Arising 
under Code for Daily Newspaper Publishing Business," Jan. 4, I935; "Pro-
posal agreed to by Mr. Richberg and Mr. Hanson in conference, January 
II, I935"; Richberg to Howe, Jan. I2, I935, Louis McHenry Howe Pa-
pers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 83; Richberg to Mcintyre, Jan. I4, 
I935, with attached draft statement; Roosevelt to Francis Biddle, Jan. 22, 
I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 7I6. 
THE PRESIDENT'S COUNSELOR II 
their plot." He could imagine "the giggling falsetto cackles of Mr. 
Rich berg when the strain was over and the deed was done."8 
Richberg perhaps incautiously responded to the "personal attack" 
of the AFL. But in doing so, he revealed much about the way he 
perceived his role in government and how he saw himself standing 
above the clash of selfish interests in the name of the public good: 
"The charge that I am a 'traitor to organized labor' amounts to the 
demand that as a public official I should put subservience to the 
policies of a particular labor organization, above loyalty to the Gov-
ernment and to my conception of the public interest. If a refusal 
to yield to such a demand be treason, let those who charge it make 
the most of it." Richberg argued that because "each party naturally 
seeks to protect self-interest and declines to yield its convictions," 
ultimately "the representatives of the government always must make 
a decision." Though Richberg believed he was dealing out even-
handed justice to both management and labor, the latter viewed his 
recommendati~n for extending the auto code as the last straw.9 
The stalemate in NRA labor policy induced Senator Robert Wag-
ner to renew his movement for legislation creating an effective la-
bor relations board with power to enforce the majority rule principle 
in matters of employee representation for collective bargaining pur-
poses. Eventually he succeeded, but won the president's backing 
only after it was clear that the NRA labor provisions had broken 
down under industry subversion and the Johnson-Richberg inter-
pretation of representation questions. Roosevelt's ambivalence was 
the product of his continuing reluctance to alienate the business 
community. He regarded its cooperation as essential to any plan 
of recovery he might propose. But by the spring of 1935, business 
8 Lewis quoted in Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: 163-64; Sidney 
Fine, The Automobile under the Blue Eagle (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1963), 
370-76; Roosevelt to Richberg, Jan. 15, 1935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, 
oF 466; Press Release, Feb. 5, 1935, containing correspondence, Charlton 
Ogburn to Roosevelt, Jan. 28, 1935, and Roosevelt to Ogburn, Feb. 4, 1935, 
in National Recovery Administration Papers, Record Group 9, National Ar-
chives, Series 7, Box 2 r. 
9 Richberg, National Emergency Council Release, Feb. 4, 1935, Office of 
Government Reports Papers, Record Group 44, Federal Records Center, 
Suitland, Md., Series 76, Box 750. 
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adamance on price fixing, monopoly, code enforcement, and labor 
policy made the president feel more and more that winning its 
loyalty was a futile hope. Roosevelt finally announced administra-
tion support for the principles of Wagner's National Labor Rela-
tions Act a few days before the Supreme Court did away with the 
NRA altogether and after the Senate had already passed the bill. 
Political necessity more than conviction won the Roosevelt adminis-
tration over to the idea of a strong labor board.10 
As the labor camp became alienated from Richberg, the busi-
ness community began to realize that he was committed to the 
preservation of the rights of employers as well as employees, and 
to the resolution of labor disputes primarily through private rather 
than government mechanisms. His stand against the majority rule 
principle helped to pull the fangs from Section 7a; his fight over 
the newspaper code protected labor-management relations from 
greater encroachments of federal authority through the NLRB. What 
Richberg had been saying in speeches since the inception of NRA 
was now borne out in deeds. 
Harold Ickes noted the change in Richberg, and in his diary 
recorded rumors that Richberg "was swinging further to the right 
all the time and that business was strong for him." He had heard 
that the job of general counsel of the Iron and Steel Institute had 
been offered to Richberg. Ickes talked to Felix Frankfurter about 
his former law partner and recorded that "he can't understand what 
has happened inside of Richberg, but he feels that something has 
gone wrong and that he is a real danger to the Administration." 
Frankfurter presumably expressed the opinion that "Richberg 
now represents exactly the opposite point of view from that which 
was supposed to be the one of this Administration." Ickes claimed 
that Justice Louis Brandeis, Senator George Norris, Senator Robert 
La Follette, Jr., Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., relief 
administrator Harry Hopkins, and Charles E. Merriam of the Uni-
versity of Chicago distrusted Richberg and were worried about his 
apparent change.11 
10 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2:400-4o6; Bernstein, The New 
Deal, 88-128. 
11 Ickes, Secret Diary, I :21o-1 1, 221, 246-48. The quotations are from 
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Arthur D. Whiteside of Dun and Bradstreet, who served on the 
National Industrial Recovery Board until the spring of 1935, was 
one of Richberg's staunchest admirers. In May 1934 he had urged 
Richberg to remain in the administration for as long as possible. As 
usual, Richberg was concerned about his financial problems, and 
Whiteside wrote to Richberg urging him to stay in office and ob-
serving that his forced withdrawal because of monetary difficulties 
would represent a serious setback for the ideals which he repre-
sented in the NRA. Whiteside even offered to help underwrite Rich-
berg's expenses should that become necessary to keep him on the 
job; he invited Richberg to call upon his office for funds in an 
emergency. Furthermore, he asked Richberg to think about asso-
ciating professionally with him when he finally did decide to leave 
the administration.12 
Richberg was receptive to Whiteside's overtures, though for the 
time being he could continue in government service without out-
side help. Nonetheless, he found comfort in the knowledge that "if 
I should find myself in unexpected difficulties there would be some-
where I could turn for a temporary lift." He assured Whiteside 
that "it would be a great pleasure to me to enjoy a further associa-
tion with you," although no commitments of a professional nature 
were concluded at this juncture.13 After Richberg retired from the 
NRA in June 1935, however, he made a temporary arrangement 
with Dun and Bradstreet to hold a retainer for a minimum of two 
months at $2,500 per month; this involved some vaguely defined 
210, 247· In addition, see Philadelphia Record, Dec. 8, 1934; New York 
Journal of Commerce, Dec. 7, 1934; William G. Woolfolk to Richberg, 
Aug. 30, 1933; Willard M. Kiplinger to Richberg, Sept. 23, 1933, Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 1; Daniel Willard to Richberg, Sept. 29, 1934; Henry I. 
Harriman to Richberg, Oct. 6, 1934; J. Howard Pew to Richberg, Oct. 6, 
1934; R. Douglas Stuart to Richberg, Oct. 12, 1934; Daniel Willard to 
Richberg, Nov. 19, 1934; Harold Boeschenstein to Stephen Early, Dec. 31, 
1934, all in Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2. 
12 Arthur D. Whiteside to Richberg, May 9, 1934, formerly in the pos-
session of Mrs. John H. Small III (Mrs. Donald R. Richberg), Charlottes-
ville, Va., and recently deposited in the Richberg Papers, L.c. 
13 Richberg to Whiteside, May 16, 1934, formerly in the possession of 
Mrs. John H. Small III and recently deposited in Richberg Papers, L.c. 
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duties such as serving as an adviser on some publicity matters.14 
Richberg's break with organized labor and his initiation into the 
business camp were thus clearly evident in NRA policy. At the same 
time, his newspaper reputation as "Assistant President" underwent 
a severe test as he tried to administer the National Emergency 
Council. His lack of the requisite authority for coordinating the 
activities of Cabinet officers and agency heads was starkly ap-
parent in the minutes of the NEC itself. Richberg's role at the meet-
ings was limited to technical matters such as preparing the agenda 
and giving progress reports on the recovery program, and rarely 
involved policy decisions. The latter were left to the president, 
members of the Cabinet, and agency heads, all of whom regularly 
attended the NEe sessions. The meetings reflected Richberg's total 
dependence on the president for his authority.15 Except in regard 
to the NRA, where he had strong ties of friendship and loyalty among 
the members of the National Industrial Recovery Board, Richberg 
was primarily a technician carrying out the orders of the president 
and taking care of numerous details of administration. He did not 
really coordinate the other members of the NEC even though he 
was executive director; instead, many-such as !ekes-successfully 
resisted what they regarded as his encroachments on their adminis-
trative preserves. Despite all the publicity, Richberg's power posi-
tion was exceedingly vulnerable.16 
Nevertheless, there was no doubt that Richberg took himself 
seriously and felt that the burdens of the whole administration 
rested on his shoulders.17 Ickes believed that "Richberg is a dan-
14 Whiteside to Richberg, June 17, 1935, formerly in possession of Mrs. 
John H. Small III and recently deposited in Richberg Papers, L.c. 
15 Lester G. Seligman and Elmer E. Cornwall, Jr., New Deal Mosaic: 
Roosevelt Confers with His National Emergency Council (Eugene, Ore., 
1965), 232-474 (minutes of NEC meetings for July 10, 1934, to April 23, 
1935'). 
16 lckes, Secret Diary, 1:221,242-43, 245-47; Ickes to Richberg, Feb. 
25, 1935; Richberg to Ickes, Feb. 28, 1935; Ickes to Richberg, March 15, 
1935, OGR Papers, Series 3, Box r6; Somers, Presidential Agency, 207. 
17 For a picture of the nature of Richberg's duties, see Richberg to Ru-
dolph Foster, Aug. 16, 1934, with attached draft Executive Order and press 
statement; Roosevelt to Richberg, Aug. 22, 1934, Franklin Roosevelt Pa-
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gerous man for the Administration" because "he is utterly selfish, 
and undoubtedly his great ability is being used to build himself 
up." Equally important, Ickes observed, "He is highly temperamen-
tal and nervous and likely to go off at half cock."'8 Although Ickes 
could not hide his own jealousy, his comments had some ring of 
truth. Richberg was under a great deal of pressure in a situation 
that was inherently unstable, and he showed the effects of the 
strain. He realized the vulnerability of his position and felt a need 
for vindication. This was amply evident in an ill-humored exchange 
with Hugh Johnson in December 1934, when Richberg learned 
that the General planned to serialize his NRA memoirs in the Satur-
day Evening Post. 
Without having seen the manuscript of Johnson's memoirs, Rich-
berg sent a protest to George Horace Lorimer, editor of the Post: 
"I have been told by several persons, seeming to have sources of 
accurate information, that this book includes certain definitely de-
scribed attacks upon me, which, if made, would be untrue, mali-
ciously libelous and designed wholly for the purpose of doing me 
harm." He informed Lorimer that "there is nothing lower in the 
scale of publishing than the publication of character assassination 
for the purpose, either of venting personal spleen, or building cir-
culation." If Lorimer went ahead, he would have to "accept the 
full legal responsibility" for any statements "derogatory to me and 
obviously designed as destructive of my personal and professional 
pers, OF 285; Executive Director, NEe, to Attorney General, Oct. 26, I934; 
Richberg to Mcintyre, Dec. I3, I934, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 788; 
S. Clay Williams to Walton Hamilton, Leon Henderson, Sidney Hillman, 
Leon Marshall, Blackwell Smith, Williams, and Whiteside, Dec. I 5, I934, 
with attached memorandum from Richberg to Chairman, National Indus-
trial Recovery Board, Dec. I3, I934, NRA Papers, Series 3, Box 3; Richberg 
to Mcintyre, Jan. 4, I935, with attached memorandum by Mcintyre, Jan. 
I2, I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 788; Richberg to Roosevelt, Jan. 
28, I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 375; Richberg to Roosevelt, Feb. 
28, I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 6-U; Richberg to Roosevelt, March 
8, I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 444; Richberg to Howe, April 23, 
1935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 285; Raymond Clapper, notes, Feb. Io, 
I939, Raymond Clapper Papers, Library of Congress, Box I8. 
18 Ickes, Secret Diary, I : 2 2 1. 
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reputation."18 Somehow, Richberg's letter became public, much to 
his dismay, bringing Johnson into the dispute. He advised Rich-
berg, "There is libel in your letter but none in my book."20 
Given his exposed position in NBC and the stalemate in NRA, it 
was not surprising that Richberg should decide in the spring of 
1935 that the recovery program was due for another shakeup. In 
a memorandum prepared for the president on March 4, he de-
scribed the NRA as "losing effectiveness and becoming danger-
ous." If the administration was going "to meet legislative investiga-
tions and bring out a workable new Act" upon the expiration of the 
NIRA in June, some "consistent policy" would have to be decided 
upon. Richberg's principal recommendation for change was that 
"the President should have intimate contact with and control over 
the Board [NIRB] through one person, actively engaged in the ad-
ministration of N.R.A. That person should know the President's 
policy and carry it forward. There should be no intervening com-
mittee." He would do away with the Industrial Emergency Com-
mittee, the division of the NBC which governed NRA policy. 
Richberg judged his own relation to NRA (as head of the NBC 
and the Industrial Emergency Committee) as one of responsibility 
without authority: "In his present position Richberg has too much 
or too little responsibility. If he is relied upon to carry out the Presi-
dent's policy, he is too remote from the N.R.A. and too much oc-
cupied with N.E.C. to meet that obligation. If he is not expected 
to do this, he should be relieved of an apparent authority which 
takes away power from the N.R.A. Board." Since the president was 
the real head of the NEC, the solution to the failure of its coordinat-
ing function lay in appointing "a subordinate in close contact with 
him, relying not on 'prestige,' but on direct authority." Richberg 
11 Richberg to George Horace Lorimer, Dec. 14, 1934, Richberg Papers, 
L.a., Box 2. 
20 Hugh Johnson to Richberg, Dec. 21, 1934; Richberg to Johnson, Dec. 
23, 1934; Johnson to Richberg, Jan. 7, 1935, formerly in the possession of 
Mrs. John H. Small III and recently deposited in Richberg Papers, L.c.; 
Washington Post, Dec. 24, 1934; New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 26, 
1934· Richberg also sought sympathy at the White House; see Richberg to 
Early, Jan. 20, 1935; Early to Richberg, Jan. 31, 1935, Franklin Roosevelt 
Papers, oF 788. 
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be done. It calls for a high grade secretary or administrative assist-
ant, and an adequate staff working directly for the President."21 
Later in the month, Richberg brought more pressure to bear on 
the White House. He told Roosevelt that the NIRB "is functioning 
badly and will continue to discredit N.R.A. unless made stronger 
and more responsive to immediate necessities." Renewal of the en-
abling legislation was in a "dangerous" situation, and Richberg 
feared that either "a bad Bill or no Bill may result unless a definite 
program is adopted and vigorously pushed." What NRA needed 
was "a Chairman of the Board with recognized authority, able to 
carry out the President's policy and knowing what it is." This would 
insure "labor and industrial support." There was only one thing to 
do: appoint Richberg. He eased into this suggestion by reporting 
that "Hillman, the best informed, most level headed labor adviser, 
strongly urged today that I should be given and accept the active 
responsibility of heading N.R.A." Richberg concluded, "It is diffi-
cult to make a suggestion apparently for my own appointment. The 
fact is I am regarded generally as the actual head of N .R.A. I am 
simply suggesting a heavier burden of direct responsibility, but 
at the same time the delegation of sufficient authority to fulfill it."22 
The frustrations of his NEe coordinating job and the continuing 
stalemate in NRA thus once again made Richberg feel compelled to 
come to the rescue. Clay Williams and Arthur Whiteside of the 
NIRB wanted to resign anyway. Furthermore, the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act would come up for renewal on June 16, 1935, 
thus providing an opportunity to correct weaknesses in the law and 
to alter it to meet the objections of critics. A spreading defiance of 
the codes had brought a renewed sense of uncertainty to NRA. The 
time was thus opportune for Richberg to leave the NEe and move 
back into the NRA as acting chairman of the NIRB in the hope of 
setting things straight. Roosevelt approved Richberg's suggestions, 
and Frank Walker, a Montana lawyer who had preceded Richberg 
21 Richberg to Roosevelt, March 4, 1935, with attached memorandum, 
Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2. 
22 Rich berg to Mcintyre, March r 9, I 93 5, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OP 
466. 
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as director of the National Emergency Council, was brought back 
to his old job. Walker had a reputation for being able to calm ruffled 
nerves and for smoothing over difficult situations. Actually, the NEe 
was on its way to limbo.23 
Though labor leaders like William Green of the American Fed-
eration of Labor and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers 
were not pleased with the prospect of Richberg heading up the 
NIRB, they agreed to the idea after receiving assurances that it would 
only be a temporary arrangement. Richberg wanted to resign from 
government in the next few months, once the future of NRA was 
settled. In addition, Philip Murray, vice president of the UMW, 
would be appointed to the NIRB under the reorganization, giving 
labor for the first time equal representation with industry on the 
Board.24 
Despite his call for vigorous leadership, one of Richberg's first 
acts as temporary chairman was to issue a statement indicating that 
he planned only a holding action until the fate of NRA had been 
determined by Congress: "Pending the enactment of legislation it 
would be unwise to put into effect new major policies which should 
receive the sanction of the Congress." Nevertheless, he promised to 
honor "the wholehearted determination of the administration to 
carry forward the industrial recovery program upon the reasonable 
assumption that this will be approved by the Congress, and that 
the extension of the Act will be authorized." Despite the brave as-
sertions of vigorous enforcement, it was clear that Richberg re-
garded the NRA as suspended in a hiatus until Congress acted.25 
23 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 2: 544-49; Hawley, The New 
Deal, I I I-27; Richberg, My Hero, I85-88; Richberg to Whiteside, March 
9, I935, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2; Richberg to Roosevelt, March 25, 
I935; Roosevelt to Richberg, March 25, I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, 
OF 466; Rosenblatt to National Industrial Recovery Board, "Effect on Com-
pliance of Uncertainty as to the Future of the National Recovery Adminis-
tration," March 26, I935, NRA Papers, Series 3, Box 3; teletype material, 
March 2I, I935, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 45; Press Release, April 23, 
I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 788. 
24 Richberg, My Hero, I87-88; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 
2: I64-65; Hawley, The New Deal, I I9. 
25 Richberg, NRA Release No. Io625, March 22, I935, NRA Papers, Series 
223. 
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In the meantime, Richberg worked behind the scenes to win the 
president's support for strong NRA legislation. Beginning in late 
I 934, while still in the NEe, Rich berg had begun to exert steady 
pressure on Roosevelt. He had helped prepare the NRA section of the 
State of the Union message, and had suggested that Roosevelt urge 
Congress "to extend Title I of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act for a period of at least two years, without substantial change." 
More experience was needed before finally passing permanent legis-
lation, and another two years would provide this. All through the 
winter of 1934 and the spring of 1935, Richberg had worked on the 
program.26 On February 20, Roosevelt sent a special message to 
Congress recommending extension of the NIRA for two years, fur-
ther clarification and definition of policy and standards for admin-
istering the Act, inducements for the voluntary submission of codes 
by industry coupled with unquestioned authority to impose mini-
mum labor and competitive standards if necessary, full protection 
for employee organization and collective bargaining, and applica-
tion of the antitrust laws against monopolies and price fixing.27 In 
an additional policy statement issued in May, the National Indus-
trial Recovery Board recommended limiting NRA jurisdiction "to 
industries engaged in, or substantially affecting interstate com-
merce" in order "to prevent the N.R.A. from taking in too much 
territory and [to] strengthen its legal authority." Additionally, 
stronger enforcement powers were needed, "primarily through in-
junction or cease and desist orders," "provision for adequate protec-
tion of individual rights and small enterprises through opportunity 
for hearing and judicial review," and "public control of all com-
pulsory processes."28 
26 Richberg to Roosevelt, Dec. 22, I934, with attached draft message, 
Franklin Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File I 82o. Also see Smith 
to Richberg, Jan. 10, 1935, NRA Papers, Series 6, Box 13; Richberg to 
Roosevelt, Jan. 14, I935; Richberg to Mcintyre, Jan. 3I, 1935, Franklin 
Roosevelt Papers, oF 788. 
27 Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roose-
velt with a Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roose-
velt, Vol. 4: The Court Disapproves, 1935 (New York, I938), 8o-84. Also 
see Richberg to Mcintyre, Feb. 15, 1935, with attached revised NRA mes-
sage, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, PPF I 82o. 
28 NRA Release No. 11297, May r6, I935, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 46. 
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In the face of mounting criticism of the NRA, Richberg worked 
to hold Roosevelt to a strong position. In mid-April, he warned that 
"if N.R.A. legislation is sufficiently devitalized to conform to the 
anti-monopoly ideas of Senators Borah and Nye, it will in my opin-
ion be made so ineffective and unworkable that it would be worse 
than no law." Richberg served notice that "I could not honorably 
support such a bill," and wanted to be consulted "before any con-
cessions are made to the defeatist position which some of your 
friends are sincerely urging because of their lack of information 
and experience." He feared such friends "failed to comprehend the 
minimum necessities of any legislation which is worth passing-
or which can be legally upheld and enforced."29 
Richberg continued his warnings through April. He was worried 
most by "the suggestion of a temporary extension of the present 
Act" for nine months or a year, and believed that "such a proposi-
tion would simply chloroform the N.R.A." Roosevelt could not back 
down on his recommendation for a two-year extension for several 
reasons: r) "The present law needs to be strengthened to with-
stand legal attacks"; 2) "An adequate personnel cannot be obtained 
or maintained except for a two year effort to make the law effec-
tive"; 3) "Uncertainty over the continuance of the law in the last 
four months had weakened the support of industry and labor and 
demoralized compliance with the codes," a condition which "will 
grow steadily worse during another brief period of extension." Rich-
berg saw the idea of a temporary extension as the "last-ditch effort" 
of NRA's opponents "to prevent the enactment of an improved 
law."30 On May r, he concluded, "My conviction is that the Presi-
dent would suffer less and the country benefit more by killing the 
Also see Richberg's testimony to Congress on extending the NRA: U. S., 
Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., Ist sess., Committee on Finance, Investiga-
tion of the National Recovery Administration, Pursuant to S. Res. 79 
(I935), I, I-I63; U.S., Congress, House, 74th Cong., Ist sess., Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, Extension of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(I935), IO-I83. 
29 Rich berg to Roosevelt, April I 3, I 9 3 5, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 
466. 
80 Richberg to Roosevelt, April 26, I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 
466. 
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N.R.A. while it is still respectable than by having it linger on, feebly 
trying to do the impossible, until everyone will believe that it never 
was any good." Keeping the pressure on Roosevelt, he added, "I 
would not personally spend one week on such a futile effort," and 
neither would "every other man of any experience in the actual re-
sponsibilities of administration."31 
Before the month of May wa~ out, the problem of new legisla-
tion would be resolved by the S1:1preme Court ruling in the case of 
United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et al., handed 
down on May 27. In fact, it was the knowledge that the Court was 
about to rule on the constitutionality of the NIRA, as well as the op-
position of NRA's critics, that increased congressional reluctance to 
pass a new law quickly. It turned out that the fate of the NRA was 
determined by the Court and not by Congress. 
The constitutionality of the NIRA had been a constant concern 
throughout the life of the administration; cases of code violations 
regularly presented themselves for litigation. From the beginning, 
General Johnson and Richberg had avoided rushing into a test 
of the law. They hoped to find a favorable case to present in the 
courts and desired to let the NRA prove itself in action, thereby 
building up a constituency which the Supreme Court might con-
sider in evaluating the merits of the experiment. Richberg reasoned 
that the NRA was "acting under a broad mandate in a new field of 
administrative law ... feeling our way and making mistakes which 
we would seek to correct as soon as discovered." He did not want 
"the constitutionality of the law itself [to] be subjected to attack on 
the basis of an administrative interpretation which would affect the 
judicial construction of the law." Time would develop administra-
tive procedures that would bear out the validity of the law. Errors 
would be corrected. Perhaps new legislation would lessen the vul-
nerability of the NRA.82 
But the failure of NRA to submit itself to the scrutiny of the Su-
81 Richberg to Mcintyre, n.d., and Richberg to Roosevelt, May I, I935, 
Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 466. 
32 Richberg, "The Truth about the Schechter Case," I-2, Richberg Pa-
pers, L.c., Box 8. Also see Ickes, Secret Diary, I :94, Ioi; Richberg, NRA 
Release No. 2067, Dec. 4, I933, NRA Papers, Series 223; Richberg, My 
Hero, 190. 
THE WAYWARD LIBERAL 
preme Court constituted an obstacle in gaining improved legisla-
tion. And the administration could not remain indefinitely unwill-
ing to have the constitutional issue settled. As a result, a test case 
worked its way up to the Supreme Court by early 1935· This was 
the Belcher case, involving violations of the Lumber and Timber 
Products Code.33 
The acting general counsel of NRA, Blackwell Smith, favored 
"pushing for the Belcher case to the utmost of our ability."34 He 
feared that unless the case were "permitted to come on in due course 
which would mean probably the last week in March," the NRA ran 
the risk of an adverse decision being handed down in the Court's 
fall term, possibly upsetting the NRA at a time when Congress would 
not be in session and able to take corrective measures. The Belcher 
case was not the best one that might be desired, but Smith felt the 
issue had to be faced. He so advised the National Industrial Recov-
ery Board on February 13, 1935, and on February 18, 1935, it in 
turn recommended to the president that "no action be taken to pre-
vent the Belcher case from being heard by the Supreme Court in 
due course."35 
Meanwhile, in March, Felix Frankfurter urged Roosevelt to 
withhold action. He reported that Solicitor General Stanley Reed 
of the Justice Department had informed him that "the N.R.A. peo-
ple are anxious for a ruling from the Supreme Court even if adverse 
in order to guide the new legislation." Frankfurter thought "that 
was a suicidal policy from any point of view," and the solicitor gen-
eral agreed. Though Reed thought the NRA position might be a re-
flection of Roosevelt's, Frankfurter assured him that "if he were 
convinced, as he is, of the wisdom of dismissing the [Belcher] ap-
peal he would have your support."36 
33 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 3: The Politics of Upheaval, 
1935-36 (Boston, 196o), 274-77; Richberg, "The Truth about the Schech-
ter Case," 3-5; Richberg, The Rainbow (New York, 1936), 209-14. 
34 Smith to G. S. Arnold, Jan. 19, 1935, NRA Papers, Series 49, Box 567. 
35 Smith to National Industrial Recovery Board, Feb. 13, 1935; Marshall 
to Roosevelt, Feb. 18, 1935, NRA Papers, Series 6, Box 14· 
36 Paula Tully to Felix Frankfurter, March 13, 1935, with attached 
"Memorandum for the President from-F. F.," n.d., Felix Frankfurter Pa-
pers, Library of Congress, Box 34· 
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When Richberg took over as acting chairman of the National 
Industrial Recovery Board on March 2 I, one of his first decisions 
was to recommend carrying the Belcher case through to a conclu-
sion. He did so with reluctance, believing that the lumber code pro-
vided a poor test case as it contained provisions on price fixing, 
production quotas, and other controls which were "of doubtful 
legality and questionable economic wisdom." The lumber code was 
one of the first to be approved, and perhaps for that reason con-
tained provisions the NRA did not now wish to defend. Nonethe-
less, Richberg was afraid that "the dismissal of the appeal might put 
the Administration in the position of seeking to exercise illegal au-
thority and to prevent a determination of the legality of its actions 
by the Supreme Court." Furthermore, all this might damage the en-
forcement of the codes and impair compliance even more. Hence, 
Richberg recommended proceeding and going through with the 
case.37 
The final decision rested not with Richberg but with the Jus-
tice Department. Here the Frankfurter strategy temporarily held 
sway. On March 26, the Department announced that it would re-
quest a dismissal of its appeal because the "Code contains adminis-
trative provisions peculiar to itself with respect to the extension of 
discretionary powers to non-government agencies-a fact . . . 
which sets this Code in a class by itself." The NRA wanted to re-
vise the code and eliminate this feature. Further, the lower court 
record provided an unsatisfactory foundation for considering the 
facts and evidence in the case.38 
As Richberg had feared, the Belcher dismissal precipitated a 
highly unfavorable public reaction. Much of the press asserted 
that the NRA was afraid to go before the Court.39 On April 3, Rich-
37 Richberg, "The Truth about the Schechter Case," 5-6. Also see Rich-
berg, The Rainbow, 215-17. 
88 Department of Justice, Press Release, March 25, 1935, NRA Papers, 
Series 49, Box 567; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 3: 2 76-77. 
39 Richberg, "The Truth about the Schechter Case," 6; Richberg, The 
Rainbow, 217; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 3:277; Boston Tran-
script, March 26, 1935; New York Evening Sun, March 27, 1935; Balti-
more Sun, March 27, 1935; Wall Street Journal, March 28, 1935; In-
dianapolis News, March 28, 1935; Philadelphia Inquirer, April 2, 1935; 
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berg wired Roosevelt, vacationing at sea on the Astor yacht N our-
mahal, that public opinion on the dismissal had been adverse, mak-
ing enforcement of the codes "generally impossible" and increasing 
the "hostility of Congress to new legislation." He urged that an-
other case, recently sustaining the NRA in the New York Circuit 
Court of Appeals, be i~mediately expedited to the Court in order 
to offset the effects of the Belcher dismissal. He believed this would 
be "of extraordinary heJp in sustaining N .R.A. and advancing leg-
islation." On April 4, Roosevelt suggested that Richberg consult 
with Attorney General Homer Cummings.40 
Also on April 4, White House aide Thomas Corcoran, a Frank-
furter protege, relayed a message from Frankfurter to Roosevelt. 
Frankfurter confidentially had learned that Cummings, "under 
urging of Richberg to silence criticism on Belcher dismissal and 
pursuant to wire from you," planned to announce to the press that 
the Department of Justice would take immediate action to place a 
new test case before the Supreme Court. Frankfurter considered it 
"most impolitic and dangerous to yield to antagonistic press 
clamor," because the "fundamental situation" on the Court had 
not changed.41 White House secretary Steve Early checked Frank-
furter's views with Richberg and the Justice Department and 
found them both "in complete disagreement with Frankfurter's 
request that case be held in abeyance." Furthermore, they believed 
that "the importance and necessity of Supreme Court test is para-
Washington Post, April 3, 1935; Chicago Journal of Commerce, March 27, 
1935; San Francisco Chronicle, April 6, 1935. 
40 Rich berg to Roosevelt, April 3, 193 5, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 
466; Roosevelt to Early, April 4, 1935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 
2oo-M; Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 3:278. For a summary of NRA 
difficulties in enforcing the codes, see Rosenblatt, memoranda entitled "Ef-
fect on Compliance of Uncertainty as to the Future of the National Recov-
ery Administration," April 8, I 5, 22, 29, I 9 3 5, and Rosenblatt, memoranda 
entitled "Report on Compliance Conditions," May 6, 13, 1935, all in NRA 
Papers, Series 3, Box 3; A. G. McKnight to Richberg, March 27, 1935; 
A. G. McKnight to Richberg, March 30, 1935, NRA Papers, Series 49, Box 
567; Richberg, NRA Release No. 10752, March 31, 1935, NRA Papers, Se-
ries 223. 
41 Thomas G. Corcoran to Roosevelt, April 4, 1935, Franklin Roosevelt 
Papers, oF 466. 
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mount and both believe case can be won." Roosevelt ordered a de-
cision held up, but his message arrived in Washington too late.42 
Accordingly, the Justice Department went ahead and issued a 
press release announcing that it would cooperate in expediting the 
case of the A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et al., to the Supreme 
Court. Richberg also put out a release backing up the action of the 
Justice Department.43 
Frankfurter later found "sorry comfort" in observing "that the 
departure from the strategy that lay behind the side-tracking of 
the Belcher case has made the legislative situation regarding N.R.A. 
so much worse." Congress simply waited for the Court to decide 
the future of the NIRA. Everything now depended on what was soon 
dubbed the "sick chicken" case. Moreover, Frankfurter observed to 
Raymond Maley, "What makes the business so sad is that the Presi-
dent's absence from Washington should have been seized upon 
as an opportunity for embarrassing this situation by forcing an ap-
peal."44 
With the decision to rush the Schechter case to a conclusion, 
Homer Cummings appointed Richberg on April 22 to participate 
along with Solicitor General Stanley Reed in arguing the case be-
fore the Supreme Court. The attorney general, himself not in com-
plete sympathy with NRA, wanted to share the responsibility. 
Richberg was only too happy to accept appointment. His paternal 
feeling toward NRA compelled him to become involved. In addition, 
he feared that Reed was not sufficiently knowledgeable about NRA to 
present a good case on his own.45 Also Richberg suspected that 
42 Early to Roosevelt, April 4, 1935; Early to Roosevelt, April 5, 1935, 
Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 2oo-M-Misc.; Roosevelt to Attorney General, 
April 4, 1935, with copies to Early and Corcoran, and indication that Rich-
berg and Stanley Reed also advised, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 10; 
Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 3:278. 
43 Department of Justice, Press Release, April4, 1935, NRA Papers, Series 
49, Box 568; Richberg, NRA Release No. 1081o, April 4, 1935, NRA Papers, 
Series 27. 
44 Frankfurter to Raymond Moley, May 2, 1935, Frankfurter Papers, 
Box 28. 
45 Homer Cummings to Richberg, April 22, 1935, NRA Papers, Series 3, 
Box 5; Richberg, My Hero, 193--95; Richberg, The Rainbow, 219-20; 
Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 3:279. 
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many officers in the Justice Department were unsympathetic to his 
cause, and in fact the NRA did encounter friction in working with 
the Department of Justice on the preparation of the case.46 
Richberg immersed himself completely in readying his argu-
ment, scheduled for May 2-3 in the Supreme Court's old chambers 
in the Capitol Building. His task was largely one of mastering the 
arguments and legal research of the NRA staff and the Justice De-
partment. Although he had a long record of legal and administra-
tive experience in the NRA to draw upon, Richberg did not have 
the time, with his duties as chairman of the NIRB, to work up the 
legal aspects of the case personally. He had to rely on others for 
this. He was simply the star in a show with many people working 
behind the scenes to support him. 
Richberg's argument before the Court emphasized the circum-
stances which had called the National Recovery Administration 
into being. The emergency created by the depression, nationwide 
in scope, required an exercise of power on a national scale. Here-
lied heavily on a broad definition of the commerce power, one ade-
quate to meet a national emergency, and urged the Court to evalu-
ate the Poultry Code not as an isolated exercise of regulatory power, 
but as part of a broad attack on a nationwide problem. Furthermore, 
he argued that the need for cooperation among businessmen to 
stabilize the anarchy of an unbridled competitive system demanded 
a new understanding of the meaning of federal regulation. The 
country must move away from the purely negative approach of the 
antitrust laws to a more positive ideal as embodied in the NRA: 
"The power to regulate is not merely the power to prohibit wrong-
doing; it must clearly also encompass a power to encourage and to 
organize cooperation in doing good." Richberg defended the com-
petitive and labor standards laid down in the Act as sufficient guides 
for the president in carrying out the will of Congress. He admitted, 
however, that because of the variety of problems in different indus-
tries, the particulars of such standards had to be left to the develop-
•s Thomas C. Billig to Smith and Scott, April 16, 1935; Scott to Smith, 
April 20, 1935; Philip E. Buck to Billig, R. J. Heilman, J. A. Fridinger, 
Frank Elmore, Jr., Allen Robinson, Stewart McDonald, Stein, April 28, 
1935, all in NRA Papers, Series 49, Box 568. 
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ment of a law merchant among businessmen themselves. The codes 
of fair competition sought to do precisely this. The codes filled the 
gap left by Congress's inability to establish guidelines adaptable to 
every industry in the nation. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with both Richberg's definition of 
the commerce power and his belief in the adequacy of the legis-
lature's instructions to the executive for implementing public pol-
icy. It threw out the NRA in United States v. A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp., et al., on May 27, 1935, as an illegal application of 
the federal power to regulate interstate commerce and as an un-
constitutional delegation of the lawmaking power to the president.47 
Although Richberg and others submitted plans for a new NRA 
with more carefully defined powers, Roosevelt decided to ask Con-
gress to approve a temporary extension of only a skeleton agency 
rather than attempt to reconstitute a full-fledged program. The 
purpose of the temporary agency would be to liquidate the NRA, 
to analyze the information on industry and trade in NRA's posses-
sion, and to assist in implementing a proposed requirement that gov-
ernment contractors abide by certain minimum labor standards. 
Roosevelt's growing frustration with a series of adverse Supreme 
Court decisions against the New Deal, plus his increasing appre-
hension that government cooperation with the business commu-
nity was an unreal expectation, undoubtedly contributed to his de-
cision. Richberg's hopes for a modified but nevertheless large-scale 
NRA program were dashed.48 
41 Richberg, The Rainbow, 2I7-4I; Richberg, My Hero, I89-96; Rich-
berg, Oral Argument of Hon. Donald R. Richberg on Behalf of the United 
States, United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp, et al., pamphlet in 
Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 47; 295 U. S. 495 (I935); Gregory Hankin to 
Billig, May 4, I935, and "Outline of Schechter Opinion," n.d., both in 
NRA Papers, Series 49, Box 567. The quotation is from Richberg, Oral Ar-
gument of Hon. Donald R. Richherg, 6. 
48 [Richberg], "Memorandum to the President," May 3I, I935, with at-
tached draft bill; Marshall to Rich berg, May 3 I, I 9 3 5; Rich berg to Roose-
velt, June 13, I935, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 46; Frankfurter to Roose-
velt, May 30, I935, Frankfurter Papers, Box 34; Roosevelt to Attorney 
General and Solicitor General, June 8, I935, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 
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With the end of an experiment that he dreamed would one day 
lead to a utopia of business-government cooperation and a rationally 
planned economy, Richberg submitted his formal resignation to 
the president on June 5· In a private note to Roosevelt on the same 
day, Richberg expressed his concern that "very little can be accom-
plished to save the great values of the N.R.A. under the limitations 
of the present program, as I understand it." If the president had 
decided to abandon the ideas behind the NRA, then Richberg's use-
fulness had ended: "I feel that I am a burden rather than an aid 
to the accomplishment of your apparent aims." Recognizing that 
he was "mentally fagged and physically depressed," and having lost 
Roosevelt's support for the kind of massive and permanent pro-
gram he had in mind, Richberg retired to Rehoboth Beach, Dela-
ware, for the summer, where he wrote a book about his NRA experi-
ences.49 
Just as Richberg's belief in his own impartiality had proved in-
accurate when it came to labor-management relations, so too did his 
sense of his own indispensability. He could not possibly control 
the entire industrial recovery program, yet time after time he felt 
compelled to come to its rescue. The irony was that his deep com-
mitment to the original principles of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, which had been designed to offset the constrictive 
trends of the depression mainly through private initiative and pri-
vate planning, prevented him from comprehending the full mean-
ing of their gradual breakdown. The ideals of business-government 
cooperation simply had to be viable; Richberg could not tolerate 
the possibility that they might not be and saw no other alternatives. 
To Richberg's mind, a larger role for government was not the 
answer, for such a policy would have contradicted the most basic 
assumptions of industrial self-government underlying the experi-
ment. The result was that his attempts to rescue the administration 
program consisted chiefly of relatively ineffective changes in imme-
berg, My Hero, 197-99; Hawley, The New Deal, 130-31; Schlesinger, 
The Age of Roosevelt, 3:287-90. 
49 Richberg to Roosevelt, June 5, 1935; Richberg to Roosevelt, June 5, 
1935 (handwritten note), Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 466; Richberg, 
My Hero, 199-202. 
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diate tactics but not in basic principles or long-range strategy. Rich-
berg believed in government-business cooperation as firmly when he 
left the administration as when he entered it, despite the evidence 
of the intervening two years that his faith was not completely 
justified. His own belief in the program as originally conceived 
contributed to the NRA's inability to break away from its mis-
take of relying too heavily on the good will of private business for 
a solution to the depression. Despite numerous reforms and reor-
ganizations, the assumptions underlying the industrial recovery pro-
gram of 1935 were essentially the same as those of 1933. 
In the end, Richberg's positive identification with the original 
plan he had helped to create, his personal loyalty to Roosevelt (who 
had given him assurances that he occupied a special place in the 
administration), and his own need for success and vindication 
impelled him toward the idea that he had a heavy responsibility 
for the success of the New Deal. And for the sake of his own 
psychic security, this was a responsibility he could not shirk. 
CHAPTER IX 
On the Sidelines 
The story of Donald Rich berg after I 93 5 is the story of a gradual 
alienation from the New Deal and Franklin Roosevelt, a strength-
ening of his identification with the businessman's approach to re-
covery, and a waning of politicaf influence. Though he enjoyed 
something of a resurgence at the White House as an expert on 
constitutional reform and business-government relations in 1937-
1938, Richberg was effectively disarmed of all political power by 
the time of the Second World War. Thenceforth, his political ac-
tivities were confined to propaganda; he substituted preaching for 
action. And as Richberg drew farther and farther away from the 
exercise of power, his ideas about its use became more theoretical 
and less relevant to the realities around him. The old campaigner 
of 1912, 1924, and 1932 emerged as a conservative, invoking the 
values of his youth rather than coming to terms with the actuali-
ties of the welfare state. His intellectual problem was not that he 
changed, but that he failed to change. His personal problem was 
that he was no longer welcome among liberals, so that his business 
associates reinforced his identity with conservatism. 
In the fall of 1935, after recovering from his NRA battles during 
the summer, Richberg decided to open up a law office of his own 
in Washington rather than return to Chicago. He had made many 
new friends in Washington during his days in government service 
and found the capital city an exciting place to be. Furthermore, the 
prospects of resuming a legal practice based on labor representation 
were slight after NRA so that there would be little attraction in go-
ing back to Chicago. He could not simply pick up where he had 
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left off, for many of his former clients were no longer in sympathy 
with him. 
Accordingly, Richberg opened up a law office, alone, on Jackson 
Place, a short distance from the White House. Despite his many 
personal contacts in Washington, the first months on his own were 
not very profitable, and Richberg gradually came to the conclu-
sion that he would have to join a large firm if he expected to handle 
important cases. A solo operator could not expect to attract large 
clients who were likely to require a great deal of attention. Even 
if he could, Richberg did not relish the prospect of becoming de-
pendent on a few substantial clients; this would hinder his feeling 
of independence even more than belonging to a large firm. Though 
he had never liked the idea of working in a large office, and had 
left his father's old firm in Chicago to practice alone in the 1920s 
partly for this reason, Richberg concluded that what he desired was 
simply not practical anymore. 
In December of 1936, as he was reaching this conclusion, Joseph 
E. Davies invited Richberg to join his Washington firm as a senior 
partner. Though Richberg had no close personal acquaintance 
with Davies, his cousin Morgan Davies had been one of Rich-
berg's partners before he left his father's firm in 1923. Joseph E. 
Davies was about to be appointed United States Ambassador to 
the ussR and wanted to bring in an older lawyer with an established 
reputation to head up the firm in his absence. He offered Richberg 
an attractive financial arrangement. With the prospect of financial 
security at last, plus his conclusion that it would be necessary to 
join a large firm in order to be a factor in Washington legal circles, 
Richberg accepted the invitation, becoming a partner in the firm 
of Davies, Richberg, Beebe, Busick, and Richardson.1 
Richberg's return to private practice, alone in 1935 and then 
as a member of one of Washington's leading firms in 1936, did not 
mean the end of his activity in the Roosevelt administration. He 
was much too drawn to politics for that, and had too deep a need 
to relate his own work with the public welfare to lose interest in 
the New Deal. Though restricted to working on a volunteer basis 
1 Donald Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but 
Unheroic Life (New York, 1954), 201-203, 228-29. 
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behind the scenes, he took all precautions to keep his line to the 
White House in good repair. Before he joined Davies in late 1936, 
he did some speech ~riting for the presidential campaign and 
helped prepare the White House draft of the Democratic platform. 
He also wrote a campaign book entitled Guilty! The Confession 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Written by a Friend. It defended the 
New Deal against the charge that it was a socialist dictatorship de-
signed to destroy free enterprise and pictured it as preserving and 
humanizing capitalism.2 
Far more important than Richberg's campaign work in 1936 was 
his informal lobbying on behalf of continuing the ideals of the Na-
tional Recovery Administration. Despite the experiences of the 
NRA, Richberg still believed that the way to permanent economic 
reform lay in cooperation between business and government and 
modification of the antitrust laws. He did not want to see Roosevelt 
launch an antibusiness or trustbusting campaign that would do ir-
revocable harm and destroy any possibility of cooperation for na-
tional economic planning. Raymond Moley spoke for a similar point 
of view.3 Rich berg believed that such a turn in the New Deal would 
be anachronistic and irrelevant to the two great realities of modern 
economic conditions: concentration and interdependence. He at-
tributed the breakdown of the NRA mainly to difficulties in admin-
istration and execution of policy; its troubles must not be allowed 
to destroy faith in the principles on which it was founded. Rich-
berg thus retained an idealized attitude toward what he regarded as 
the essentials of the NRA and failed to explain (except for adminis-
tration reasons) why it had been so difficult to put them into effect 
in the real world of monopolies, labor strife, unfair competition, 
and managed markets. As a result of his uncritical attitude, Rich-
berg did not modify his position and remained a spokesman for a 
business-government commonwealth of cooperation. 
Richberg opposed the Louis Brandeis-Felix Frankfurter theory 
2 Ibid., 203-206; Donald Richberg to Stephen Early, Oct. 20, 1936, 
with attached "Memorandum concerning N.R.A.," Donald Richberg Papers, 
Library of Congress, Box 33; [Richberg], Guilty/ The Confession of Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt, Written by a Friend (Garden City, N. Y., 1936). 
3 Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York, 1966), 525-30. 
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that the ills of the depression could be attributed to economic con-
centration itself; a return to competition by breaking up large busi-
nesses into smaller units would compensate for the mismanagement 
of a few industrial czars who had tried to gain a stranglehold on 
the nation's economy. Richberg did not want to destroy a managed 
economy, but to control it for the benefit of workers and consumers 
as well as investors. To him, managing the economy offered the one 
hope that man could rationally control his destiny and spread pros-
perity; there was no logical necessity for trusting to the operation of 
the mystical laws of laissez faire which allegedly governed the free 
market.4 
Richberg was very much concerned with keeping the president 
in contact with businessmen who he thought would be receptive 
to some sign from the White House that the end of NRA did not 
mean the beginning of trustbusting. As early as March I 936, Felix 
Frankfurter expressed concern to Solicitor General Stanley Reed 
over "the resurgence of Donald Richberg" and how it had "aroused 
alarm among some of our very best friends."5 The president's own 
uncertainty about his future business policy kept the White House 
door open to spokesmen like Richberg as well as those of opposing 
views. The struggle between the antitrusters and the advocates of 
business-government planning was far from over.6 Richberg kept 
himself in the forefront of those urging Roosevelt to stick to the 
ideals of NRA. He regularly bombarded the president with recom-
mendations on policy and urged him not to sell the NRA short. Dur-
ing the 1936 campaign, he suggested that Roosevelt's spokesmen 
not "apologize for N.RA." but "extol its temporary and permanent 
values." 
Beyond campaign strategy, Richberg wanted the president to 
4 Richberg, The Rainbow (Garden City, N. Y., 1936), 224-84; Ar-
thur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 3: The Politics of Up-
heaval, 1935-1936 (Boston, 196o), 385-400. 
5 Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed, March 25, 1936, Felix Frankfurter 
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 32. 
6 See Ellis Wayne Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monop-
oly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, N.J., 1966), 383-403, 
and Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 3:385-408, for a picture of the 
struggle over policy. 
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use the NRA experience as the foundation for a renewed program. 
As a first step, he proposed continuing the analysis of NRA records 
already underway and making "a comprehensive public report upon 
the N.R.A. as a whole." He was confident of the results of such a 
study and expected it to emphasize "the soundness of [the NRA] 
program, [and] the difficulties and the public service already ac-
complished and to be accomplished along the lines of the original 
N.R.A. program revised in the light of experience." All this would 
be a prelude to an "effort to draft or enact further legislation." But 
the important thing in the spring of I936 was to start working on 
some kind of a plan to follow up NRA, "otherwise there will be 
much pulling and hauling and one or two very aggressive groups 
may take the lead in promoting a bad program which it will be 
hard to stop." Shortly thereafter, Roosevelt created a Committee 
of Industrial Analysis to complete the administration's evaluation 
of theNRA.7 
At the same time, Richberg launched his personal campaign to 
bring Roosevelt together with friendly businessmen, and newspa-
perman Raymond Clapper noted in the spring of I 936 that "Rich-
berg [has] been seeing Roosevelt [a] great deal secretly recently." 
Richberg's self-appointed mission was twofold: I) to encourage the 
president to be patient and give businessmen another chance to 
work out a program, and 2) to make the business community real-
ize that Roosevelt was, going to be reelected in I936 and that they 
must be prepared to work with him.8 
Richberg feared that Roosevelt's patience was running out and 
that a crackdown on business was likely after the election. On the 
other side, too many businessmen distrusted the president; for this 
reason, Richberg had recommended to Roosevelt that the new 
7 Richberg to Franklin Roosevelt, Feb. 25, 1936, with attached "Memo-
randum as to the Future of the N.R.A. Program," Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 466-Misc.; Samuel I. 
Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
with a Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt, 
Vol. 5: The People Approve, 1936 (New York, 1938), 152-58. 
8 Raymond Clapper, notes for March 23, 1936, Raymond Clapper Pa-
pers, Library of Congress, Box 210. 
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Committee of Industrial Analysis be (according to Clapper's testi-
mony) "strictly a business men's proposition so they won't be scared 
off."9 In the spring of I 936, he encouraged Roosevelt to include in 
his special Message to Congress on unemployment and relief an 
appeal to businessmen to meet with him and discuss ways of increas-
ing employment. Richberg hoped that some "self-selected group of 
business managers" would voluntarily come forth and lay the foun-
dation for a permanent organization to serve as a liaison between 
government and business in launching a new scheme for economic 
planning. Such a meeting between the president and friendly 
business leaders would create an atmosphere of cooperation. 
Richberg urged the idea on Roosevelt as a practical way to uti-
lize the NRA experience. Data in the government's possession could 
be made available to "business organizations seeking to improve the 
public service of private enterprise." For their part, industrialists 
would "undertake to bring about the expansion of the volume of 
employment and the volume of production." Richberg hoped that 
bringing businessmen together on this basis would "avoid even 
the appearances of the exercise of coercive influence by the na-
tional government to bring about such an organization." The feel-
ing in industry that the NRA was an instrument of government 
regimentation had been one of the great obstacles to its success in 
Richberg's opinion. He saw the ultimate solution to the depression 
coming from the private sector; somehow the number of jobs had 
to be increased, for government relief and make-work programs 
could not continue indefinitely if capitalism was to survive. The 
needed mobilization of private resources, if it were to come about 
at all, or if it were not to be the result of a government dictator-
ship, would have to result from the voluntary cooperative efforts 
of the business community. Hopefully, the president could serve 
as the rallying point for such an effort?0 
In his relief message of March I 8, Roosevelt did not make the 
9 Ibid. 
10 Richberg to Roosevelt, March 6, I936, with attached "Memorandum 
concerning Relief Message and Business Cooperation"; Richberg to Roose-
velt, March I 3, I 936, with attached "Memorandum for the President," 
Franklin Roosevelt Papers, President's Personal File I82o. 
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kind of explicit appeal for a White House business conference that 
Richberg had in mind, but he did urge the private sector to take the 
initiative in cooperative efforts to increase employment. The presi-
dent offered the assistance of the federal government in such a 
project and implied that he would stand ready to listen to any 
suggestions coming from the business community .11 
To Charles R. Hook, president of the American Rolling Mill 
Company and future head of the National Association of Manu-
facturers, Richberg urged that the business community not wait 
until after the November elections to respond to Roosevelt's gesture 
of goodwill. To postpone action in the futile hope of a Democratic 
defeat would only insure a continuing deterioration in relations be-
tween FDR and business. To avert an antibusiness program in 1937, 
industry should mobilize now.12 
Although his efforts were unavailing in bringing about a con-
crete program right away, Richberg thought he saw signs of a sof-
tening attitude on both sides and continued to drum up support 
for his ideas. By autumn, he worked out a proposal for revising the 
antitrust laws as part of his plan of cooperation between business-
men and the federal government. In messages to the president and 
in addresses before groups of lawyers and businessmen, he recom-
mended recasting the laws to acknowledge that "large business 
operations are a natural development" and that they should be con-
trolled rather than destroyed. Cooperative arrangements within 
or among trades for expanding and stabilizing markets, production, 
and employment were desirable so long as they were "openly made 
with the resulting cooperation subject to public scrutiny." Most 
important, "The developing field of trade agreements should be 
supervised by an administrative agency charged with the duty of 
maintaining the laws against monopolistic and unfair trade prac-
tices, but authorized to sanction agreements clearly within the law 
or within any twilight zone, subject to the rights of public or pri-
11 Rosenman, ed., Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
5:125-31; Clapper, notes for March 23, 1936, Clapper Papers, Box 210. 
12 Richberg to Charles R. Hook, April 10, 1936, and Richberg, "Memo-
randum on the Need for Immediate Non-Partisan Formulation of Con-
structive Policies," Richberg Papers, L.C., Box 38. 
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vate objectors to submit a complaint to the administrative com-
mission for a decision, which like all commission orders would be 
subject to judicial review." 
What Richberg wanted was "a clear legal distinction between 
mere size and actual monopolistic power, and also between the 
possession of power that may be abused and the actual abuse of 
power." The antitrust laws ought to establish more precise stand-
ards. Yet even by fair practices, competition often led to concen-
tration. It was a natural development and should not be punished 
by law unless accomplished through illegitimate means, which 
could be legally defined and controlled. Richberg's recommenda-
tions thus reflected his persistent faith in the ideals of the NRA: 
the key to prosperity lay in industrial self-government and private 
initiative, supervised and assisted by a government agency designed 
to modify the antitrust laws in the public interest.13 
Undeterred by the lack of concrete results in 1936, Richberg 
continued his personal campaign at the White House and in busi-
ness circles throughout 1937· He regularly bombarded both camps 
with recommendations in letters, speeches, and private conversa-
tions. The essentials of his program remained unchanged, and he 
urged Roosevelt not to deviate from "the foundation principle of 
our political economy," which was "the self-regulation of com-
merce and the fixing of prices and wages by competition." The 
legitimate sphere of government action was in eliminating the 
excesses of competition, but not in fighting or taking over either 
management or labor. Richberg's goal was cooperation within and 
between management and labor, with the government's assistance, 
to stabilize the vagaries of the competitive system. He did not want 
government domination. Ideally, such matters as wages and hours 
"should be the product of collective bargaining," and not of fed-
13 Richberg, "A Suggestion for Revision of the Anti-Trust Laws," Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 85 (Nov. 1936), II-I 5· Also see 
Richberg to Hook, Sept. 3, 1936, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 38; Richberg 
to Early, Oct. 20, 1936, with attached "Memorandum concerning N.R.A.," 
Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 33; Richberg to Roosevelt, Nov. 16, 1936, with 
attached memorandum, "Civilizing Competition," Franklin Roosevelt Pa-
pers, PPF 24 I 8. 
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eral decree. In other words, they should be settled privately.14' 
Roosevelt always welcomed Richberg's suggestions, yet nothing 
concrete resulted from them. The president's reluctance about 
committing himself was undoubtedly the product of the continuing 
policy dispute in administration circles between the antitrusters and 
the government-business planners. 
Richberg had his long-hoped-for chance to bring about a recon-
ciliation between the business community and Roosevelt in the 
early part of I938. He succeeded in arranging a meeting for Janu-
ary I I between the president and a group of leading industrialists, 
including Ernest T. Weir of Weirton Steel, Lewis Brown of Johns-
Manville, Colby Chester of the NAM, and Alfred P. Sloan of Gen-
eral Motors. Furthermore, it was followed a few days later by a 
similar gathering of business and labor leaders arranged by Adolf 
Berle and Rexford Tugwell.15 
At the meeting set up by Richberg, the discussion centered on 
the relationship between production and purchasing power, a hous-
ing program, investment in capital goods, communication between 
business and government, and wages and hours legislation. Al-
though the conferees were able to agree with Roosevelt's objectives, 
difficulties arose as to how to bring them about. The industry rep-
resentatives favored a minimum of legislation, preferring to work 
uRichberg to Marguerite LeHand, Dec. 29, I937, with attached "D. R. 
Memo-z-lntroductory Material," "D. R. Memo-2-lndustrial Man-
agement and Labor," "D. R. Memo-3-Conclusion Material," Franklin 
Roosevelt Papers, PPF rS2o. Also see Richberg to Roosevelt, Feb. I9, I937, 
with attached memorandum; Richberg to Marvin Mcintyre, July 2S, I937, 
Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 196I; Daniel Roper to Roosevelt, March 3, 
I937, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, OF 3-Q; Roper to Mcintyre, March IS, 
I937, with attached memorandum, Roper to Roosevelt, March IS, I937, 
Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 3; Roosevelt to Robert H. Jackson, Oct. 2o, 
1937, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 35S; Richberg to LeHand, Feb. 25, 
1937, and Richberg to Roosevelt, Feb. 25, I937, Richberg Papers, L.a., 
Box 2; Clapper, diary entry for Feb. 2 and May 29, 1937, Clapper Papers, 
Box S; Richberg, "Future Federal Regulation of Business," Vital Speeches 
of the Day 3 (Feb. I, I937): 23S-4I; Richberg, "The Black-Connery 
Bill," Vital Speeches of the Day 3 (July I5, I937): 5S5-S7. 
15 Hawley, The New Deal, 396-403; Clapper, diary entries for Jan. 9, 
12, and 14, 193S, Clapper Papers, Box S. 
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through trade associations or other private means rather than a fed-
eral program. There was no opposition to the principle of collec-
tive bargaining, and Richberg told Raymond Clapper that the con-
ferees agreed it was "here to stay." Senator Robert Wagner's 
National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935 after the Supreme 
Court ruling against the NRA, was not discussed in explicit terms. 
The business representatives, however, definitely preferred handling 
labor relations by agreement and mediation rather than what Rich-
berg described as the "process now being tried." 
Richberg came away from the meeting optimistic. He thought 
there was a real chance that machinery for cooperative ventures 
might develop out of the conference, and was impressed by the ap-
parent sincerity of both the president and the businessmen.16 The 
next week, Roosevelt conferred with the Commerce Department's 
Business Advisory Council and representatives of the automo-
bile industry in two separate meetings. Talk of renewed efforts at 
economic planning dominated all these sessions, yet the business 
community adhered to its belief that industry must have the de-
cisive role in any cooperative efforts by government and business. 
Power must remain in its hands, not those of government offi-
cials.17 
Hardly a week had passed before Richberg's high hopes were 
dashed. On January 14, Roosevelt struck out at holding companies 
during one of his news conferences. Richberg was deeply upset 
at this development, and told Clapper that the president's "loose 
talking" could undo his efforts to effect a business-government 
scheme of cooperation. According to Clapper, Richberg "forecast 
. . . that the days of democracy are numbered." Further, he be-
lieved that "within [the] next two weeks," the "destiny of [the] 
nation would be decided." If "this cooperative effort" failed, it 
would make each side more adamant than before, and end up with 
government domination of the economy and the possible end of 
free enterprise. Richberg feared "left wing advisers" were telling 
16 Clapper, diary entries for Jan. 12 and 14, 1938, Clapper Papers, Box 8. 
11 Hawley, The New Deal, 397· Also see Richberg to Mcintyre, Jan. 25, 
1938, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, PPF 8246; Richberg to Mcintyre, Feb. 8, 
1938, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2. 
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Roosevelt that business-government cooperation could not work. 
Clapper foresaw the possibility that what Roosevelt decided "in 
[the] next two weeks will determine whether Don will publicly 
break with him."18 
Within the space of a few weeks, Richberg had plunged from 
extreme optimism to extreme pessimism. His tendency to overstate 
his views and to overreact to events seemed to be a function of his 
deep commitment to the principles of the business-government 
commonwealth. Having worked so hard for so long on promoting 
his program, he was iinable to consider compromising it, and saw 
its fortunes in terms of ali-or-nothing. After hearing about Roose-
velt's January 14 press conference, Richberg seemed to Clapper a 
"crushed and disappointed man." At the end of the month, in an 
address to the Northeastern Lumbermen's Association, Richberg 
reiterated a statement which he took from Roosevelt's most recent 
State of the Union message: "No government can conscript co-
operation." He sent a copy of his remarks to the president, remarks 
which predicted that "free enterprise and free government will 
survive, or, in the destruction of one, both will be destroyed."19 
The worst blow was yet to come. In April, Richberg read a news-
paper report quoting Roosevelt to the effect that he was in "sub-
stantial agreement" with the antimonopoly views of Senator Wil-
liam Borah of Idaho. Richberg immediately dispatched a note of 
disbelief to the president. He warned Roosevelt against the "school 
of 'trust busters' who extend a just hostility to monopolistic en-
terprises into an unwarranted and purely unreasoning hostility 
first, to all big business and second, to all efforts of business, 
whether big or little, to cooperate in promoting an orderly and 
fair competition to get rid of the hazards and insecurity resulting 
from a ruthless and anarchistic competition." It was unfair to as-
sume that "cooperation is always a cloak for monopolistic con-
spiracy." He reminded Roosevelt, "The philosophy of the N.R.A. 
was wholly consistent with the New Deal," but doubted whether 
18 Clapper, diary entry for Jan. 14, 1938, Clapper Papers, Box 8. 
19 Ibid.; Richberg, "Government and Business," Address to Northeastern 
Lumbermen's Association, New York City, Jan. 26, 1938, copy in Franklin 
Roosevelt Papers, oF I 96 I. 
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the same could be said for the Borah position. Though the NRA had 
failed as an institution, Richberg was convinced that "in the last 
year or two, throughout the country . . . there has developed a 
much better understanding of the principles of the N .R.A. and 
widespread regret that they have not been carried forward." The 
economic recession of 1937-1938 demonstrated the need for a re-
turn to the ideals of the early New DeaP0 
Despite Richberg's hopes that Roosevelt would reconsider his 
position, within a few days the president recommended that Con-
gress authorize a massive investigation of monopoly and economic 
concentration, and the Temporary National Economic Committee 
(TNEc) came into being on June 16, 1938. Long befuddled as to 
which direction to take, Richberg's or Borah's, Roosevelt finally 
moved toward the latter, perhaps as much out of frustration as con-
viction. For the time being, the antitrusters had bested the advo-
cates of business-government cooperation.21 
By the spring of 1938, Richberg had thus fully defined the prin-
cipal elements of his policy position. But the president decided to 
undertake a different approach to business and industry. Although 
Richberg maintained personal contact with Roosevelt for several 
more years, and consulted with him on personal and public mat-
ters, the two drifted farther and farther apart once the president 
had committed himself to the TNEC investigation. This was a dif-
ference over policy, and not the result of a personal clash. There 
was no dramatic break, but simply a deepening disagreement on 
economic questions. 
Richberg's interest in the administration between 1935 and 1938 
was not restricted solely to business-government relations. Roose-
velt had a high regard for his views on constitutional questions and 
sought his counsel a number of times in 1936-1937. And because 
Roosevelt wanted his help on the Supreme Court problem, he was 
undoubtedly all the more willing to listen to Richberg's ideas on 
other matters-such as business policy-even though he eventu-
ally took a different tack. 
20 Richberg to Roosevelt, April 23, 1938, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, oF 
277; Clapper, diary entry for May 19, 1938, Clapper Papers, Box 8. 
21 Hawley, The New Deal, 410-19. 
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Richberg was as disturbed as Roosevelt over the Supreme Court's 
record of striking down New Deal legislation. Of course, he had 
been most concerned with the Schechter decision, and once the 
Court acted, he turned immediately to developing new proposals 
in light of the decision. To Rich berg, the Court's decision outlined 
not only the limits of government action but also its possibilities. 
He used the Schechter judgment as the foundation on which to 
build a new program-although Roosevelt eventually decided 
against continuing an NRA-like agency.22 
Though the Court's decisions might point the way for shaping 
future legislation, Richberg nevertheless believed that its attitude 
was unnecessarily hostile to the New Deal. The problem was that 
there were no clear and absolute standards of judgment, so that 
lawyers and judges might disagree among themselves in construing 
the constitutionality of a law. Given this fact, the final decision 
usually rested on the judge's own political and social beliefs. Yet 
the nation should not be tyrannized by the personal political or 
economic views of a few men clothed in the robes of the judiciary, 
for the ultimate repository of constitutional authority in the Amer-
ican form of government was the people themselves. Only they 
could amend the Constitution. Only they, Richberg believed, 
could finally interpret it. Some way had to be found to make it 
feasible for the people to render an interpretation binding on the 
Court, lest it subvert the expressed desire of the majority by strik-
ing down the New Deal. Richberg dared not think what the con-
sequences of such a situation might be. Perhaps the legislature 
could serve as the people's spokesman in authoritatively interpret-
ing the Constitution.23 
22 [Richberg], "Memorandum to the President," May 31, 1935, Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 46; Richberg, The Rainbow, 224-41. 
23 Richberg, "Undermining the Constitution," Vital Speeches of the Day 
2 (Jan. 13, 1936): 238-44; Richberg, "Should We Amend the Constitu-
tion?" Missouri Bar Journal 7 (March 1936): 45-46, 50-53; Richberg, 
"The Constitution and the New Deal," Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 185 (May 1936): 56-64; Richberg to Mc-
Intyre, June 16, 1936, with attached memorandum, "Concerning the Con-
stitution and the Supreme Court," Franklin Roosevelt Papers, President's 
Secretary's File; Richberg to Roosevelt, Nov. 16, 1936, with attached address 
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Although Richberg helped Roosevelt prepare the White House 
draft of a noncommittal plank on the judiciary for the I936 Demo-
cratic platform, he had a well-developed program which he put 
forth to the president and anyone else who would listen. His 
method of attack was the same as his campaign on behalf of 
business-government planning. He sent salvos of messages and 
suggestions into the White House and propagandized his theories 
before numerous legal and business groups. Richberg was a reg-
ular on the luncheon and banquet circuit and spoke all over the 
country.24 
Richberg's idea was to remove certain constitutional questions 
from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. He based 
his proposal on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which 
bestowed on Congress the authority "to make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" its specifi-
cally enumerated powers. To Richberg, the solution seemed inevi-
table: "Where the Congress has been granted an express power, 
such as the power to regulate commerce . . . then under the Con-
stitution it is solely a question of legislative judgment, not subject 
to judicial review, as to what extent and character of regulation is 
'necessary and proper.'" The Supreme Court could not substitute 
its judgment for that of Congress in determining the scope or ap-
propriateness of legislation under the powers explicitly granted to 
the legislature in the Constitution. Congress should declare the 
review of these discretionary powers off-limits to the courts. Exer-
cises of implied powers not specifically granted by the Constitution 
would remain subject to review. The legislature would thus 
emerge as the authoritative spokesman of the people's will. 
Furthermore, to assure that judges would respect the preroga-
by Richberg, "The Function of the Supreme Court under the Constitution," 
Oct. 12, 1936, Franklin Roosevelt Papers, PPF 2418. 
24 For a picture of Richberg's informal lobbying on behalf of constitutional 
reform, seen. 23. On preparing the 1936 platform, see Richberg, "Memo-
randum for Judge Rosenman," May 23, 1949, with attached copy of Rich-
berg to Mcintyre, June 16, 1936, and "Memorandum for President-in re 
Constitutional Issues," Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 33; Richberg, My Hero, 
203-205. 
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tives of the legislature, Richberg suggested redefining the federal 
judiciary's lifetime tenure "during good behavior." The Constitu-
tion protected the tenure of federal justices, but Richberg believed 
it was possible for Congress to define the meaning of good behavior 
so as "to penalize any refusal to perform, or any violation of, their 
official duties, as defined by Congress." If a judge violated the 
definition of appellate jurisdiction as established by Congress, he 
would be subject to removal. Surely the judges themselves could 
not define good behavior. Some outside authority must have the 
power to do so, and that authority was Congress. 
Richberg also suggested that Congress delimit the jurisdiction 
of the lower courts to require that all constitutional issues be re-
ferred to the Supreme Court for immediate adjudication. He 
thereby hoped to avoid what he regarded as the all-too-common 
spectacle of conflicting opinions on the same question handed 
down by local courts around the country.25 
Finally, Richberg also toyed with another way of curbing the 
Supreme Court. He thought it might be possible to permit Con-
gress to reenact legislation declared unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court once a general election had intervened. Presumably 
the disputed legislation would be an issue in the campaign, and 
therefore the newly elected representatives and senators would be 
able to give an accurate expression of the people's will. They could 
give the people's interpretation of the Constitution as applied to 
the law in question. If such an expression of the ultimate authority 
of the people could thus be given, it ought to be binding on the 
Supreme Court. 
Richberg believed that most of his proposals could be imple-
mented without resorting to a constitutional amendment. In fact, 
he considered an amendment inappropriate, for there was nothing 
basically wrong with the Constitution itself, but only with the mean-
ing assigned to it by certain judges. The solution lay not in amend-
25 Richberg to Roosevelt, Nov. 16, 1936, with attached memorandum, 
"The Constitutional Issue," Nov. 16, 1936, "Outline Draft of a Bill to 
Amend the Judicial Code," and "The Function of the Supreme Court under 
the Constitution," address by Richberg, Oct. 12, 1936, all in Franklin 
Roosevelt Papers, PPF 2418. 
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ing it to meet a temporary disagreement over its meaning, but in 
providing a way for the final authority-the people and not the 
Court-to offer its interpretation.26 
Though Roosevelt maintained a keen interest in all proposals 
for court reform, Richberg's suggestions did not come to fruition 
in official policy. In late December 1936 he sent the president an-
other idea which was less elaborate than his earlier suggestions. 
He proposed that federal judges reaching the age of seventy years 
should be retired from active service at the discretion of the presi-
dent. The retired judge would remain an official member of his 
court and continue to receive full compensation, but he would 
serve in an inactive capacity and would not be counted in the num-
ber of judges fixed by law for making up a court. In the event of a 
disqualification or some other indisposition of one of the active 
members of the court, he could be recalled for temporary duty. 
Richberg was convinced that such a proposal for introducing 
younger blood into the federal co!-ut system was constitutional, for 
the judge retained both his lifetime tenure and his regular com-
pensation, as required by the Constitution. But Attorney General 
Homer Cummings disagreed, and Roosevelt consequently shelved 
the idea early in January 1937.27 
Richberg heard no more from the White House about court 
reform until later in January, when he was called in at the last 
minute to help prepare the final documents in Roosevelt's court-
packing plan. By then, the main outlines of policy had been deter-
mined, and Richberg assisted only in the task of formulating them 
in palatable language. Roosevelt had decided to seek authority to 
reform the entire federal court system and to make an additional 
appointment to the judiciary for every member over seventy years 
of age who had served ten years or more and did not resign within 
six months of his seventieth birthday. He would not be allowed to 
add more than six just~ces to the Supreme Court in this manner. 
26 Richberg, "Should We Amend the Constitution?" 45-46, 50-53; Rich-
berg, "The Constitution and the New Deal," 56-64. 
27 Richberg, "Memorandum of Judge Rosenman," May 23, 1949, with 
copy of Richberg to Roosevelt, Dec. 28, 1936, and draft statutory amend-
ment, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 33; Richberg, My Hero, 220-21. 
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Along with Cummings, Solicitor General Stanley Reed, and Sam-
uel Rosenman, one of Roosevelt's intimate advisers while governor 
of New York, Richberg worked on an outline of the program to be 
issued by the attorney general, the draft bill for implementing the 
plan, and the president's Message to Congress.28 
Although Richberg was not in complete agreement with the 
chosen method of attacking the Supreme Court problem, he recog-
nized that a policy decision had been determined and did not argue 
for a different approach. Richberg gave Roosevelt his loyalty 
throughout the Court fight. Only when the plan encountered in-
tractable opposition and became bogged down in Congress did 
Richberg come forth with a different idea. In June, he proposed re-
turning to his suggestion of December 1936 for active and inactive 
membership on federal courts. Since the Supreme Court had re-
cently rendered a series of decisions favorable to the New Deal, 
the real battle had been won, and the Court had been forced to up-
date its interpretation of the Constitution. Roosevelt thus could 
afford to compromise on his original plan. Richberg thought of his 
earlier idea as a way out of the president's dilemma, but Roosevelt 
was not receptive.29 
With the breakdown of the court-packing plan in 1937 and 
Roosevelt's rejection of his proposals for reviving a program of 
business-government cooperation, Richberg moved away from the 
inner circle of the president's advisers. Occasionally, he consulted 
with Roosevelt on matters of public policy, as in 1939-1940 when 
he represented American oil companies contesting the expropria-
tion of their properties in Mexico, and later when he suggested 
proposals for administrative reorganization to cope with the de-
mands of wartime mobilization after Pearl Harbor in 1941.80 But 
28 Rich berg, My Hero, 22 1-22; Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt 
(New York, 1952), 144-58. 
29 Richberg, My Hero, 221-26; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and 
Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1950), 89-90; Richberg, 
"Memorandum for Judge Rosenman," May 23, 1949, with copy of Rich-
berg to Homer Cummings, June 24, 1937, and "Outline of a Bill," Richberg 
Papers, L.c., Box 33· 
30 On Mexico, see Richberg to LeHand, Jan. 30, 1940; Richberg to Edwin 
M. Watson, June 24, 1940, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2; Richberg, My 
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his influence at the White House rapidly diminished after 1938. 
Of course, this process had been going on since I935, but was 
symbolized by Roosevelt's avowal of an antitrust program in 1938. 
Although personally friendly, Roosevelt and Richberg drew 
farther and farther apart. For a while after the court fight in 1937, 
Richberg had hopes that the president might appoint him to a 
vacancy on the Supreme Court, and Roosevelt did give him serious 
consideration. But their growing estrangement on policy matters 
precluded this. And certainly Richberg's reputation as a "traitor" 
to organized labor would mean a knock-down fight in the Senate 
over his nomination, something the president would not wish to 
invite. Richberg himself had doubts about whether he really 
wanted such a position; it would mean a drastic cut in income 
once again and furthermore would require him to cut back his 
activities as a presidential adviser and informal spokesman for 
business-government cooperation. As on so many questions, Rich-
berg's position was ambiguous. He wanted the honor of being of-
fered appointment, yet he wanted to do other things as well. But 
the problem never arose.81 
The result of Richberg's gradual alienation from the New Deal 
was that he had no place to turn except the private practice of law. 
Already well established in one of Washington's leading and most 
prosperous firms, after 1938 he devoted his energies more and more 
to representing business clients. Though he occasionally repre-
sented labor clients after his NRA days, these few links to the union 
movement were finally all severed by the early 194os.32 Richberg 
was no longer welcome in the liberal camp, so he turned to the 
conservative camp for support. And there he was destined to find it. 
Hero, 248-68; E. David Cronon, Joseph Daniels in Mexico (Madison, 
Wis., I96o), 236-49. On wartime reorganization, see Richberg to Watson, 
Dec. I I, I94I, with attached "Memorandum for the President"; Roosevelt 
to Richberg, Dec. I2, I94Ii Richberg to Mcintyre, Jan. 9, I942, Franklin 
Roosevelt Papers, oF I 96 I. 
31 Richberg to Mcintyre, June 9, I937, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 33; 
Mcintyre to Department of Justice, June I4, I937, Franklin Roosevelt 
Papers, oF I96I; Clapper, diary entries for Aug. I4, I937, and Jan. 9, 
I938, Clapper Papers, Box 8; Richberg, My Hero, 226-27. 
32 Richberg, My Hero, 276. 
CHAPTER X 
Reaping the Whirlwind 
Once he had lost his place among Franklin Roosevelt's dose ad-
visers, Donald Richberg divided his attention between the practice 
of law and propaganda work designed to influence the administra-
tion from the outside. In the latter regard, he was convinced that 
Roosevelt had to be brought back to the principles which had 
guided the early days of the New Deal. But Richberg's publicity 
work was symbolic of his decline in political stature. Unable to con-
trol power himself, or after 1938 even to have an intimate influence 
over those who did, he was forced to turn to the platform as the 
only available outlet for his ideas about public affairs. In terms of 
effectiveness, of course, this was the least viable way of influencing 
the administration, yet Richberg had no other choice. He would 
have preferred to remain among the president's confidants, but dif-
ferences over policy gradually had forced him out. Nonetheless, 
Richberg's habit of giving advice had been cultivated for too long 
simply to be set aside, so he relied on propaganda as a means of per-
petuating whatever influence he had left. He would not stand by 
silently and be ignored while the administration pursued what he 
regarded as wrongheaded policies. 
At least Richberg was well on his way to attaining the kind of 
financial security which had eluded him during his days of govern-
ment service. His position as a senior partner in one of Washing-
ton's leading law firms assured that. Over the next two decades, he 
served as counsel or director of such corporations as the United 
Light and Power System, American Natural Gas Company, Stand-
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ard Oil of California, American Light and Traction Company, Con-
tinental Gas and Electric Corporation, A. P. Giannini's Trans-
america Corporation, the Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance, 
and a number of railroad managements. From 1938 until 1941, he 
represented Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, Sinclair, and Dutch Shell in their attempts to recover con-
trol of oil reserves which they had developed in Mexico but which 
had been expropriated by the government of President Lazaro 
Oirdenas. Though hardly involving the bulk of his energies, Rich-
berg continued to engage in some labor litigation on behalf of the 
railway employee organizations (still the most conservative sector 
of the labor movement) until 1943, when he and his union clients 
belatedly decided that they could no longer work together.1 
Not surprisingly, Richberg's work in corporation law had conse-
quences for his thinking about industrial relations. It reinforced his 
previous commitment against government paternalism in any form. 
But given the direction which liberals in government were taking, 
it also meant that Richberg would never come to terms with the 
trend toward big government which was inherent in the growing 
demand for more and more social welfare legislation. President 
Harry Truman's proposed Fair Deal program exemplified the 
heavy reliance on government which Richberg abhorred. The re-
sult was that the ideological immobility which had become appar-
ent in Richberg during the New Deal became even more sharply 
defined. In the context of the 1940s and 1950s, Richberg's ideas 
about labor relations were out of touch with contemporary trends, 
so that he appeared to be parrotting the cliches of the most con-
servative elements in the business community. Yet Richberg be-
lieved that he was keeping faith with principles which had always 
1 Donald Richberg, My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful 
but Unheroic Life (New York, 1954), 228-29, 248-68, 276, 323-26; 
Richberg, Labor Union Monopoly: A Clear and Present Danger (Chicago, 
1957), viii-ix; E. David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison, 
Wis., 196o), 236-49; Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1939; Richberg, "Certifi-
cate of Necessity" [Feb. 25, 1946], Donald Richberg Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box 57; Richberg, Address to Thirty-Fourth Convention, Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Denver, Colo., July 23, 1941, 
Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 22. 
THE WAYWARD LIBERAL 
offered the only hope for genuine stability in industrial relations. 
In the 192os, Richberg's objective had been to redefine industrial 
relations in terms of what he believed was the single most impor-
tant reality of the modem economy: the interdependence of pro-
ducers. Labor contributors and capital contributors had a mutual 
self-interest in the success of what was a common undertaking; nei-
ther could carry on without the other. From this basic premise Rich-
berg evolved his particular approach to labor relations. Granted the 
complementary nature of labor and capital interests, industrial 
peace would come about provided each was able to protect those 
interests. The problem in the 192os had been to make it possible for 
labor to uphold its role in the program by guaranteeing its right to 
organize into unions and by requiring businessmen to engage in 
collective bargaining with their workers. Business was adequately 
organized already, and in fact dominated the labor-capital relation-
ship. The result was that the interests of investors were placed be-
fore those of employees, creating constant labor unrest. Until or-
ganized, the individual worker was ineffective in dealing on a basis 
of equality with his employer, so that unionization and collective 
bargaining became the prerequisites to industrial peace. 
A vital feature of Richberg's scheme had been its emphasis on pri-
vate bargaining and agreement by the parties themselves. His pro-
posals for new labor legislation did not mean the domination of the 
federal government in industrial relations. Public control would 
have taken decision-making power away from those who contrib-
uted their own talent or wealth to the success of an enterprise and 
placed it in the hands of a political directorate, perhaps leading to a 
form of socialism. Such a solution to labor's problems, in Richberg's 
thinking, would destroy the very object which he was seeking on 
behalf of the railway employee organizations-namely, the right to 
have a say in their own destiny. The purpose of his legislative and 
court battles of the 192os was simply to make labor's legal privileges 
equal to those of capital. This would make it possible-in the face 
of overwhelming employer dominance-for organized labor to look 
after its own interests. In other words, Richberg's purpose was to 
expand the rights of certain private organizations and not to tum 
to government paternalism as the answer. Although Richberg 
REAPING THE WHIRLWIND 
talked much of planning and control in the I92os and I93os, he 
meant planning and control by the private sector, not the public. 
Anything else would compromise the essential characteristics of the 
free enterprise system-something which neither he nor his clients 
wished to do. 
By the I94os and I95os, Richberg's ideas coincided not with 
those of organized labor but more with those of the business com-
munity. To many union leaders, the federal government and the 
Democratic party seemed to provide surer protection than a balance 
of interests between capital and labor. Furthermore, the great labor 
strikes of the late 1930s and of the period of readjustment after 
World War II seemed to belie the feasibility of a voluntary system 
for preserving industrial peace without a powerful government po-
liceman to contain labor strife and require settlements. Even Rich-
berg came to believe that in strikes involving the public interest 
compulsory arbitration would be necessary, though he saw this as a 
last resort and retained his faith that genuine cooperative efforts 
would yield agreements. In addition, the whole depression and war-
time experience had accustomed Americans to a vastly expanded 
role for government in the economy. The welfare state liberal pre-
ferred to rely on the federal government as the guarantor of the 
public good, and not on a delicate, self-sustaining balance of inter-
ests among labor, capital, and consumers. In fact, this shift in em-
phasis from private to public domination marked one of the differ-
ences between the old liberalism and the new. But Richberg 
remained wedded to what was essentially his original ideal, an ideal 
less and less identified with the liberal viewpoint in the postwar 
world. 
It was precisely the emphasis of the new liberalism on govern-
ment initiative and public control that alarmed Richberg most after 
the war. His vision of liberalism had never encompassed state so-
cialism, but he feared that such a trend was emerging. The danger 
was clear in labor relations. In former times, Richberg believed, ac-
cess to political power had been the special weapon of business; it 
invoked the government's duty to preserve law and order and to 
protect property as a way of breaking strikes and imposing settle-
ments by force. But the labor union was no longer as helpless as it 
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had been in the 192os. Richberg felt that it had become involved in 
a conspiracy to use its loyalty to the Democratic party for obtaining 
special-interest legislation which would enable it to dominate the 
labor-capital relationship. Such was the apparent purpose of Sena-
tor Robert Wagner's National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Rich-
berg believed that the Wagner Act granted labor an increase in 
rights without a corresponding increase in responsibilities and had 
denied employers equal protection under the law. It enumerated 
unfair employer practices, but did not define unfair employee prac-
tices. It failed to regulate the internal organization of unions, while 
endowing them with an exclusive right to represent all workers in 
plants where the closed shop was permitted. It prohibited employer-
dominated unions, but did not explicitly prevent the use of coer-
cion or intimidation by employee organizations against workers 
who refused to join a union. It did not require labor to bargain in 
good faith, while penalizing management for failing to do so. 
In Richberg's view, collective bargaining had become "collective 
coercion" by organized labor. He insisted that the best way to pre-
serve the greatest amount of liberty for all parties was through self-
restraint and self-discipline, not intimidation or coercion, for this 
would obviate the need for the compulsory discipline of govern-
ment. Such liberty could only be realized through a mutual balanc-
ing of interests, a balance that Richberg believed had been epit-
omized in the Railway Labor Act of 1926 with its reciprocal 
obligations for both labor and capital in the railroading industry. 
But beginning in the Roosevelt administration, it seemed that the 
unions-not management-insisted on upsetting this balance. 
Richberg felt that the true libertarian must therefore move against 
the pretensions of organized labor as he had once moved against 
those of big business.2 
2 Richberg to David B. Robertson and Bert M. Jewell, Feb. 25, 1949, 
Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 2; Richberg, Address to Thirty-Fourth Conven-
tion, B. of L.F. and E., July 23, 1941; Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 22; 
"Should We Adopt the Proposed New Federal Industrial Relations Act?" 
American Forum of the Air 7 (July 17, 1945); Richberg, "Where Is Or-
ganized Labor Going?" Address to Rotary Club, Washington, D. C., Feb. 
27, 1946; Richberg, "Essentials of a Government Labor Policy," Address 
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Even before the 1930s were out, Richberg was proposing various 
plans for revising the Wagner Act. Besides voicing his criticisms in 
speeches and articles, Richberg formulated specific recommenda-
tions which he provided for the use of certain businessmen who 
were urging the secretary of commerce to support amendments to 
the law. Among the beneficiaries of Richberg's handiwork were 
Henry I. Harriman of the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
John D. Biggers of Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Company, and Wil-
liam L. Bett of SKF lndustries.8 By far his most concerted effort, 
however, came toward the end of the Second World War. Public 
agitation over the danger of labor strikes during the war and post-
war periods and Richberg's own apprehension of what he soon 
would be calling "labor union monopoly" induced him to join in the 
movement that eventually led to the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
Act in 1947. Richberg was the principal author of plans for a com-
prehensive revision of the Wagner Act which were embodied in a 
new Federal Industrial Relations Act. Democratic Senator Carl A. 
Hatch of New Mexico and Republican Senators Harold H. Burton 
of Ohio and Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota introduced the measure 
into Congress on June 20, r 945. 
The Ball-Burton-Hatch bill was the product of a self-appointed 
drafting committee formed in Philadelphia on February 4, 1944. 
The original impetus behind the project had come from a small 
group of lawyers, businessmen, and public officials who came to-
gether in late 1942 and early 1943 and who were motivated by a 
common concern for developing more precise legal procedures for 
the orderly settlement of labor disputes. Instrumental in bringing 
to Thirteenth Annual Midwest Conference on Industrial Relations, Uni-
versity of Chicago, Oct. 18, 1946, all in Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 23; 
Richberg, "Significant Developments in Labor Law, 1941-1946," George 
Washington Law Review 14 (June 1946): 537-63; Richberg, My Hero, 
320-21, 346-6o; Richberg, Labor Union Monopoly. 
3 Richberg, My Hero, 299-300; Washington News, Oct. 29, 1938; Henry 
I. Harriman to John D. Biggers, April 25, 1939, with attached memoran-
dum, "Suggested Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act of 
1935"; Biggers to William L. Bett, May 19, 1939, Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box 43· 
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coherence to these initial discussions was William Draper Lewis, 
director of the American Law Institute and Richberg's old comrade-
in-arms from the days of the Progressive National Service of 1913-
1914. The eventual outcome was the organization of a bipartisan 
voluntary group known as the Committee to Promote Industrial 
Peace. 
By the time the Ball-Burton-Hatch bill was introduced in Con-
gress, the membership of the committee included Richberg as chair-
man, Lewis, George W. Alger, Harold Evans, Samuel S. Fels, 
Lawrence Hunt, Leon C. Marshall, Charles B. Rugg, George B. 
Sjoselius, Kirk Smith, Arthur D. Whiteside, and Jerome J. Roth-
schild. Fels, the Philadelphia businessman and philanthropist, 
agreed to fund the expenses of the committee, which came to less 
than $5 ,ooo. The members served without compensation and de-
cided from the beginning that no official representatives of em-
ployer or labor organizations would be allowed to join. The an-
nounced objective was to create a committee of disinterested and 
bipartisan citizens who would produce a comprehensive labor rela-
tions bill designed to protect the public welfare above all other in-
terests. Of course, the background or current business and legal 
connections of most of the committee's members meant that they 
were hardly noncommittal about labor questions, but no members 
were admitted for the specific purpose of serving as spokesmen for 
capital or labor-interest groups. The committee proceeded by hav-
ing Richberg prepare the initial drafts of legislation; then the rest 
of the members reviewed the proposals and suggested changes. Ulti-
mately, the committee draft was presented for final revision to the 
three senators who eventually sponsored it in Congress. In the later 
stages of the work, the services of Frederic P. Lee, former legisla-
tive counsel of the United States Senate, were engaged to perfect 
the technical legal requirements of the draft bill.4 
~ Rich berg, "The Proposed Federal Industrial Relations Act," Political 
Science Quarterly 61 (June 1946): 189-94; Committee to Promote In-
dustrial Peace and Carl A. Hatch, Harold H. Burton, and Joseph H. Ball, 
Federal Industrial Relations Act: Revised Draft, June 1945, 3-5, copy in 
Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 44; Richberg, My Hero, 299; Richberg to 
Howard W. Smith, March 6, 1947, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 43· 
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The resulting legislation clearly reflected Richberg's balance-of-
interests concept of industrial relations. As in the Railway Labor 
Act of 1926, the bill imposed a legal duty on employers and em-
ployees alike to exert every reasonable effort to settle disputes by 
negotiation and agreement and to avoid changing existing condi-
tions of work (such as by strikes or lockouts) while procedures for 
settlement were being carried out. A system of mediation and vol-
untary arbitration was set up, with provision for compulsory arbi-
tration in disputes which, on the basis of a finding of fact by the 
Federal Labor Relations Board (to replace the National Labor Re-
lations Board), threatened to cut off services essential to the public 
welfare. Awards under compulsory arbitration, however, normally 
would be in effect for one year and at most two years. The provi-
sions of the Wagner Act relating to unfair labor practices were re-
defined and expanded to cover unfair practices by either manage-
ment or labor, instead of by the former only. In instances where 
labor agreements provided that membership in a union would be 
required as a condition of employment, the Act subjected employee 
organizations to standards relating to the representativeness of their 
leadership, approval of agreements by vote of union members, and 
equal membership rights for all employees. The powers of the gov-
ernment to seek injunctive relief as a means of enforcing the bill 
were expanded. Specially appointed bipartisan adjustment boards 
and an Unfair Labor Practices Tribunal were provided for han-
dling grievances over the enforcement of contracts or over the labor 
practices of either management or unions. Only controversies which 
threatened to affect interstate commerce were covered by the bill, 
and certain categories of workers were normally excluded alto-
gether: state and federal employees, workers in establishments em-
ploying less than twenty persons, agricultural laborers, domestic 
servants, workers employed by labor organizations, and those cov-
ered by the Railway Labor Act.5 
Richberg worked hard to arouse interest in the proposed legisla-
tion, debating and speaking at every opportunity. He hoped to capi-
5 Richberg, "The Proposed Federal Industrial Relations Act," 194-204; 
Committee to Promote Industrial Peace and Hatch, Burton, Ball, Federal 
Industrial Relations Act, 6-7 I. 
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talize on the antilabor feeling that had led to the Smith-Connally 
War Labor Disputes Act of I943· But in the absence of great labor 
conflicts in the spring and summer of I 945 and the domination of 
other political issues centering on the cessation of hostilities in Eu-
rope and Asia, the campaign for the Ball-Burton-Hatch bill slack-
ened. Furthermore, Senator Burton resigned from Congress in 
September I 94 5 to accept an appointment to the Supreme Court, 
thus removing one of the principal sponsors of the particular meas-
ure which Richberg was promoting. The ultimate significance of 
the Ball-Burton-Hatch bill was to be symbolic, as it signified a 
trend toward more restrictive labor legislation which would culmi-
nate in the next two years. Many people in and out of Congress 
shared Richberg's fears, so that a movement for new labor legisla-
tion was likely to develop with or without the prodding of the Com-
mittee to Promote Industrial Peace. But it took several labor crises 
in steel, automobiles, coal, and railroading in the late 1945 and 
early I 946 to activate the latent congressional demand for action 
against the alleged power of labor unions. In January 1946 the 
House Rules Committee substituted a bill similar to the Ball-
Burton-Hatch proposal, framed by Republican Representative 
Francis Case of South Dakota, for a more mild measure backed by 
the Truman administration. Along with many other people, Rich-
berg had a minor role in helping to formulate the Case bill, and he 
lobbied at the White House in a futile effort to head off a presiden-
tial veto. Ultimately, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, passed by a 
Republican Congress over President Truman's veto, accomplished 
many of the goals Ric~berg had worked for, though personally he 
had no direct hand in the actual drafting of the bill, but only of-
fered suggestions to interested congressmen.6 
For Richberg, the Taft-Hartley Act was a step in the right direc-
6 Richberg, My Hero, 299-30I; Richberg to Harry S Truman, May 3I, 
I 946, with "Memorandum Concerning Revised Case Bill," Rich berg Papers, 
L.c., Box 33; Richberg to Smith, March 6, I947; Smith to Richberg, March 
I2, I947; Richberg to Smith, April I, I947; Smith to Richberg, April 3, 
I947; Richberg to Walker Stone, April 23, I947, Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box 43; Gerald D. Reilly, "The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley 
Act," George Washington Law Review 29 (Dec. I96o): 289-90. 
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tion, but he continued to agitate for further revision of the nation's 
labor laws. He volunteered specific recommendations to one of the 
Act's sponsors, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, looking toward the 
refinement of both the substantive and administrative features of 
the law.7 For the most part, however, Richberg worked through 
propaganda. In 1957, he published Labor Union Monopoly, one of 
his most successful polemics; it summarized his analysis of post-
New Deal trends in industrial relations. Copies of this short treatise 
were distributed by Edward A. Rumely's Committee for Constitu-
tional Government, and purchases were made by the National As-
sociation of Manufacturers and by many of the nation's foremost 
corporations (including, among many others, Daystrom Instru-
ment, Dow Chemical, General Electric, B. F. Goodrich, Guaranty 
Trust of New York, Minneapolis-Honeywell, Socony Mobil, Stand-
ard Oil of California, Sun Oil, and Stewart Warner Corporation).8 
Besides producing a voluminous number of articles for publication 
and speaking on the banquet circuit as often as he was able, in 
1948 Richberg defended Arizona's right-to-work law, forbidding the 
closed shop, in the United States Supreme Court, and won his case 
in a majority opinion written by Justice Hugo Black.11 
On balance, however, Richberg devoted by far the greatest 
amount of his time to propaganda work rather than new legislation 
or legal advocacy insofar as his personal campaign for reforming la-
bor relations was concerned. This became especially true as retire-
ment age approached. The later years of life freed Richberg for 
what he described in his second autobiographical effort, My Hero, 
published in 1954, as a "personal crusade for liberty." In 1947, he 
and his wife moved to Charlottesville, Virginia. Richberg did not 
7 Richberg to Robert A. Taft, Feb. 3, 1949, with attached memorandum, 
"In re Revision of Taft-Hartley Act, January 14, 1949," Richberg Papers, 
L.c., Box 2. 
8 Richberg, Labor Union Monopoly; Edward A. Rumely to Richberg, 
Oct. 17, 1958, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 4i Memorandum, "A few of the 
purchasers of ... Labor Union Monopoly ... ," Richberg Papers, L.c., 
Box 16. 
9 Richberg, My Hero, 331-32; American Federation of Labor, Arizona 
State Federation of Labor, et al., v. American Sash & Door Company, et al., 
335 u. s. 538 (1949). 
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stop practicing law, but rather went into semiretirement. He main-
tained his partnership in Davies, Richberg, Beebe, Busick, and 
Richardson (which became Davies, Richberg, Tydings, Beebe, and 
Landa in I 95 1), and remained active as a director of the American 
Natural Gas Company. He continued to argue cases, including 
four successful suits before the Supreme Court. In 1947, he was 
elected to the Board of Trustees of American University in Wash-
ington, D. C. In 1953, he joined a Task Force of the Commission 
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, un-
der former President Herbert Hoover as chairman. He regularly 
served on a committee to direct the annual conferences of the Uni-
versity of Virginia's Institute of Public Affairs. And from 1949 to 
1953, Richberg undertook an entirely new experience for him; he 
became a visiting lecturer in constitutional law at the University of 
Virginia Law School. His first seminar took as its theme "The 
theory and principles of local self-government as originally devel-
oped in the federal constitution and as affected by modem pres-
sures for sociallegislation."10 
During his years of residency in the South, Rich berg's concern 
with states' rights and local government became nearly as com-
pelling as his alarm over developments in organized labor. Of 
course, such a concern was a logical outgrowth of his longstanding 
fear of government paternalism in labor relations-whether on be-
half of management or the unions. If private individuals and or-
ganizations should have as much control over their own affairs as 
was consistent with the public welfare, then the same was true of 
local as opposed to national government. This position induced 
Richberg to write and argue against federal civil rights bills pro-
posed by both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, and 
led him to the active defense of attempts in Virginia to circumvent 
the Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision. Two years 
10 Richberg, My Hero, 317-45; Ben Moreell to Richberg, Nov. 6, 1953, 
Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 3; Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Herbert Hoover, Chairman, Citation, May 31, 
1955, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 51; Richberg to George Creel, May 12, 
1952, George Creel Papers, Library of Congress, Box 4; [Richberg], "Out-
line of Projects" and "Outline of Seminar," Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 33· 
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after the Court's ruling, Richberg co-authored a bill "to prevent 
white and colored children from being compelled to attend mixed 
schools contrary to the wishes of such children and their parents." 
It was sponsored in the Virginia General Assembly by State Sena-
tor Edward 0. McCue.11 
Although Richberg doubted that all men were equal culturally 
and socially, and sometimes utilized outmoded anthropological 
theories in support of his contentions, the heart of his argument 
was more concerned with the nature of the federal union than with 
racial questions per se. For the most part, Richberg restricted him-
self to debating the rights of local versus central government in 
matters such as schooling which were essentially the responsibility 
of the individual community. He argued that the freedom of the 
individual person included the right to associate or not to associate 
with whomever he chose and that this personal right had a counter-
part in the rights of local versus national government. Even in the 
case of publicly financed schools, the weight of the majority state 
and local opinion-as against national opinion-should have been 
controlling in Richberg's view.12 Taking his position to its logical 
11 [Richberg], Draft of a Bill [1956]; Richberg, Memorandum, "A Legal 
Commentary on Senator McCue's Segregation Bill" [1956]; Richberg, 
"Memorandum for Senator McCue" [1956], Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 49; 
Roanoke, Va., Times, July 26, 1956; Richberg, "-Nor Can Government," 
American Affairs 10 (Jan. 1948): Supplement; Richberg to Richard B. 
Russell, July 16, 1957; Richberg, "Comment on Civil Rights Bill," July 16, 
1957, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 33· 
12 Richberg to Editor [John H. Colburn, Richmond Times-Dispatch], 
Sept. 7, 1951, Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 3; Richberg, "Aspects of the Race 
Problem," unidentified newspaper clipping, Aug. 8, 1958, Richberg Papers, 
L.a., Box 49; Richberg to E. J. Oglesby, July 16, 1956, printed letter, 
Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 4; Richberg, Letter to Editor, Richmond Times-
Dispatch, Dec. 7, 1958. Although Richberg's arguments emphasized con-
stitutional questions, his views on the relations of the races were explicit: 
"By aeons of achievement Caucasoids, and Mongoloids, have proved them-
selves superior to Negroids in all parts of the world. To maintain a superior 
culture a people must take pride in it and protect it from deterioration. It is 
a scientific fact that the breeding of a superior and an inferior degenerates 
the superior. Scientifically sound laws against miscegenation (as in Virginia) 
demonstrate one reason for requiring certain racial segregations, particularly 
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conclusion, he worked to prevent his old college fraternity, Phi 
Gamma Delta, from capitulating to outside pressure for lifting re-
strictions against the admission of Negroes.13 In matters of racial 
segregation as well as in labor relations, Richberg's argument 
turned on the threat of federal interference, and the implications 
that government dictation from the center would have for indi-
vidual liberty. 
The threat of "creeping socialism" and federal paternalism 
seemed all the more ominous to Richberg as time went on. He be-
lieved that the trend had been obscured by the candidacies of many 
Republican officeseekers, who seemed to capitulate to the allegedly 
socializing programs of the Democrats, so that Americans could not 
really perceive what was happening to them. Eventually, Richberg 
concluded that the tide could be stemmed only by a drastic re-
organization of the country's political party system. The objective 
of such a shakeup would be to place the supporters of states' rights 
in one party and the proponents of the welfare state in another. 
Once the implications of what the socializers and the conservatives 
represented were clearly separated and identified, Americans could 
make their choice. The obscurantism created by some Republican 
party platforms would be ended, and with it would end the threat 
that the socializing forces in America would win by default. As 
the I952 presidential election approached, Richberg felt that the 
time had come for the antisocialists to make their stand.14 
Such was the purpose of the Committee to Explore Political Re-
alignment, which was founded by about a hundred like-minded 
citizens, including Rich berg, in September I 95 I. The new com-
mittee was the brainchild of Republican Senator Karl Mundt of 
South Dakota, a longtime proponent of party realignment. The 
Mundt program contemplated converting the informal alliance of 
segregation in schools for impressionable children." Richberg to Editor 
[Colburn], Sept. 7, I95I, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 3· 
13 Richberg to Edward H. DeHart, Jan. I I, I950; Richberg to Cecil J. 
Wilkinson, March I, I95o; [Richberg], "Notes on Committee Report" 
[I950 Ekklesia of Phi Gamma Delta], Richberg Papers, L.C., Box 55· 
14 Chicago Tribune, Feb. 25, I949; Richberg to A. Willis Robertson, 
Sept. I8, 1951, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 3; Richberg, My Hero, 320-23. 
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conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats that had op-
erated in Congress against New Deal-Fair Deal legislation since 
1937 into a majority force among the nation's voters. Mundt hoped 
that the work of the committee might stem "the encroachment of 
socialism and the all-inclusive centralized super-state" through a 
restructuring of the party system which would give voters a clear 
choice of political alternatives. Richberg joined the executive com-
mittee of the new organization, along with former Republican 
Senator from New Jersey Albert W. Hawkes, former American 
Farm Bureau Federation president Edward A. O'Neal, former 
Democratic senator from Nebraska Edward R. Burke, former Carle-
ton College president Donald J. Cowling, former Democratic gov-
ernor of New Jersey and secretary of the navy Charles Edison, 
former Republican governor of Maine Horace A. Hildreth, and 
commentator Felix Morley. The only purpose of the group was to 
investigate the possibility of realigning conservatives and liberals 
strictly into two separate parties with no intermingling. From the 
beginning, the formation of a third party was ruled out; the most 
optimistic hope of the committee was that the Republicans might 
someday-perhaps in 1956-become the vehicle of the country's 
antisocialist forces. In fact, the executive committee resolved to dis-
continue its operations once the work of investigation had been 
completed; Mundt expected the committee would remain active 
from three to six months. 
As anticipated, the Mundt group finished its work by the end 
of the year, and the executive committee voted to dissolve effective 
December 31, 1951. In a final report made public in mid-Decem-
ber, the committee announced its conclusion that further organiz-
ing action would be inappropriate for the time being. It had de-
cided that a genuine restructuring of the party system would have 
to "spring from the grass roots and cannot properly or effectively 
be imposed from the top." Operating on this premise, the commit-
tee concluded that "the case for political realignment should there-
fore be explored, emphasized and expedited primarily by local lead-
ership." It was hoped that public opinion would rally to the Mundt 
program after the 1952 presidential nominating conventions had 
taken place, for at that time, the committee reasoned, the need 
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for party realignment would become more apparent than ever.15 
The Committee to Explore Political Realignment made little if 
any impact on politics in I952. Such an outcome was symbolic of 
the political impotence to which Richberg and other old liberals 
like him had arrived by the I95os. Except for this exercise in fu-
tility, he had no significant part in the presidential election, though 
he served on two campaign committees-the Virginia Democrats 
for Eisenhower and the Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon. But such 
had been Richberg's situation in presidential campaigns ever since 
I 940; at most he could claim the role of the elder-but definitely 
inactive-statesman. In I952 he carried on a heavy correspond-
ence with friends of similar persuasion who were likewise on the 
sidelines, such as George Creel and Felix Morley. That year his 
preference for a Democratic presidential nominee was Senator 
Richard Russell of Georgia. But because he thought it unlikely 
that the Democrats would turn away from what he regarded as a 
social welfare candidate, Richberg pinned his hopes on the Re-
publican party instead. Although he initially favored Taft, he ulti-
mately supported Eisenhower as an acceptable compromise with 
his ideaP6 
Once he had drifted away from the New Deal, Richberg was 
simply no longer a factor in the political equation. His later years 
were spent primarily in writing and broadcasting propaganda. Most 
of his efforts were directed to audiences who were already con-
15 New York Times, Sept. I8, I95Ii Washington Daily News, Sept. I8, 
I95Ii Karl E. Mundt to Richberg, Sept. 2I, I95I, Richberg Papers, L.a., 
Box 3; "Outline of The Case for Political Realignment," n.d.; Memoran-
dum by Edward R. Burke, Donald J. Cowling, Charles Edison, Albert W. 
Hawkes, Horace A. Hildreth, Felix Morley, Edward A. O'Neal, and Rich-
berg, Nov. I95Ii Executive Committee, Committee to Explore Political 
Realignment, Agenda and Minutes, Sept. 22, Oct. I, Oct. 26, Nov. 30, 
I95Ii Committee to Explore Political Realignment, Summary of Findings 
and Conclusions, Dec. Io, I95I, all in Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 42. 
16 Walter Williams to Richberg, Oct. 3I, I952i E. J. Oglesby to Richberg, 
Nov. 7, I952i Felix Morley to Creel, April 4, I952i Morley to Creel, April 
I4, I952i Creel to Richberg, April I9, I952i Richberg to Taft, Oct. I2, 
I95Ii Richberg Papers, L.a., Box 3; Richberg to Creel, March I, I952i 
Richberg to Creel, April 5, I952i Richberg to Creel, May I2, I952i Rich-
berg to Creel, Sept. Io, I952, Creel Papers, Box 4· 
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vinced of what he was saying, so that even as a publicist his impact 
was of doubtful consequence. Typical of his efforts was an inter-
pretive study of the American past entitled Only the Brave Are 
Free. Co-authored with Albert Britt, an old friend and past presi-
dent of Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois, and professor of his-
tory at Scripps College in Claremont, California, it emphasized 
the incompatibility of the welfare state and individual liberty. After 
the manuscript was rejected by Rinehart; Simon and Schuster; 
McGraw Hill; Knopf; Henry Holt; Longmans Green; Houghton 
Miffiin; and Harper, it was finally published by Caxton Printers 
of Caldwell, Idaho.17 
Local activities occupied much of Richberg's time. In I954 the 
Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge awarded him the George 
Washington Honor Medal for one of his articles, "The Rights and 
Wrongs of Labor," and in 1955 the Daughters of the American 
Revolution presented him with an Award of Merit. For a time in 
1955, Richberg wrote a series of guest editorials for the Richmond 
News Leader, edited by James J. Kilpatrick. And in 1957 he was 
elected an honorary life member of the Charlottesville-Albemarle 
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, a group 
organized following the Supreme Court's 1954 desegregation rul-
ing. Though occasionally plagued by heart trouble, Richberg re-
mained active to the very end of his life. He died November 27, 
1960.18 
Although Richberg had identified wholeheartedly with the Pro-
gressives in the early part of the century, his later apparently 
conservative political position turned out to be not entirely incon-
sistent. It simply revealed the tremendous metamorphosis that 
17 Richberg and Albert Britt, Only the Brave Are Free: A Condensed 
Review of the Growth of Self-Government in America (Caldwell, Idaho, 
1958); [Britt] to Jean Parker Waterbury, Oct. 15, 1954, Richberg Papers, 
L.c., Box 3· 
18 Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge, Certificate of Award, Feb. 22, 
1954, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 51; Charlottesville, Va., Daily Progress, 
Nov. 4, 1955; James J. Kilpatrick to Richberg, June 24, 1955; Richberg to 
Kilpatrick, June 29, 1955; Kilpatrick to Richberg, June 30, 1955; Kilpatrick 
to Richberg, Jan. 2, 1956, Richberg Papers, L.c., Box 4; Charlottesville 
Daily Progress, Sept. 7, 1957. 
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liberalism had undergone through the twentieth century. As a Pro-
gressive in I 91 2, Rich berg could hardly have foreseen and iden-
tified with the welfare state ideals of the middle of the twentieth 
century. He could not anticipate what such ideals would mean in 
terms of the growth of government power over the individual per-
son. His liberalism had more in common with the nineteenth cen-
tury than with the ~elfare state. Even as a labor lawyer in the 
192os, when his reputation as a liberal was strongest, he saw him-
self as fighting for the right of labor to do things for itself-freeing 
it from the coercion of management, which had denied the worker 
his right of association and liberty of contract. Richberg was bat-
tling for ancient constitutional rights, and usually sought support 
for his efforts by arguing that his proposals were not a departure 
from past legal principles, but only a new codification of them. 
In the National Recovery Administration, Richberg once again 
conceived his task as that of assisting in a process of self-govern-
ment, not federal regulation. The main thrust of the experiment lay 
in the private rather than the public sector. Believing that the long-
term solution to the depression would have to come from private 
business, rather than government spending and welfare programs, 
he remained an advocate of the business-government common-
wealth of cooperation for the rest of his life. 
Until the advent of the New Deal, Richberg's idea of liberalism 
seemed to coincide with that of many progressives and labor lead-
ers. But once the Roosevelt administration, impelled by the neces-
sities of the depression, gave the country a fleeting glimpse of the 
welfare state, liberalism came more and more to be identified with 
big government and federal programs. Welfare seemed to be re-
placing the old ideals of competition and individual achievement. 
Such a development contradicted what Richberg believed had been 
the real goals of his progressive and New Deal career. Intead of 
liberating people from ~he impediments that prevented them from 
controlling their own destiny, the government was taking over the 
very thing that made a man free, i.e., his ability to run his own life 
without being dependent on others. 
Throughout, the personal factor affected Richberg's career. Like 
most men, he needed personal recognition and wanted to feel that 
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what he did was consistent with the public interest. The roots of 
his reform career could be traced to his self-conscious and some-
times compulsive desire to devote his energies to public rather than 
private service. Such was the underlying rationale for his work 
as a Progressive, as a labor lawyer, as a New Dealer, and as a 
propagandist against "labor union monopoly." But his need for 
personal recognition also meant that the approval-and hence in-
fluence--of his associates counted for much. Perhaps Richberg's 
happiest days were as a Progressive and labor lawyer, when he en-
joyed the confidence of his liberal and labor friends. Untroubled 
by conflicting loyalties, as was to have been the situation during 
the New Deal, Richberg could envision a happy coincidence be-
tween his work and the public welfare. The problem of dissonance 
between his views and those of the younger generation of liberals 
was not so easily resolved at a later time, but the need to do so 
was as apparent in Richberg as ever. 
It was the New Deal experience that made Richberg's position 
as an old-fashioned liberal very clear. As such it marked the turn-
ing point in his relations with organized labor. And after the demise 
of the National Recovery Administration, his ideological immobil-
ity made him persist in advocating programs that President Roose-
velt no longer found desirable or politically acceptable. As his iden-
tification with business grew more pronounced, Richberg became 
more of a liability to the administration, so that by I 938, when the 
president decided on a trustbusting campaign, Richberg found 
himself outside the sphere of Roosevelt's intimate advisers. De-
serted by those who possessed real political power, and supported 
principally by the business community, Richberg became more 
theoretical and less effective in his political activities. Unable to 
exercise power directly, he turned to sermonizing in the hope of 
influencing government indirectly. But this was the mark of po-
litical impotence, not political power. It meant the effective end of 
Donald Richberg's influence on public policy. 
Bibliographical Note 
What follows is by no means an exhaustive review of all the source 
materials of value to this study. The footnotes for each chapter in-
dicate the items of direct relevance to particular passages. A num-
ber of secondary works contain references to Donald Richberg, 
but very few provide more than a Beeting glimpse of the man and 
his work. Consequently, heaviest reliance has been placed upon 
several collections of manuscripts located in the Library of Con-
gress and the National Archives in Washington, D. C.; the Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, N. Y.; the University of 
Chicago Library and the Chicago Historical Society; the State His-
torical Society of Wisconsin in Madison; the Federal Records Cen-
ter in Suitland, Md.; the Oral History Research Office of Colum-
bia University in New York City; and the Social Welfare History 
Archives of the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis. 
The following were the manuscript collections most valuable to 
the completion of this study: Donald Richberg Papers, Harold 
Ickes Papers, Felix Frankfurter Papers, George Norris Papers, and 
Raymond Clapper Papers, all at the Library of Congress; Donald 
Richberg Papers, Chicago Historical Society; Franklin D. Roose-
velt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevel~ Library; National Recovery Ad-
ministration Papers, Record Group 9, National Archives; Raymond 
Robins Papers and Charles McCarthy Papers, State_ Historical So-
ciety of Wisconsin; Charles E. Merriam Papers, University of Chi-
cago; and Papers of the Office of Government Reports, Record 
Group 44, Federal Records Center, Suitland. 
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A number of other collections proved useful in addition to the 
above: Theodore Roosevelt Papers, George Creel Papers, Joseph E. 
Davies Papers, Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Progressive Na-
tional Committee (1936) Papers, American Federation of Labor 
Papers (Samuel Gompers and William Green Letterbooks), all at 
the Library of Congress; American Federation of Labor Papers 
and Donald Richberg Papers (speech and article material), State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin; Samuel I. Rosenman Papers, 
Frances Perkins Papers, Leon Henderson Papers, Lowell Mellett 
Papers, Harry Hopkins Papers, Louis McHenry Howe Papers, 
and the Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., all at the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library; Julius Rosenwald Papers and University of 
Chicago President's Papers (1889-I925), University of Chicago 
Library; Survey Associates Papers, Social Welfare History Archives 
of the University of Minnesota. 
The Oral History Research Office at Columbia University had 
twenty-eight oral history memoirs that contained references to 
Donald Richberg. Several of these proved to be of little value, but 
others yielded significant information. Especially important were 
the reminiscences of Thomas I. Emerson, Rexford Tugwell, Boris 
Shishkin, Charles Fahy, John P. Frey, William W. Cumberland, 
William H. Davis, Gardner Jackson, Lindsay Rogers, Chester T. 
Lane, and James M. Landis. 
Unfortunately, the National Recovery Administration Papers 
contain very little material by or about General Hugh Johnson, 
the first administrator. His files were apparently removed when he 
retired from the NRA in the fall of 1934· A considerable part of these 
materials have since been lost, although a historian is currently at 
work on a biography of Johnson and has had access to the re-
mainder. The papers were not available to me. The Papers of Ray-
mond Moley will soon be ready for research at the Hoover Insti-
tution on War, Revolution, and Peace in Stanford, California, but 
were not accessible at the time of writing. Mr. Moley, however, 
granted me an interview, as did Richberg's widow, Mrs. John H. 
Small III of Charlottesville, Virginia, and his former associate, 
John S. Lord of Chicago. David E. Lilienthal and Samuel I. Rosen-
man corresponded with me concerning certain aspects of Richberg's 
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career. In addition, Mrs. Small loaned me several hundred manu-
script items, and permitted most of this material, except certain 
documents relating to the Richberg family and ancestry, to be 
added to the Richberg Papers at the Library of Congress. Mr. Lord, 
head of the Chicago law :firm of Lord, Bissell, and Brook, also 
opened to me his office :files of correspondence with Richberg. 
The most useful printed primary and secondary works and 
periodical materials have been indicated in the footnotes. The Rich-
berg Papers in the Library of Congress contain virtually a com-
plete :file of all Richberg's speeches and writings, published and 
unpublished. In addition, the clippings :files of the National Re-
covery Administration Papers provided voluminous newspaper ma-
terial for the 1930s. The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and 
Literary Digest were systematically reviewed also. Published diaries, 
autobiographies, and government documents abound for the New 
Deal years, but exist in much less generous quantities for the other 
phases of Richberg's career. 
Few secondary works give more than passing mention to Donald 
Richberg. Authors usually introduce him at the particular point 
where he has a bearing on the subject under examination, and then 
promptly lead him offstage. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in The Age 
of Roosevelt, Vol. I: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933, 
Vol. 2: The Coming of the New Deal, Vol. 3: The Politics of Up-
heaval, 1935-1936 (Boston, 1957-196o), provides the best glimpse 
of Richberg in a comprehensive history, and takes measure of his 
personal foibles as well as his achievements and intellectual life. 
Another study is Christopher Lasch, "Donald Richberg and the 
Idea of a National Interest" (M.A. thesis [Columbia University, 
1955]). Perhaps the most valuable of numerous secondary accounts 
for this study have been the following: Irving Bernstein, The Lean 
Years: A History of the American Worker, 192o-r933 (Boston, 
196o), and The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkeley, 
Calif., 195o); Robert H. Zieger, Republicans and Labor, I9I9-
I929 (Lexington, Ky., 1969); Sidney Fine, The Automobile un-
der the Blue Eagle: Labor, Management, and the Automobile 
Manufacturing Code (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1963); Otis L. Graham, 
Jr., An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New 
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Deal (New York, 1967); Ellis Wayne Hawley, The New Deal 
and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence 
(Princeton, N.J., 1966); and J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator Rob-
ert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism (New York, 1 968). 
There are, of course, literally hundreds of other secondary accounts 
of relevance to this subject, but in the final analysis, the story of 
Donald Richberg emerges most clearly from manuscript collec-
tions, government documents, periodical literature, and newspapers. 
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O'Fallon Railroad case, 69, 70, 
7I, 73; Senate resolution on 
behalf of, 72-73; and 1924 
Progressive campaign, 74-75; 
and operation of Railway Labor 
Act, 76-79; and Texas and New 
Orleans Railroad case, 79-8 I; 
and I 928 election, 8 I-84; and 
Norris-La Guardia Anti-
Injunction Act of I932, 85-93 
passim; and Doak, 9I-92; and 
Tents of the Mighty, 94; and 
Conference of Progressives 
(I93I), 94-96; and RLEA 
program, 96-I o I passim; nego-
tiates wage reductions, I o I-
Io3; seeks RLEA retainer, I03-
I o4; meets Franklin Roosevelt, 
Io6-Io7; and 1932 presiden-
tial campaign, Io7-Io8; enters 
Roosevelt administration, Io8-
I I, I 1 9-21; cabinet ambitions, 
109; works on recovery program, 
I 11-12, 115, 1 17-18; ideas on 
industrial recovery, 1 15-1 7; as 
labor representative in NRA, 115, 
1 19, 1 21; and authorship of 
Section 7a, 1 I 8; view of NRA 
role, 120-21, 122-23; on NRA 
rationale, 1 24-26; business in-
fluence on, 128, 1 52; NRA duties, 
128-29; and Section 7a, 129-3 1, 
1 33; resists National Labor 
Board, 132-34; and Public 
Resolution No. 44, 1 34; defends 
NRA, 134-36; and National Re-
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